NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JOEL DAVID JOSEPH, No. 12-56141
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-06598-CAS-
AGR
v.
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2014**
Before: PREGERSON, LEAVY, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Joel David Joseph, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s order
dismissing his action arising from his failure to pass the California Bar Exam. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the
basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Joseph’s action because the State Bar
of California is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hirsh v. Justices
of the Supreme Court, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (the State Bar
of California is an arm of the state and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Joseph’s Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) motion because Joseph failed to establish grounds for such relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for
reconsideration).
Joseph’s contention that the district court deprived Joseph of due process by
allegedly failing to serve him electronically with its dismissal order and not
entering a separate judgment is unpersuasive. See Stephanie-Cardona LLC v.
Smith’s Food and Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven if
the district court does not set forth the judgment on a separate document, an
appealable final order is considered entered when 150 days have run from the time
the final order is docketed.”).
AFFIRMED.
2 12-56141