UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OSCAR SALAZAR, et al . ,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 93-452 (GK)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs' counsel have filed a Motion for an Award of
Litigation Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, for
2012 and for Work in the District Court That Had Been Held in
Abeyance Related to Defendants' Motion to Terminate the Consent
Decree [Dkt. No. 1850]. The Court has already awarded
Plaintiffs' counsel $482,663.13 for fees undisputed by
Defendants [Dkt. No. 1891]. Therefore, the amount remaining to
be dealt with in this Motion is $851,853.46, and Plaintiffs'
counsel seek a total award of $1,334,516.59. 1 Upon consideration
of the Motion, the Opposition [Dkt. No. 1882], the Reply [Dkt.
No. 1903], Defendants' Surreply [Dkt. No. 1909], an Errata [Dkt.
No. 1912] , Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief [ Dkt. No. 194 3] , and
1
Plaintiffs' counsel originally sought $1,352,052.28 in fees and
expenses. Mot. at 2. However, in their Reply, Plaintiffs'
counsel reduced their request by $17,535.69. See Pls. Ex. 26
[Dkt. No. 1903-5].
the extensive record in this case, the Court concludes that the
Motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants raise many arguments that were addressed at
length in the Court's recent Memorandum Opinion [Dkt. No. 1922]
granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for an
Award of Litigation Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses, For 2011 and Certain Categories and Work from 2010
Through 2012 That Had Previously Been Held in Abeyance or Not
Decided. Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 93-452, F. Supp.
2d 2014 WL 342084 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2014) ("Salazar III").
The Court will incorporate the analysis in Salazar III and focus
this opinion on the resolution of arguments that were not
previously raised.
I. APPROPRIATE BILLING RATES FOR COUNSEL
In Salazar III, 2014 WL 342084, at *1-*3, this Court upheld
the use of the Legal Services Index ("LSI") of the Nationwide
Consumer Price Index ("CPI") to update the Laffey rates at which
Plaintiffs' counsel are compensated. For all of the reasons laid
out in Salazar III, the Court again concludes that the LSI is a
more reasonable and accurate index for the costs of legal fees
than the All-Items CPI for the Washington, D.C. area. See id.;
see also Eley v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 11-309, F. Supp. 2d
2013 WL 6092502, at *9-*10 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2013) (a
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thorough and comprehensive decision by Judge Beryl Howell that
reached the same conclusion) . Thus, Defendants' request to apply
the All-Items•CPI for the Washington, D.C. area shall be denied.
II. APPROPRIATE BILLING RATES FOR SERVICES OF PARALEGALS TO
INDIVIDUAL CLASS MEMBERS, PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 64 OF THE
SETTLEMENT ORDER
Defendants argue that Paragraph 64 of the Settlement Order
prohibits Plaintiffs' counsel for charging for the work non-
lawyers provide to individual class members. See Order Modifying
the Amended Remedial Order of May 6, 1997 and Vacating the Order
of March 27, 1997, at 40 (emphasis added) [Dkt. No. 663]
("Settlement Order"). In Salazar III, this Court ruled that
paralegals may be compensated for such work under the Settlement
Order. 2014 WL 342084, at *3-*4. Defendants raise no new
arguments, and, thus, their request to deny fees for work done
by paralegals is again denied.
III. LEGAL WORK ON BEHALF OF INDIVIDUAL CLASS MEMBERS
A. Adequacy of Time Records
Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' counsel's "pervasive use
of vague billing descriptions and block billing." Defs.' Opp' n
at 13-18. They seek a 10% across-the-board reduction for
vagueness and a 5% across-the-board reduction for block billing. 2
2
Defendants also request a 5% reduction for "duplicative work by
multiple attorneys." Defs.' Opp'n at 18-19. The substance of
Defendants' claim overlaps with their request for a general
-3-
Defendants cite several cases establishing that time
records which include unrelated tasks that do not specify how
much time was spent on each task are insufficient. Defs.' Opp'n
at 17. However, that is not the situation here.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel's time records,
including those cited by Defendants, contain a high level of
detail. Plaintiffs' counsel have summarized how much time was
spent on each type of case (i.e. reimbursement, reimbursement
fair hearings, recertification, recertification fair hearings,
referrals for non-class members, EPSDT). They use categories and
subcategories to further identify the type of work described in
the time entries. The time spent on each individual task for
each class member is specified down to the minute.
Thus, the time records for individual claims are presented
in a fashion that allows this Court to review Plaintiffs'
counsel's records for reasonableness. Because the time records
are adequate and for the same reasons the Court rejected this
argument in Salazar III, 2014 WL 342084, at *4, Defendants'
request for across-the-board reductions for vagueness and block-
billing shall be denied. 3
across-the-board reduction for overstaffing, Defs.' Opp'n at 9-
10, and will be addressed below in Section XIV.
3
The Court also encourages the parties to confer about providing
Plaintiffs' counsel's time records in an electronic format that
-4-
B. Unsuccessful Individual Claims
Defendants object to $22,132.11 in fees that Plaintiffs'
counsel have requested for work on four individual claims where
Plaintiffs did not prevail. Defs.' Opp'n at 19-22.
The Court has recently emphasized that "Plaintiffs are
entitled to attorneys' fees for the work they do to monitor
Defendants' compliance with the extensive and detailed
Settlement Order, negotiated and consented to by all parties in
this case, as long as the efforts of Plaintiffs' counsel are
'reasonably related to the claims upon which Plaintiffs were
definitely successful.'" 2014 WL 342084, at *4 (quoting Turner
v. Orr, 785 F.2d 1498, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986)); see also Blackman
v. Dist. of Columbia, 390 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2005)
(noting that "test is whether the later issues litigated were
inextricably intertwined with those on which the plaintiff
prevailed in the underlying suit") (quotation and citation
omitted).
This does not mean, as Defendants suggest, that this Court
has granted de facto prevailing party status to Plaintiffs for
every claim they make. However, Plaintiffs' counsel are clearly
entitled to compensation for the work they do representing
individual class members on claims related to denials or
might permit Defendants to sort and search them in a more
efficient fashion.
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reduction of services to EPSDT-eligible children and for
failures to reimburse beneficiaries for out-of-pocket expenses,
issues that were long ago decided in Plaintiffs' favor by this
Court. See Salazar v. Dist. of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 328-
34 (D.D.C. 1996). By the same reasoning, Plaintiffs' counsel are
not entitled to fees for work done on "a claim that is distinct
in all respects from [Plaintiffs' ] successful claims." Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
Three of the individual claims challenged by Defendants
involved representing individuals in administrative hearings on
issues "inextricably intertwined" with those on which Plaintiffs
prevailed in this suit. First, Plaintiffs' counsel requested a
fair hearing for "R. E." to challenge a decision to suspend or
terminate the child's chiropractic therapy services without
adequate advance notice. Second Affidavit of Bruce J. Terris, at
c:IT 20 (Dec. 5, 2013) ("Second Terris Affidavit") [Dkt. No. 1903-
3] . Eventually, a third party paid for the services, so a fair
hearing was no longer necessary. Id.
Second, Plaintiffs' counsel requested a fair hearing for
"D. H." to request reimbursement for significant out-of-pocket
expenses owed to her for medical services rendered to her
children. Id. at c:IT 21. Near the date of the hearing, D.H.
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withdrew her request for reasons beyond the control of counsel.
Id.
Third, Plaintiffs' counsel requested a fair hearing for
"R.H." to challenge a decision by the DC Healthy Smiles Program
denying payment for deep gum and root cleaning and surgical bone
reshaping services. Id. at