UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
MUSTAFA ABDUL ALJAFF, )
)
Petitioner, )
) Criminal No. 09-208-1 (EGS)
v. )
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is petitioner Mustafa Abdul
Aljaff’s pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Upon consideration of petitioner’s
motion, the government’s response, the applicable law, and the
entire record, the Court DENIES petitioner’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 21, 2009, Mr. Aljaff was charged with involvement
in a conspiracy to import, transport, and sell counterfeit
integrated circuits to domestic and foreign companies, and to
the United States government. See Indictment, Dkt. No. 3. On
January 12, 2010, he entered into a plea agreement, in which he
agreed to plead guilty to Counts 1 (conspiracy) and 6
(trafficking in counterfeit goods or services) of the
indictment. Plea Agreement, Dkt. No. 38 at 1. The agreement
contemplated that the applicable sentencing guideline range
would be 24 to 30 months, that Mr. Aljaff would forfeit
specified items, and that he would pay restitution in an amount
not to exceed $177,862.22. Id. at 4-5, 8. In return, the
government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the
indictment. See id. at 2.
In advance of Mr. Aljaff’s sentencing, his counsel
submitted two memoranda, which provided extensive information in
support of Mr. Aljaff’s request that he be sentenced to 24
months of imprisonment. See Def.’s Sent. Mem., Dkt. No. 96;
Def.’s Supp. Sent. Mem., Dkt. No. 101. Mr. Aljaff’s counsel also
filed motions in advance of the sentencing hearing requesting
that Mr. Aljaff be permitted to wear civilian clothes to his
sentencing, and that he be allowed to enter a treatment facility
before voluntarily surrendering to the Bureau of Prisons. See
Mot. to Permit Def. to Wear Civilian Clothing, Dkt. No. 109;
Mot. to Permit Voluntary Surrender, Dkt. No. 111.
The government also submitted a memorandum in advance of
Mr. Aljaff’s sentencing. See Govt’s Sent. Mem., Dkt. No. 88. The
government requested that Mr. Aljaff pay restitution of no more
than $177,862.22, that he forfeit the items described in the
plea agreement, and that he be sentenced to between 23 and 28.5
months of imprisonment. Id. at 57, 61-62, 69.
On February 15, 2012, this Court sentenced Mr. Aljaff to
concurrent 30-month terms of imprisonment on each count to be
2
followed by concurrent 36-month terms of supervised release, and
ordered him to pay restitution of $177,862.22. Judgment, Dkt.
No. 115 at 2, 3, 5. On April 9, 2013, the parties filed a
consent motion to amend the judgment to reflect that
petitioner’s restitution liability was intended to be joint and
several with his co-defendant. See Consent Mot., Dkt. No. 122 at
1. This Court granted that motion on May 10, 2013. Order, Dkt.
No. 123.
Mr. Aljaff delivered his § 2255 motion to prison
authorities for mailing on February 13, 2013, and the Court
received the petition on February 19, 2013.1 See Pet’r’s Mot. to
Vacate (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 121 at 1, 13. Mr. Aljaff claims that
(1) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by “fail[ing] to
properly execute the terms and conditions of the Plea Agreement”
and (2) the government breached the plea agreement because
“[t]he restitution and forfeiture that was agreed upon in the
plea agreement was not honored.” Id. at 4, 5. Petitioner’s
motion is ripe for decision by the Court.
1
Mr. Aljaff’s petition is deemed to have been filed on February
13, 2013, the date on which it was delivered to prison
authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276
(1988); United States v. Carr, No. 02-0106(JDB), 2006 WL 401818,
at *1 n.2 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2006). This is within one year of the
date on which Mr. Aljaff’s conviction became final, as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A prisoner who was sentenced by a federal court may move
the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence if the prisoner believes “that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A § 2255 motion may be denied when
it “offer[s] only bald legal conclusions with no supporting
factual allegations.” Mitchell v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d
322, 328 (D.D.C. 2012).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Hearing
As a preliminary matter, the Court determines that no
evidentiary hearing is required to resolve petitioner’s motion.
A court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion
if “the motion . . . and the records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(b). A hearing is required only when a petition raises
“‘detailed and specific’ factual allegations” regarding
“information outside of the record or the judge’s ‘personal
knowledge or recollection.’” United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d
1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Machibroda v. United
4
States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)). Appellate courts generally
respect a district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary
hearing where, as here, the judge deciding the motion also
presided over the initial case. See United States v. Toms, 396
F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Because petitioner has raised no
factual allegations and the pleadings and the record demonstrate
that he is entitled to no relief, an evidentiary hearing is not
warranted. The Court therefore proceeds to the merits of
petitioner’s claims.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Mr. Aljaff’s ineffective-assistance claim states, in full,
“Defense Counsel failed to properly execute the terms and
conditions of the Plea Agreement.” Mot. at 4. To prevail on this
claim, petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) “counsel’s
performance was deficient,” and (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). The Court’s review of counsel’s performance is
“highly deferential,” id. at 689, and petitioner’s claim may be
summarily denied if his “conclusory allegations are unsupported
by specifics.” United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 933 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (quotations marks and alteration omitted).
To prove deficient performance, Mr. Aljaff must “identify
the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have
been the result of reasonable professional judgment.”
5
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Instead, he did not identify which
terms of the plea agreement are at issue, much less how his
counsel failed to execute those terms. Such “vague and
conclusory allegations” cannot overcome the “strong presumption
that counsel rendered adequate assistance.” United States v.
Turner, 818 F. Supp. 2d 207, 211 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted).
Nor did Mr. Aljaff allege that his counsel’s behavior
prejudiced his defense. Even if the Court could discern which
terms of the plea agreement counsel allegedly failed to execute,
petitioner provided no basis to find a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. For these reasons alone, the motion should be denied.
The Court’s review of the record does not shed any
additional light on Mr. Aljaff’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective in executing the plea agreement. Indeed, his counsel
filed detailed sentencing memoranda which requested a sentence
at the bottom of the range contemplated by the plea agreement.
See Def.’s Sent. Mem., Dkt. No. 96; Def.’s Supp. Sent. Mem.,
Dkt. No. 111. Mr. Aljaff’s counsel filed motions in advance of
his sentencing seeking to permit him to wear civilian clothing
to the hearing, and to enter a treatment facility before
voluntarily surrendering to the Bureau of Prisons. See Mot. to
6
Permit Def. to Wear Civilian Clothing, Dkt. No. 109; Mot. to
Permit Voluntary Surrender, Dkt. No. 111.
After petitioner filed his § 2255 motion, his counsel moved
to amend the judgment to reflect that petitioner’s restitution
liability was intended to be joint and several with his co-
defendant. See Consent Mot., Dkt. No. 122 at 1. To the extent
that petitioner intended this motion to correct that issue, his
claim is moot because this Court already granted the motion and
amended the judgment accordingly. See Order, Dkt. No. 123. For
these reasons, Mr. Aljaff’s ineffective-assistance claim must be
denied.
C. Breach of Plea Agreement Claim
Mr. Aljaff’s second claim is that “[t]he Government
breached their plea agreement” because “[t]he restitution and
forfeiture that was agreed upon in the plea agreement was not
honored, and was breached.” Mot. at 5. To prevail on a claim
that the government breached a plea agreement, petitioner must
prove that the agreement was breached under “principles of
contract law.” United States v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 35 (D.C. Cir.
2000). Although Mr. Aljaff “maintains the burden of proving that
the agreement has been breached,” id. at 36, he did not explain
or provide any support for his claim. He did not state which of
the agreement’s restitution and forfeiture provisions were
7
breached, nor did he describe how they were breached. See Mot.
at 5.
Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that the
restitution and forfeiture portions of the plea agreement were
ever breached. The government sought restitution of $177,862.22,
Govt’s Sent. Mem., Dkt. No. 88 at 57, which is the maximum
amount contemplated by the plea agreement, Plea Agreement, Dkt.
No. 38 at 8, and the government sought forfeiture of “items . .
. as detailed on Attachments A and B to the plea agreement.”
Govt’s Sent. Mem., Dkt. No. 88 at 61. Because Mr. Aljaff did not
describe how the government allegedly breached his plea
agreement and the record reflects the government’s apparent
adherence to the agreement, petitioner’s claim must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES petitioner’s
pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. An
appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
October 28, 2013
8