UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA!, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 12-2039 (BAH)
v.
Consolidated with:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Civil Action No. 12-2071 (BAH)
et al.,
Defendants, Judge Beryl A. Howell
v.
NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO
INDIANS,
Intervenor-Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiffs bring this consolidated action, under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 461, et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, et seq., the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, et seq., to challenge the decision of the Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior to acquire a 305-acre parcel of land in Madera County, California in
trust on behalf of the intervenor-defendant North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians and the
Secretary’s decision to allow gaming on the land in question. Pending before the Court are the
government defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 20, and the Stand Up plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 26.
1
I. BACKGROUND
This case challenges two separate but related decisions of the Secretary of the United
States Department of the Interior (“the Secretary”) regarding a 305.49-acre parcel of land located
in Madera County, California (“the Madera Site”). See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 31, ECF No. 1. In
particular, the Madera Site is located adjacent to Route 99 in an unincorporated portion of
Madera County, just outside the northwest border of the City of Madera. See Intervenor’s Opp’n
to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Intervenor’s Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 34; see also Pls.’ App. of
Evidence (“Pls.’ App.”) Ex. 13, at 212, ECF No. 27-15. 1 The first decision, made in September
2011 pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A),
determined that the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians (“the North Fork Tribe”) would be
permitted to conduct gaming on the Madera Site because “a gaming establishment would 1) be in
the best interest of the [North Fork] Tribe and its members; and 2) . . . it would not be
detrimental to the surrounding community.” Pls.’ App. Ex. 19 (“IGRA ROD”) at 281, ECF No.
27-24. This decision under the IGRA also determined that the proposed “Alternative A,”—a
“gaming-resort complex” on the Madera Site that would include a 247,180 square-foot gaming
and entertainment facility, a 200-room hotel, and a 4,500-space parking facility—would “best
meet the purpose and need for the Proposed Action.” 2 Id. at 281, 286, 295–97. The second
decision, made over one year later, in November 2012, pursuant to the Indian Reorganization
Act (“IRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 465, approved a fee-to-trust application submitted by the North Fork
1
The plaintiffs have submitted a consecutively paginated Appendix of Evidence at ECF No. 27. When citing
evidence within this Appendix, the Court will cite both to (1) the exhibit; and (2) the page number within the
Appendix where the cited material is located.
2
The “Proposed Action” referenced is “that the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] issue a Secretarial Determination and
transfer the 305.49 acres into Federal trust for the [North Fork] Tribe in order for the Tribe to conduct tribal
government gaming authorized under the IGRA.” IGRA ROD at 287.
2
Tribe, whereby the United States would acquire the Madera Site to hold it in trust for the benefit
of the North Fork Tribe. See Pls.’ App. Ex. 20 (“IRA ROD”) at 378, ECF No. 27-27.
The plaintiffs in this consolidated action consist of two distinct groups. The first group
(“the Stand Up plaintiffs”) consists of various individual citizens and community organizations
located in and around Madera, California. 3 See Compl. ¶¶ 5–10 (No. 12-2039). The other
group, the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians (“the Picayune Tribe”), is a federally
recognized Indian Tribe located in Madera County that operates a class III gaming facility called
the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino on its reservation lands, which are located
approximately 30 miles from the Madera Site. 4 See Compl. ¶ 5 (No. 12-2071). 5 Although all
plaintiffs challenge both of the Secretary’s decisions described above on a variety of grounds,
only the Stand Up plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction. 6 See Mot. for Prelim. Inj.
at 1, ECF No. 26. Summarized briefly below is the regulatory, factual, and procedural
background relevant to the two motions presently pending before the Court.
3
The Stand Up plaintiffs include: Stand Up for California!, Randall Brannon, Madera Ministerial Association,
Susan Stjerne, First Assembly of God–Madera, and Dennis Sylvester. See Compl. ¶¶ 5–10.
4
There are differing accounts of exactly how far the Picayune Tribe’s gaming facility is from the proposed Madera
Site. Here, the Court cites to the allegations of the Picayune Tribe, as set forth in its Complaint.
5
The Picayune Tribe filed its Complaint on December 31, 2012—twelve days after the Stand Up plaintiffs filed
their Complaint. See Compl., ECF No. 1, Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians v. United States, No. 12-
2071. Upon the consent of all parties, the Court consolidated the Picayune Tribe’s lawsuit with the Stand Up
plaintiffs’ lawsuit on January 9, 2013. See Minute Order dated Jan. 9, 2013.
6
The Court observes that the Picayune Tribe would not be able to establish irreparable harm in any event because
the only harms that it complains of are economic in nature. See, e.g., Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571
F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting the “general rule that economic harm does not constitute irreparable
injury”); see also Compl. ¶ 3, No. 12-2071 (alleging that “[t]hese illegal actions will have a devastating economic
impact on the Picayune Tribe”). Furthermore, the Picayune Tribe does not allege that, absent relief, the defendants’
actions will “threaten[] the very existence of the [Picayune Tribe’s] business,” which is the standard for finding
irreparable economic harm. See Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 759 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Nat’l Ass’n of
Mortg. Brokers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 773 F. Supp. 2d 151, 182 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying
preliminary injunction where plaintiff “[did] not inform the Court that the [agency action] threatens the very
existence of his business” (citing Wisconsin Gas, 758 F.2d at 674)).
3
A. Regulatory Framework
The regulatory framework that pertains to the plaintiffs’ claims is set forth in three
statutes: fee-to-trust determinations are authorized under the IRA, gaming eligibility
determinations are guided by the IGRA, and the development of environmental impact
statements are mandated under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). 7
1. The Indian Reorganization Act
“The intent and purpose of the [IRA] was to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and
7
The defendants do not challenge the standing of the plaintiffs in this action, but “federal courts, being courts of
limited jurisdiction, must assure themselves of jurisdiction over any controversy they hear, regardless of the parties’
failure to assert any jurisdictional question.” Canning v. NLRB, Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024, at *5
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). “The doctrine of standing ‘is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement.’” Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements”: (1) an injury in fact; that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendants; and
(3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. To proceed to the merits of plaintiffs’
claims, a court “need only find one party with standing.” Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA, No. 11-1265, 2013 WL
216052, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 2013); accord Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement.”).
As discussed above, the plaintiffs consist of three individual citizens of Madera County, three organizations with
members who reside in Madera County, and one federally recognized Indian tribe that operates a gaming
establishment on its reservation lands located in Madera County. See supra Part I (discussing the identity of the
plaintiffs). The Picayune Tribe has alleged that the Secretary’s action in acquiring the Madera Site in trust for the
North Fork Tribe and permitting gaming on that land “will have a devastating economic impact on the Picayune
Tribe.” Compl. ¶ 3, No. 12-2071. The Court is satisfied that the Picayune Tribe has standing, and therefore, the
Court may proceed to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. See Ams. for Safe Access, 2013 WL 216052, at
*4. The economic injury that would result from the development of the Madera Site, the existence of which the
defendants do not contest, is sufficiently concrete to constitute an injury in fact. See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l Inc. v.
EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is well established that ‘[p]arties suffer cognizable injury under
Article III when an agency lift[s] regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow[s] increased
competition.’” (quoting Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
Furthermore, this economic injury will be fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct since it will result, if at all,
because of the defendants’ decision to transfer-in-trust the Madera Site and permit gaming thereon. Finally, the
Picayune Tribe’s injury in fact is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision because, if the plaintiffs are
successful on the merits, the Secretary’s determinations will likely be vacated, and the economic injury to the
Picayune Tribe will not occur. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs have standing to bring suit, “to show irreparable
harm [for purposes of a preliminary injunction], ‘a plaintiff must do more than merely allege . . . harm sufficient to
establish standing.’” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 766 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)). Although the Picayune
Tribe does not move for preliminary injunctive relief, once a Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, it has
the power to hear motions from any party.
4
paternalism.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Pursuant to that purpose, the IRA provides that the Secretary “is authorized, in
his discretion, to acquire . . . any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands . . . for
the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. The statute further specifies that
“[t]itle to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act . . . shall be taken in the name of the
United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired.” Id.
The IRA defines “Indian” to include, inter alia, “all persons of Indian descent who are members
of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Id. § 479.
The Department of the Interior’s (“DOI’s”) regulations, promulgated pursuant to the
IRA, state that “land may be acquired for a tribe in trust status” when, inter alia, “the Secretary
determines that the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination,
economic development, or Indian housing.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(3). In considering an
application for the acquisition of off-reservation trust land, the Secretary is required by DOI
regulations to consider a number of factors, including “the existence of statutory authority for the
acquisition and any limitations contained in such authority,” the “need of the individual Indian or
the tribe for additional land,” the “purpose for which the land will be used,” and “[t]he location
of the land relative to state boundaries, and its distance from the boundaries of the tribe’s
reservations.” Id. §§ 151.10–151.11.
2. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Related to the purposes of the IRA, the IGRA was enacted “to provide a statutory basis
for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). The IGRA
provides that “gaming regulated by [the IGRA] shall not be conducted on lands acquired by the
Secretary in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe after October 17, 1988.” Id. § 2719(a). This
5
prohibition on conducting gaming on trust land acquired after 1988, however, does not apply
when, inter alia,
the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and
local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a
gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the
Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding
community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is
to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination[.]
Id. § 2719(b)(1)(A). 8 Relevant to this case, the DOI’s regulations define “surrounding
community” to mean “local governments and nearby Indian tribes located within a 25-mile
radius of the site of the proposed gaming establishment.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.2. This same
definition further states that “[a] local government or nearby Indian tribe located beyond the 25-
mile radius may petition for consultation if it can establish that its governmental functions,
infrastructure or services will be directly, immediately and significantly impacted by the
proposed gaming establishment.” Id.
3. National Environmental Policy Act
A third statutory framework relevant to the Secretary’s determinations in this case is that
of the NEPA. That statute requires all federal agencies to “include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official” on a number
of considerations. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). These considerations include “the environmental
impact of the proposed action,” “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,” and “alternatives to the proposed action.” Id. This
“detailed statement” is commonly known as an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). See,
e.g., Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The parties appear
8
The Court will sometimes refer to this as a “two-part determination,” which is a term used in the DOI’s definitions
relating to the IGRA. See 25 C.F.R. § 292.2.
6
to agree that the fee-to-trust acquisition at issue in this case qualifies as a “major Federal action”
under the NEPA, and therefore the DOI was required to prepare an EIS regarding the
environmental impacts of that acquisition. See Compl. ¶ 22; United States’ Response to Pls.’
Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 24–25, ECF No. 30.
B. The North Fork Tribe
The North Fork Tribe, which is an intervenor in this action, 9 “consists of the modern
descendants of Mono Indians using and occupying lands near and in the San Joaquin Valley for
several centuries.” Pls.’ App. Ex. 23, at 467. The North Fork Tribe currently consists of
approximately 1,900 citizens, many of whom live on or around an 80-acre parcel of land in
Madera County (“the North Fork Rancheria”), which is held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of individual members of the North Fork Tribe. See Intervenor’s Opp’n at 4; IGRA ROD
at 294. The United States also holds a 61.5-acre tract of land (“the HUD tract”) in North Fork,
California in trust for the benefit of the North Fork Tribe itself, which contains a community
center, basic infrastructure (i.e., roads, water, sewer), and pads for nine single-family homes. See
IGRA ROD at 289.
In 1906, Congress passed the first in a series of laws that authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to purchase land in California for the benefit of individual Indians. See Act of June 21,
1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 333. In 1916, pursuant to these statutes, the DOI purchased what is
now the North Fork Rancheria “for the use of the North Fork band of landless Indians.” See
Decl. of Judy Bethel-Fink (“Bethel-Fink Decl.”) Ex. A at 1, ECF No. 33-1; Intervenor’s Opp’n at
4. In 1934, the IRA was passed. See Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat.
984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, et seq.). One of the provisions of the IRA required the
9
See Minute Order dated Jan. 17, 2013 (granting motion to intervene).
7
Secretary to call and hold special elections among Indian tribes on whether the tribes wanted to
ratify the IRA and adopt a tribal constitution and by-laws. See 25 U.S.C. § 476(c). 10 The IRA
also contains an opt-out provision regarding these tribal elections, whereby the statute “shall not
apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians, voting at a special election duly
called by the Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application.” Id. § 478. One of these
special elections was held on the North Fork Rancheria on June 20, 1935, and four of the six
adult North Fork Indians voted against the application of the IRA. See Bethel-Fink Decl. Ex. B,
at 2.
C. The Trust Application and Decisionmaking Process
On March 1, 2005, the North Fork Tribe submitted a formal request to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) to acquire the Madera Site in trust for “the development and operation of
a gaming resort and hotel.” See Intervenor’s Opp’n Ex. H at 1, ECF No. 34-4. Several months
before this formal request was submitted, the BIA published a notice in the Federal Register
announcing its intent to prepare an EIS for the North Fork Tribe’s proposed trust acquisition of
the Madera Site. See Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the
North Fork Rancheria’s Proposed Trust Acquisition, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (Oct. 27, 2004). This
notice provided the opportunity for public comment “on the scope and implementation of this
proposal” until November 26, 2004. See id. This “scoping” comment period was later extended
until May 6, 2005. See 70 Fed. Reg. 17,461 (Apr. 6, 2005).
In February 2008, the DOI distributed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS”)
regarding the proposed acquisition of the Madera Site “to Federal, tribal, state, and local
10
This provision also states that such elections were required to be called “within [180] days after the receipt of a
tribal request for an election to ratify a proposed constitution and bylaws or to revoke such constitution and bylaws”
or “within [90] days after receipt of a tribal request for election to ratify an amendment to the constitution and
bylaws.” 25 U.S.C. § 476(c).
8
agencies and other interested parties for a 45-day review and comment period.” IGRA ROD at
288; see also Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the North Fork Rancheria’s Proposed
305 Acre Trust Acquisition, 73 Fed. Reg. 8898 (Feb. 15, 2008) (providing notice that “[w]ritten
comments on the scope and implementation of this proposal must arrive by March 31, 2008”).
During the public comment period, the BIA received a total of 331 comment letters, and the BIA
also conducted a public hearing on March 12, 2008, at which 101 individuals spoke. See IGRA
ROD at 288; Defs.’ Ex. J at 7–10, ECF No. 30-10 (listing commenters at public hearing). 11
Following the public comment period on the DEIS, on August 6, 2010, the BIA published a
notice in the Federal Register announcing its intent to submit a Final Environmental Impact
Statement (“FEIS”) to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). See Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the North Fork Rancheria’s Proposed 305-Acre Trust Acquisition, 75 Fed.
Reg. 47,621 (Aug. 6, 2010). This notice also provided 30 days within which to comment on the
FEIS and stated that the FEIS was publicly available in a number of locations, including online.
See id. at 47,621–22.
On September 1, 2011, after the FEIS had been published, the then Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs, Larry Echo Hawk, issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) under the IGRA, which
concluded that “Alternative A,” which was the alternative that involved a large gaming/hotel
complex on the Madera Site, was the “Preferred Alternative.” IGRA ROD at 281. This
alternative was chosen from among five alternatives because it “will best meet the purpose and
need for the Proposed Action, in promoting the long-term economic self-sufficiency, self-
determination and self-government of the [North Fork] Tribe.” Id. In reaching this conclusion,
11
The plaintiffs and their representatives were responsible for 40 comments, either written during the comment
period or spoken at the public hearing, including three comments from representatives of the Chukchansi Gold
Resort Casino, which is owned and operated by plaintiff Picayune Tribe. See Defs.’ Ex. J, at 1–11.
9
the Secretary 12 also concluded that, under 25 C.F.R. Part 292, Alternative A was “in the best
interest of the [North Fork] Tribe and its citizens,” and “would not result in detrimental impact
on the surrounding community.” Id. at 368–70. The Secretary’s conclusions in the ROD were
supported by an analysis of the alternative actions; consideration of the factors laid out in 25
C.F.R. Part 292, which the Secretary is required to consider (e.g., economic impacts of
development, impacts on the surrounding community, historical connection to the land); and the
mitigation measures that would be taken to lessen any potential negative impacts on the
surrounding community and others outside that community. See id. at 289–372. Generally, the
ROD also stated that the Secretary’s decision was based on, inter alia, “thorough review and
consideration of the [North Fork] Tribe’s fee-to-trust application and material submitted pursuant
to the IGRA . . . the DEIS; the FEIS; the administrative record; and comments received from the
public, Federal, state, and local governmental agencies; and potentially affected Indian tribes.”
Id. at 282.
On November 26, 2012, the current Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Kevin
Washburn, issued an ROD under the IRA, approving the North Fork Tribe’s fee-to-trust
application for “Alternative A” on the Madera Site. See IRA ROD at 377. This ROD announced
that “the action to be implemented is [Alternative A], which includes acquisition in trust of the
305.49-acre Madera site and construction of a gaming-resort complex including a 247,180 square
foot casino facility, 200-room hotel, surface and structured parking facilities, and corresponding
mitigation measures.” Id. Similarly to the decision made under the IGRA, the IRA ROD
“determined that this Preferred Alternative will best meet the purpose and need for the Proposed
Action by promoting the long-term economic self-sufficiency, self-determination and self-
12
Although the ROD was authored by the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, the Court will refer to the decision
as that of the “Secretary,” as that term is defined in IGRA regulations: “the Secretary of the Interior or authorized
representative.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.2.
10
governance of the [North Fork] Tribe.” Id. Likewise, this second ROD analyzed alternative
actions; environmental impacts and public comments; and mitigation measures to be taken. See
id. at 386–435. The ROD also summarized the Secretary’s consideration of the factors outlined
in 25 C.F.R. Part 151, including an analysis of the Secretary’s authority for the acquisition under
25 U.S.C. § 465. See id. at 435–43.
Following these Records of Decision, defendant Assistant Secretary Washburn
announced his decision to acquire the Madera Site by publishing a notice in the Federal Register
on December 3, 2012. See Land Acquisitions; North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of
California, 77 Fed. Reg. 71,611 (Dec. 3, 2012). The notice stated that it was being published,
inter alia, “to comply with the requirements of 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) that notice be given of the
Secretary’s decision to acquire land in trust at least 30 days prior to signatory acceptance of the
land into trust.” Id. As stated in the BIA’s Federal Register notice implementing 25 C.F.R.
§ 151.12(b), the 30-day waiting period “procedure permits judicial review before transfer of title
to the United States” because “[t]he Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. [§] 2409a, precludes
judicial review after the United States acquires title.” See Final Rule; Land Acquisitions, 61 Fed.
Reg. 18,082 (Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 151). In keeping with the reasoning
and purpose underlying 24 C.F.R. § 151.12(b), the DOI has traditionally imposed a self-stay
beyond the 30 days set forth in 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) for fee-to-trust transfers until any
challenges have been resolved on the merits. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FEE-TO-TRUST
HANDBOOK, VERSION II (“BIA HANDBOOK”) at 15 (July 13, 2011), available at
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xraca/documents/text/idc-002543.pdf (“If an action is filed, take
no further action [on the fee-to-trust transfer] until the judicial review process has been
exhausted.”).
11
On December 19, 2012, within the 30-day window, the Stand Up plaintiffs filed their
Complaint in the instant action. See ECF No. 1. The day before the Complaint was filed,
however, government counsel notified the plaintiffs’ counsel that the BIA would no longer be
following its self-stay procedure because a recent Supreme Court case, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-
Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012), held that the Quiet Title
Act (“QTA”) no longer bars challenges to fee-to-trust acquisitions after transfer of title has
already taken place. See Mot. for Expedited Status Conference (“Pls.’ Emergency Mot.”) Ex. 1,
ECF No. 11-1. The government agreed to stay the transfer of the Madera Site until February 1,
2013, and also agreed to a briefing schedule for a motion for preliminary injunction to give the
plaintiffs an opportunity to seek relief from the transfer before it takes place. See Joint Status
Report at 3, 8–9, ECF No. 14. Pursuant to the jointly agreed upon briefing schedule, the
government defendants 13 filed a motion to transfer venue on January 4, 2013, see ECF No. 20,
and the Stand Up plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on January 11, 2013, see
ECF No. 26. The Court heard oral argument on these motions at a hearing on January 25, 2013.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Preliminary Injunction
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of
the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395
(1981). It is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy” and “should not be granted unless the
movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S.
968, 972 (1997) (emphasis and internal quotation mark omitted). Plaintiffs seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their
13
The government defendants include: the United States of America, the United States Department of the Interior,
Secretary of the Interior Kenneth Salazar, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs
Kevin K. Washburn. See Compl. ¶¶ 11–14 (No. 12-2039); Compl. ¶ 6 (No. 12-2071).
12
claims; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the
balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); accord Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722,
724 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Historically, these four factors have been evaluated on a “sliding scale” in this Circuit,
such that “[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does
not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” Davis v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Recently, however, the continued
viability of that approach has been called into some doubt, as the Supreme Court and the D.C.
Circuit have strongly suggested, without holding, that a likelihood of success on the merits is an
independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction. See Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 690 (2008) (“[A] party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among
other things, a likelihood of success on the merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sherley
v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e read Winter at least to suggest if not to
hold that a likelihood of success is an independent, free-standing requirement for a preliminary
injunction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (“Munaf made clear that a likelihood of success is an independent, free-standing
requirement for a preliminary injunction.”). The D.C. Circuit has nevertheless, despite its
strongly suggestive dicta, explicitly abstained from deciding this question. See Sherley, 644 F.3d
at 393 (observing that “[w]e need not wade into this circuit split today”). Thus, absent binding
authority or clear guidance, the Court finds that the most prudent course is to bypass this
unresolved issue and proceed to explain why a preliminary injunction is not appropriate under
the “sliding scale” framework. If the plaintiffs cannot meet the less demanding “sliding scale”
13
standard, then a fortiori they cannot satisfy the more stringent standard alluded to by the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
That being said, in meeting the requisite burden for injunctive relief, “[i]t is particularly
important for the movant to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.” Konarski v.
Donovan, 763 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Greater New Orleans Fair Hous.
Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 639 F.3d 1078, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“In
ruling on a preliminary injunction a key issue—often the dispositive one—is whether the movant
has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.”). Indeed, absent a “substantial
indication of probable success, there would be no justification for the court’s intrusion into the
ordinary processes of administration and judicial review.” Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n
v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). Assessing the likelihood of
success on the merits “does not involve a final determination of the merits, but rather the
exercise of sound judicial discretion on the need for interim relief.” Nat’l Org. for Women v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As an
extraordinary remedy, courts should grant such relief sparingly.” Konarski, 763 F. Supp. 2d at
133 (citing Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972).
B. Review of Agency Action
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “This is a
‘deferential standard’ that ‘presumes the validity of agency action.’” WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC,
14
238 F.3d 449, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1344, 1352
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
“Although the ‘scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and
a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,’” the Court “must nonetheless be
sure the [agency] has ‘examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)). In determining whether the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, the
Court must determine whether the agency action was a “product of reasoned decisionmaking” or
whether the agency “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 52.
“The ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is particularly deferential in matters implicating
predictive judgments . . . .” Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
“In circumstances involving agency predictions of uncertain future events, complete factual
support in the record for the [agency]’s judgment or prediction is not possible or required since a
forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based
on the expert knowledge of the agency.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also AT&T
v. FCC, 832 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“When . . . ‘an agency is obliged to make policy
judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer,’ [the
Court’s] role is more limited; we require only that the agency ‘so state and go on to identify the
15
considerations it found persuasive.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC,
737 F.2d 1095, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
C. Venue Transfer
A case may be transferred to another venue “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “The decision whether or not to
transfer the case to another judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is discretionary.” In
re DRC, Inc., 358 F. App’x 193, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2009). “A transfer in derogation of proper venue
in the District of Columbia must be justified by particular circumstances that render the forum
inappropriate by reference to considerations specified in the statute.” Id. In deciding a motion to
transfer venue under § 1404(a), a court must first determine whether the transferee district is one
where the action “might have been brought,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964), and then the statute directs the court to evaluate “the convenience of
parties and witnesses” and whether the transfer would be “in the interest of justice,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). The broad “interest of justice” language in § 1404(a) “is intended to place discretion
in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-
case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622). Therefore, the statute “calls on the district
court to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific factors” in a manner that is “flexible and
individualized.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The Court will begin by discussing the government defendants’ motion to transfer venue
before proceeding to discuss whether the Stand Up plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing to
warrant the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.
16
A. Motion to Transfer Venue
As discussed above, the first requirement for a transfer of venue is that the action “might
have been brought” in the transferee venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For venue purposes, a
civil action may be brought, inter alia, in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Neither the plaintiffs nor the
intervenor-defendant North Fork Tribe, all of whom oppose the motion to transfer, contest that
this case “might have been brought” in the Eastern District of California. This action “might
have been brought” in the Eastern District of California both because the land in question, i.e.,
the “property that is the subject of the action,” is located in that district, and also because “a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district, such
as the public hearings underlying the fee-to-trust decision and the assessments made regarding
the local environmental impacts of the development. See id.
As to whether transfer would be “in the interest of justice,” prior cases have traditionally
established a list of private and public interests factors for courts to weigh. See, e.g., Foote v.
Chu, 858 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121–23 (D.D.C. 2012). Not all of these factors are statutory,
however; rather, they are intended to elucidate the concerns implied by the phrase “in the interest
of justice.” See Stewart Organization, 487 U.S. at 29. In evaluating “the interest of justice,” the
Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s statement that analyses of venue transfer under
§ 1404(a) are to be done on an individualized, case-by-case basis. See id. With that flexible
standard in mind, the Court notes that the instant case does involve a significant amount of local
interest in the use of the Madera Site. Indeed, this local interest is what the government
defendants rely heavily, if not exclusively, upon in advocating for a transfer of venue. See Fed.
17
Defs.’ Opposed Mot. to Transfer Venue & Mem. in Supp. (“Defs.’ Transfer Mem.”) at 8–12,
ECF No. 20. In this regard, the Court is mindful of the oft-cited “local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home.” See, e.g., MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du
Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The instant
case, however, is not a purely “localized controversy,” and, more importantly, considerations of
fairness embedded in the “interest of justice” compel the conclusion that this case must remain in
this forum. 14
First, although this case does implicate the use of land in the localized area of Madera
County, there should be no mistake that this is not a land dispute. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recently made clear that a challenge to a DOI fee-to-trust acquisition by a party with no
competing interest in the land is “a garden-variety APA claim.” Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2208.
The controversy in this case also has national implications regarding the scope of the Secretary’s
authority to make such acquisitions and the standards by which such acquisition decisions should
be judged. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (denying
14
The other traditional private and public interest factors are either neutral or weigh slightly against transfer in this
particular case. See Foote, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 121–23 (listing factors). The express statutory factors regarding the
convenience of the parties and witnesses are essentially neutral since this is an administrative law challenge that is
likely to be resolved through motions practice on the administrative record. Thus, consideration of any parties’
access to proof does not weigh for or against transfer. The plaintiffs contend that the District of Columbia is more
convenient for the parties because “[a]ttorneys for Plaintiffs, as well as for Defendants and the intervening tribe, are
based in this District.” Pls. Stand Up for California!, et al.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer (“Pls.’ Transfer
Opp’n”) at 12, ECF No. 22. This argument, however, stretches the meaning of “parties” in § 1404(a) too far to
cover a party’s counsel. Where counsel resides is of little relevance for purposes of evaluating venue transfer
motions. See, e.g., Intrepid Potash-N.M., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 669 F. Supp. 2d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The
convenience to counsel is of minor, if any, importance under § 1404(a).” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, this Court is equally competent to adjudicate federal questions as any other federal district court, and the
congestion of the courts weighs against transfer because the Eastern District of California is among the more
overworked federal courts in the nation. See, e.g., U.S. Courts, Judicial Emergencies,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx (last updated 1/29/13)
(listing two “judicial emergencies” in the Eastern District of California with 1141 weighted filings per vacancy).
Finally, although the plaintiffs and defendants prefer different fora, the plaintiffs’ choice is generally entitled to
some deference. See, e.g., Foote, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (observing that “[c]ourts normally give considerable
deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” though it is “‘conferred less deference by the court when it is not the
plaintiff’s home forum’”). Thus, to the extent these factors weigh on the scale at all, only the last factor weighs
somewhat against transfer.
18
venue transfer where agency action was “a decision of national significance”); see also Pls.’
Transfer Opp’n at 10 (noting that “[t]his case involves similar national issues regarding the
authority of the Secretary to take land into trust”). Finally, the Court notes that the weight given
to the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home is diminished in this case
because the local interests most vocally opposed to the trust transfer (the plaintiffs) as well as the
local interest most interested in seeing the transfer upheld (the North Fork Tribe) are all opposed
to transfer. See generally Pls.’ Transfer Opp’n; Proposed Intervenor-Def.’s Response to Fed.
Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 23; Pl. Picayune Tribe’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to
Transfer Venue, ECF No. 24.
Of overarching importance in this particular case, however, is the unfairness that would
inure to the plaintiffs if this case were transferred. This case is distinguishable from the mine run
of cases because the government defendants in this case have made clear that they will transfer
the Madera Site into trust on February 1, 2013 regardless of whether any court has yet made a
ruling on whether the plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Joint Status
Report at 3. As a result of the government defendants’ position, and due to the congested docket
in the Eastern District of California, 15 transferring this case to the Eastern District of California
would essentially deprive the plaintiffs of any opportunity to have their preliminary injunction
motion decided before the transfer of land is consummated. Fairness and the “interest of justice”
therefore dictate that the Court deny the government defendants’ motion to transfer. See 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). 16
15
See supra note 14 (citing “judicial emergencies” in Eastern District of California).
16
Implicitly recognizing the fundamental unfairness of transferring this case in the face of the government’ s
declination to postpone the transfer of land into trust, the government has suggested, alternatively, that the Court
transfer this case following consideration of the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. See Defs.’
Transfer Mem. at 15. Transfer at that procedural juncture would, however, necessitate another district court
19
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Having decided that this case will remain in this forum, the Court will now analyze the
parties’ arguments for and against the preliminary injunctive relief sought by the Stand Up
plaintiffs. One of the most essential considerations for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief
is whether the Stand Up plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006)
(acknowledging “the well-established principle that the party seeking pretrial relief bears the
burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits”). The Stand Up plaintiffs raise
numerous claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the IRA, the IGRA, and the
NEPA, but for the reasons discussed below the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any of these claims.
1. The Secretary’s Authority to Acquire the Madera Site
The first and most formidable claim raised by the Stand Up plaintiffs in support of
preliminary injunctive relief is that “the Secretary failed to assemble, develop, or consider a full
record in making [his] finding that the Tribe was recognized and under federal jurisdiction in
1934.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 17, ECF Nos. 26-1
through 26-3. This argument goes to the question of whether the Secretary properly considered
his statutory authority to acquire the Madera Site under the IRA. The plaintiffs argue both that
the North Fork people do not qualify as “Indians” under the IRA and also that, even if the North
Fork Tribe does qualify under the IRA, the Secretary’s conclusion in this regard was not
supported by the record and, thus, was arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 17–21.
becoming familiar with the underlying facts and claims and would not conserve or be an efficient use of judicial
resources.
20
As discussed above, the regulations promulgated by the DOI pursuant to the IRA require
that, in considering requests for the acquisition of land into trust status, the Secretary must
consider “[t]he existence of statutory authority for the acquisition and any limitations contained
in such authority.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(a); see also id. § 151.11(a) (requiring same consideration
for off-reservation acquisitions). That authority, for purposes of the instant action, is located at
25 U.S.C. § 465, which states that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion,
to acquire . . . any interest in lands . . . for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” The plain
text of the statute limits the Secretary to acquiring land only “for Indians,” and the IRA defines
“Indian” as, inter alia, “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” Id. § 479. This same definition further states that “[t]he
term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized
band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation.” Id. 17 The Supreme Court has held that
“the word ‘now’ in § 479 limits the definition of ‘Indian,’ and therefore limits the exercise of the
Secretary’s trust authority under § 465 to those members of tribes that were under federal
jurisdiction at the time the IRA was enacted,” i.e., June 18, 1934. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S.
379, 391 (2009).
Although the Supreme Court’s Carcieri decision clarified the temporal requirement that
the Secretary may only acquire lands into trust for the benefit of Indians who are members of
tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, Carcieri also left several relevant questions
unanswered. The first and most pressing question left open by Carcieri is what it means to have
been “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Carcieri stated
that “under Federal jurisdiction” implied a certain government-to-government relationship with a
17
The Stand Up plaintiffs have submitted supplemental authority, which confirms that “a band is ‘tribe’ within the
definition of [25 U.S.C. § 479].” See Pls. Stand Up for California!, et al.’s Notice of Supplementary Authority
(“Pls.’ Supplemental Authority”) Ex. A at 6, ECF No. 40-1.
21
tribe that could be evidenced by “a treaty with the United States (in effect in 1934), a (pre-1934)
congressional appropriation, or enrollment (as of 1934) with the [Bureau of Indian Affairs].” Id.
at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring). The leading treatise on Indian law has similarly observed that
any tribe subject to federal plenary power over Indian affairs could be considered
“under Federal jurisdiction,” especially if the federal government has at any time
taken some action, such as treaty negotiations, provision of federal benefits,
inclusion in a BIA census, or forcible relocation, that reflects and acknowledges
federal power and responsibility toward the tribe.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02 (2012). In concluding that he had
authority to acquire the Madera Site in trust for the North Fork Tribe, the Secretary relied
primarily on the fact that “a majority of the adult Indians residing at the [North Fork] Tribe’s
Reservation voted to reject the IRA at a special election duly held by the Secretary on June 10,
1935.” IRA ROD at 437. From this, the Secretary reasoned that “[t]he calling of a Section 18
election at the [North Fork] Tribe’s Reservation conclusively establishes that the Tribe was
under Federal jurisdiction for Carcieri purposes.” Id.
The plaintiffs contend that the Secretary’s analysis of his statutory authority was
“[c]onclusory” and his “reliance on this sole factor was improper, given the BIA’s prior
recognition of the complexity of this determination, and given the Secretary’s failure to consider
and address the countervailing evidence before him.” Pls.’ Mem. at 17. In support of this
contention, the plaintiffs cite to a 2011 document submitted by the BIA in response to questions
from a congressional committee regarding which federally recognized tribes were under federal
jurisdiction in 1934. See id. at 18. In that response, the BIA stated that “[w]hether a tribe was
under federal jurisdiction [in 1934] requires a fact-intensive analysis of the history of interactions
between that tribe and the United States.” Pls.’ App. Ex. 24, at 520, ECF No. 27-33. The
plaintiffs’ argument is unlikely to succeed on the merits, however, because it was rational for the
Secretary to conclude that the North Fork Tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” based solely on
22
the 1935 IRA election and also because other evidence considered by the Secretary conclusively
establishes that the North Fork Tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934.
First, the Secretary’s conclusion that he had the authority to acquire land for the North
Fork Tribe, based solely on the IRA election, was rational because the text of the IRA establishes
that the only people eligible to vote in such elections were “adult Indians.” See 25 U.S.C. § 478
(“This Act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians, voting at a
special election duly called by the Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application.”);
see also id. § 476 (requiring Secretary to call “a special election” at which “adult members” of
“[a]ny Indian tribe” were to vote regarding “the right to organize for [the tribe’s] common
welfare”). As discussed previously, the word “Indian” is a term of art in the IRA, 18 and therefore
it was perfectly reasonable for the Secretary to conclude that any persons voting in an IRA
election were “adult Indians,” i.e., adult “members of [a] recognized Indian tribe now under
Federal jurisdiction.” See id. § 479. 19
Even more persuasive, however, is another fact that the Secretary considered in his IRA
ROD, which is that “[t]he North Fork Rancheria was originally established by purchase under
the authority of the Interior’s Appropriations Act of June 30, 1913.” IRA ROD at 437. As
discussed previously, that purchase took place in 1916—well before the IRA was passed. See
supra Part I.B (discussing history of North Fork Tribe). This purchase of land is important, and
likely dispositive in its own right, regarding whether the North Fork Tribe was “under Federal
18
The Stand Up plaintiffs’ notice of supplemental authority concedes that Carcieri “establishes that in order to
qualify for trust land, a tribe must satisfy the definition of ‘Indian’ not ‘tribe.’” Pls.’ Supplemental Authority at 2.
This fact is of somewhat diminished significance in any event, only because the relevant definition of “Indian”
circularly depends upon individuals being “members of any recognized Indian tribe.” See 25 U.S.C. § 479.
19
Additionally, the fact that the North Fork Indians voted not to reorganize under the IRA in 1935 does not affect
the Secretary’s authority to acquire land into trust for the benefit of the North Fork Indians. As the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Carcieri, a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2202, “ensures that tribes
may benefit from § 465 even if they opted out of the IRA pursuant to § 478, which allowed tribal members to reject
the application of the IRA to their tribe.” Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 394–95.
23
jurisdiction” in 1934. Historical DOI documents submitted in this case show that the 1916
purchase was made “for the use of the North Fork band of landless Indians.” See Bethel-Fink
Decl. Ex. A at 1. This document demonstrates two things. First, it demonstrates a clear
jurisdictional relationship between the North Fork Tribe and the federal government prior to
1934. See, e.g., Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that “a (pre-1934)
congressional appropriation” would likely establish federal jurisdiction); COHEN’S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02 (concluding that, inter alia, “provision of federal benefits”
would establish federal jurisdiction within the meaning of the IRA). Second, this document
establishes that the 1916 acquisition was for members of the North Fork Tribe because the
acquisition was for “landless Indians” of “the North Fork band,” which clearly falls within the
IRA’s expansive definition of “tribe.” See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (defining “tribe” as “any Indian tribe,
organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation”). 20
Although the IRA ROD states that “none of the lands within the exterior boundaries of
the North Fork Rancheria are owned by, or held in trust for, the Tribe,” IRA ROD at 391–92, this
fact is largely irrelevant in determining whether the North Fork people are “Indians” within the
meaning of § 479. 21 As stated previously, the broad definition of “tribe” in § 479 indicates that a
formal tribal government is not necessary to be considered a “tribe” for purposes of the IRA. See
25 U.S.C. § 479. The fact that the North Fork people were, at least as early as 1916, an
organized band of individual Indians is sufficient to conclude that the North Fork people were a
“tribe” under the IRA. As a result, the 1916 purchase of land in trust for the “North Fork band of
20
The Stand Up plaintiffs’ supplemental authority states, inter alia, that lands purchased under the 1913 act “could
be used for any landless California Indians,” but the cited authority also clearly recognizes that some Rancherias,
like the North Fork Rancheria in this case, were purchased for “specific band[s]” of landless Indians. See Pls.’
Supplemental Authority Ex. C at 3.
21
The North Fork Tribe “did not formally organize its government until 1996 when it officially adopted its
constitution.” Pls.’ Mem. at 20.
24
landless Indians” establishes that the North Fork people are “Indians” within the meaning of the
IRA, and were treated as such in the special election in 1935. Therefore, the Secretary logically
concluded that the North Fork Tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. 22 The fact that
the Secretary did not cite the 1916 purchase specifically within the section analyzing his
statutory authority is unlikely to undercut this conclusion because the fact of the 1916 purchase
was clearly considered in the IRA ROD, see IRA ROD at 437, and a court’s “task is to enforce a
standard of agency reasonableness, not perfection.” Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
15 F.3d 1112, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Two other interrelated questions left unanswered from Carcieri, which are relevant to the
soundness of the Secretary’s decision in this case, are (1) what the meaning of “recognized
Indian tribe” is; and (2) whether a tribe must have been “recognized” in 1934 to be eligible for
trust land. As to the first question, the Secretary has already formally discussed the
interpretation of the term “recognized Indian tribe” in a previous fee-to-trust decision that was
cited by the North Fork Tribe in the instant case. See Intervenor’s Opp’n at 9 nn.4–5. In that
ROD, which was issued in December 2010 with respect to a trust acquisition for the Cowlitz
Indian Tribe, the Secretary noted two possible meanings of the word “recognized.” See BIA,
Record of Decision, Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation for the 151.87-acre
Cowlitz Parcel in Clark County, Washington, for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe (“Cowlitz ROD”) at
87, available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/mywcsp/documents/text/idc012719.pdf (Dec. 17,
2010). The word “recognized” could be used in the “‘cognitive’ or quasi-anthropological sense,”
which means that “‘federal officials simply knew or realized that an Indian tribe existed.” See id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William W. Quinn, Federal Acknowledgement of
22
The Secretary’s IGRA ROD also discussed numerous other historical facts that could reasonably indicate federal
jurisdiction over the North Fork Indians prior to 1934, such as the fact that “the Tribe’s predecessors were
represented by signatories to the 1851 Treaty signed at Camp Barbour.” See IGRA ROD at 340–45.
25
American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 331, 333 (1990)). It could also be used “in a more formal or ‘jurisdictional’ sense to
connote that a tribe is a governmental entity comprised of Indians and that the entity has a unique
relationship with the United States.” Id. In evaluating the legislative history of the IRA, the
Secretary observed that “[t]he members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs debating the
IRA appeared to use the term ‘recognized Indian tribe’ in the cognitive or quasi-anthropological
sense.” Id. at 88.
In the Cowlitz ROD, the Secretary ultimately determined that he “need not reach the
question of the precise meaning of ‘recognized Indian tribe’ as used in the IRA” because the
Cowlitz Tribe was “recognized” in both the cognitive and jurisdictional senses of the word. See
id. 88–89. Nevertheless, this discussion is instructive to the Court in interpreting the phrase
“recognized Indian tribe.” The Court agrees with the Secretary’s interpretation of the legislative
history of the IRA, and the Court also observes that using the phrase “recognized Indian tribe” in
a jurisdictional sense would be redundant because the statute further modifies “recognized Indian
tribe” by the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction.” See 25 U.S.C. § 479. It is true that the
federal government established rigorous, formal criteria for being a federally recognized Indian
tribe in the 1970s, see 25 C.F.R. § 83.7, but as the Secretary noted in the Cowlitz ROD: “There
would have been little need to insert an undefined and ambiguous phrase such as ‘under federal
jurisdiction,’ if the IRA had incorporated the rigorous, modern definition of federally recognized
Indian tribe.” Cowlitz ROD at 88. The Secretary’s thorough and validly reasoned interpretive
discussion of this ambiguous statutory term is entitled to “respect” even “if lacking power to
control” because it manifests a “a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
26
(1944). Thus, both based on the Secretary’s interpretive discussion and the Court’s own reading
of the statutory language, the Court concludes that the phrase “recognized Indian tribe” in the
IRA refers to recognition in the cognitive or quasi-anthropological sense.
In so concluding, the Court need not decide in this particular case the second question left
open by Carcieri: whether an Indian tribe is required to have been “recognized” prior to 1934 in
order to be eligible to receive trust land under the IRA. This is because the North Fork Tribe was
clearly “recognized” in the cognitive sense of the word both before and after 1934, as evidenced
by the 1916 trust acquisition of the North Fork Rancheria and the IRA election previously
discussed. In sum, then, the Secretary’s conclusion that he is “authorized to acquire land in trust
for the [North Fork] Tribe under Section 5 of the IRA,” IRA ROD at 437, was supported by
substantial evidence, which the Secretary considered during his decision-making process.
Therefore, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary’s
decision in this regard was either unsupported or arbitrary and capricious.
2. The Secretary’s Failure to Send the “Entire Application Record”
The Court now turns to the plaintiffs’ procedural claim under the APA. The plaintiffs
argue that “[t]he Secretary did not follow his own procedures (mandated by his own regulations)
in failing to send the California Governor a copy of the entire record when requesting the
Governor’s concurrence in the Secretary’s two-part decision.” Pls.’ Mem. at 21. Under the
regulations promulgated by DOI pursuant to the IGRA, “[i]f the Secretary makes a favorable
Secretarial Determination,” the Secretary must send to the governor of the state where the
gaming will occur, inter alia, “[a] copy of the entire application record.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.22.
Based on this language, the plaintiffs complain that the Secretary sent the Governor Concurrence
Request “almost a year before the Fee-to-Trust ROD was issued,” and thus the concurrence
request did not include the Secretary’s conclusions regarding acquisition of the Madera Site. See
27
Pls.’ Mem. at 22. In support of their contention that “entire application record” includes the
Secretary’s IRA decision, the plaintiffs point to a statement made by the DOI when it
promulgated the current IGRA regulations in 2008. See Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim.
Inj. (“Pls.’ Reply”) at 12, ECF No. 36. As the agency’s Federal Register notice stated, during
the notice-and-comment period “[o]ne comment observed that, throughout the regulations,
‘application’ is used to refer both to the tribe’s initial written request and to the subsequent
application package developed by the BIA Regional Office for submission to the Secretary,
creating confusion.” Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After Oct. 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg.
29,354, 29,368 (May 20, 2008). The agency responded that “[i]n consideration of the comment,
changes were made throughout the regulations accordingly.” Id.
The plaintiffs’ argument on this point falls short for two reasons. First, the evidence cited
by the plaintiffs from the 2008 rulemaking record do not establish what the plaintiffs contend.
The comment and agency response were with respect to a different section of the regulations, 25
C.F.R. § 292.16, than the one requiring the “entire application record” to be sent to the
concurring governor, 25 C.F.R. § 292.22. Furthermore, just because the agency made certain
unspecified changes “throughout the regulations accordingly” does not even come close to
establishing that the term “entire application record” was intended to include the Secretary’s IRA
ROD. More likely, this language referenced the fact that the DOI removed the phrases
“application package” and “complete application record” from the regulations to avoid the
confusion noted by the comment and amended the language of 25 C.F.R. § 292.16 to refer
unambiguously to “[a] tribe’s application requesting a Secretarial Determination under
§ 292.13.” Compare 65 Fed. Reg. 55,471, 55,475–76 (Sept. 14, 2000) (Proposed Rule), with 73
28
Fed. Reg. at 29,378 (Final Rule). None of this has anything to do with the Secretary’s
concurrence request under 25 C.F.R. § 292.22.
More fundamentally, the plaintiffs’ argument misunderstands the simple fact that, in a
case like this one, the Secretary’s decision under the IGRA must logically be finalized before the
Secretary’s decision under the IRA can be made. Permitting gaming on trust land would be
essential to the Secretary’s conclusion under the IRA that the acquisition meets the criteria listed
in 25 C.F.R. Part 151, such as “[t]he need of the individual Indian or the tribe for additional
land,” and “[t]he purposes for which the land will be used.” See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10. Similarly,
the governor’s concurrence is plainly required before gaming on trust land can be permitted. See
25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). Therefore, in this case, approving a trust acquisition under the IRA
prior to the governor’s concurrence would have been putting the proverbial cart before the horse:
The Secretary would not yet have known whether gaming would be permitted and thus would
have had no basis to ascertain whether the basic criteria for approving a trust acquisition had
been met. See Intervenor’s Opp’n at 14–15 & n.18 (explaining why Secretary must “seek the
Governor’s concurrence” and “only then . . . make the final determination to take the land into
trust”); see also Sokakogan Chippewa Comm’y (Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa) v.
Babbitt, 929 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (“Even if the secretary finds that the
proposed off-reservation gaming establishment [meets the requirements of the two-part
determination] and the governor concurs in that determination, the secretary must decide whether
to exercise his discretion to acquire the land in trust . . . .”). Hence, the plaintiffs are unlikely to
succeed on the merits of their argument regarding the Secretary’s purported procedural error
regarding the “entire application record.”
29
3. The Secretary’s Consideration of Impacts on the Surrounding
Community
The plaintiffs also contend that the Secretary’s determination under the IGRA, that
permitting gaming on the Madera Site would not be detrimental to the surrounding community,
was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider comments regarding a number of
detrimental impacts, including: (1) “the destructive and ruinous impacts on families, employers,
and community social services caused by gambling,” (2) “increases in prostitution and other
crimes,” (3) “environmental and economic impacts on Fresno, Mariposa, Merced and Madera
Counties,” (4) “impacts on water supply and water wells on adjacent farms and homes,” and
(5) “infringement upon the tribal sovereignty of other indigenous people, including the North
Valley Yokuts and the Picayune Rancheria.” Pls.’ Mem. at 23. For the reasons discussed below,
however, none of these points is likely to succeed on the merits because the Secretary appears to
have considered all aspects of the problem that he was required to consider under the IGRA, and
this Court must confer significant deference to the Secretary’s expertise.
At the outset, it is important to recall that the DOI has interpreted the term “surrounding
community” in the IGRA only to include “local governments and nearby Indian tribes located
within a 25-mile radius of the site of the proposed gaming establishment.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.2.
The plaintiffs in the instant action do not directly challenge the DOI’s interpretation of this term,
but they do complain that the Secretary failed to consider or “simply ignored” comments from
the plaintiffs and other “members of the community” about the potential harms listed above.
Pls.’ Mem. at 23. Although the Secretary can, and likely should, consider comments from local
citizens in making decisions under the IGRA, the statute and its implementing regulations only
require that the Secretary consider “detriment[]” on “local governments and nearby Indian tribes
30
located within a 25-mile radius of the site of the proposed gaming establishment.” 25 C.F.R.
§§ 292.2, 292.21(a). 23
a) Problem Gambling
First, as to “the destructive and ruinous impacts on families, employers, and community
social services caused by gambling,” Pls.’ Mem. at 23, the IGRA ROD addressed the potential
effects on the surrounding community stemming from what the parties have called “problem
gambling.” See Intervenor’s Opp’n at 17. The Secretary observed that “[w]hile operation of a
gaming facility could increase the percentage of problem gamblers in the surrounding
community, problem gambling may be attenuated, or possibly reduced, through the expansion of
problem gambling services offered by the Resort.” IGRA ROD at 347. In this regard, the
Secretary also noted several ways in which the North Fork Tribe had agreed to help mitigate the
potential detrimental effects of “problem gambling.” The Tribe agreed to do so by, inter alia,
paying $50,000 to the Madera County Department of Behavioral Health Services “to supplement
its budget for alcohol education and the treatment and prevention of problem gambling and
gambling disorders,” id. at 355, and implementing a number of training and precautionary
measures to “recogniz[e] and address[]” problem gambling on the premises, id. at 324–25. The
FEIS concluded that these mitigation measures “would mitigate [the] effect [of problem
gambling] to a less than significant level.” FEIS at 4.7-9 (Feb. 2009), available at
http://northforkeis.com/documents/final_eis/report.htm. The Secretary clearly considered this
aspect of the problem in concluding that permitting gaming on the Madera Site would not be
detrimental to the surrounding community.
23
As a factual matter, the plaintiffs’ contention that the Secretary “ignored” any comments appears to be
unsupported by even the partial record before the Court, which indicates that the Secretary responded to each public
comment letter. See Intervenor’s Ex. G, ECF No. 34-3 (DOI’s responses to each public comment letter); see also
IGRA ROD at 289 (“Responses to each public comment letter are also provided in Attachment II of this ROD.”).
31
b) Crime
As to the “increases in prostitution and other crimes,” the plaintiffs argue that the
Secretary’s consideration of this potential problem was “illogical, irrational, and implausible.”
Pls.’ Mem. at 23. The Secretary observed, relying on the FEIS, that “[t]he Resort will not result
in a significant increase in crime in the surrounding community” because “although an increase
in calls for service might be expected as would be the case with any large-scale development, the
Resort will not result in an increase regional crime rate.” IGRA ROD at 347. In further support
of this conclusion, the Secretary cited the fact that the North Fork Tribe would be mitigating any
detrimental effect on local law enforcement resources by contributing $415,000 to fund the
creation of 5.5 new local law enforcement positions. See id. at 355. The plaintiffs complain that
“[t]he Secretary irrationally focuses on crime ‘rates’ and ignores not only the increased
concentration of crime that will occur around the casino . . . but also the potentially vice-related
and even violent types of crime associated with the proposed casino development and the
individuals such a development will attract.” Pls.’ Mem. at 24. They also contend that,
regardless of whether mitigation measures may lessen the potential negative effects of gaming,
“the inescapable conclusion is that the casino will have a detrimental impact on the surrounding
community” despite the fact that “[t]he Secretary seems to conclude that there is no detrimental
impact on the surrounding community simply because the Tribe may take some steps to lessen
the damaging effects of the $200 million casino.” Id. at 25.
First, the plaintiffs’ argument that it is “irrational” to focus on regional crime rates is
peculiar because the Court finds such a focus perfectly rational when considering potential
detriment to a surrounding community. Second, the plaintiffs’ more generic concerns about
gaming and crime appear to be divorced from the facts considered by the Secretary, and based
instead on a speculative and biased assumption about the “types” of people and behavior that a
32
gaming establishment attracts. The FEIS surveyed five other California communities “that have
had Indian casinos within close proximity or in their jurisdiction for at least the past two years.”
FEIS at 4.7-6. Based on this survey and a review of literature regarding the link between casinos
and crime, the FEIS concluded that there was “no definitive link between casinos and regional
crime rates,” and therefore “Alternative A’s impact to crime would be less than significant.” Id.
at 4.7-8. The Secretary relied upon and discussed the FEIS’s findings in this regard when
discussing crime in his IGRA ROD. See IGRA ROD at 347. That the plaintiffs speculate
regarding what gaming may bring to their community cannot undercut the Secretary’s reasonable
reliance on empirical socioeconomic data, as well as the tangible mitigation efforts proposed by
the North Fork Tribe, in concluding that a casino development would not be detrimental to the
surrounding community.
Furthermore, the Court observes that the plaintiffs’ argument appears to misconstrue the
standard by which the Secretary must judge the potential negative effects of a gaming
establishment under the IGRA. The plaintiffs construct a straw man by arguing that “[t]he
Secretary seems to conclude that there is no detrimental impact on the surrounding community
simply because the Tribe may take some steps to lessen the damaging effects of the $200 million
casino.” Pls.’ Mem. at 25. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ apparent premise, the IGRA does not
require that a new gaming development be completely devoid of any negative impacts. Rather,
the IGRA requires the Secretary, in consultation with state, local, and tribal governments, to
determine that “a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands . . . would not be detrimental to
the surrounding community.” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). All new commercial developments
are bound to entail some costs, but the Secretary’s duty under the IGRA is to determine whether
those costs will be significant enough to be “detrimental to the surrounding community.” See id.
33
The plaintiffs’ reading of the IGRA would essentially preclude any new gaming establishments,
since every gaming establishment is highly likely to entail some negative impacts on the
surrounding community. Thus, such a cramped reading would have the phrase “detrimental to
the surrounding community” nullify the “overarching intent” of the IGRA, which was “‘in large
part to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.’”
Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos v. Kempthorne, 492 F.3d 460, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(quoting Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Although the plaintiffs may take moral umbrage with the goals and purposes of the IGRA, those
policy grievances are best addressed to the political branches that enacted the law. See
Intervenor’s Opp’n at 21 (“Plaintiffs may disagree with IGRA’s policies and with [the]
Secretary’s ultimate decisions, but policy decisions are not for them or courts to make.”). This
Court has neither the power nor the competency to rewrite the purposes of duly enacted
legislation. See, e.g., Badaracco v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)
(“Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of
improvement.”).
c) Environmental and Economic Impacts
Moving to the plaintiffs’ third concern, the Secretary clearly considered the
“environmental and economic impacts on Fresno, Mariposa, Merced and Madera Counties.”
Pls.’ Mem. at 23. Although the plaintiffs do not elaborate in their briefing what particular
environmental or economic impacts were ignored, the Secretary’s IGRA ROD considered both
the potential economic impacts on surrounding local governments as well as potential
environmental effects of the gaming establishment. As with the potential negative impacts
already discussed, the Secretary considered the possibility that a major commercial development
34
would put a financial strain on local governments and concluded that any potential impact would
be mitigated by the North Fork Tribe’s agreement to offset the impacts. See IGRA ROD at 369–
70. Once again, the Secretary relied upon the thorough analysis of these costs provided in the
FEIS, which analyzed the development’s potential effects on everything from provision of water
services to law enforcement to telecommunications to schools. See, e.g., id. at 370; FEIS at 4.9-
1 to 4.9-32 (analyzing impacts on public services from each alternative). After considering all of
this evidence, the Secretary concluded that, based on the millions of dollars that would inure to
local governments through increased tax revenue and offset payments from the North Fork Tribe,
“the trust acquisition of the [Madera] Site, and the operation of class III gaming there, would not
result in a significant cost increase for either Madera County or the adjacent local units of
government” and also “would not result in a detrimental impact to the environment in the area.”
IGRA ROD at 369–70. Without more elaboration regarding what was missing from this
analysis, the plaintiffs have done nothing to undercut the rationality of the Secretary’s decision
with regard to potential economic and environmental impacts.
d) Effects on Local Indian Tribes
The plaintiffs’ argument that the Secretary failed to consider “infringement upon the
tribal sovereignty of other indigenous people, including the North Valley Yokuts and the
Picayune Rancheria” is likewise vague and unelaborated. See Pls.’ Mem. at 23. The plaintiff
Picayune Tribe, however, has submitted a separate brief that “address[es] certain issues raised”
by the Stand Up plaintiffs’ motion. See Pl. Picayune Rancheria’s Mem. Addressing Issues
Raised by Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Picayune Mem.”) at 1, ECF No. 28. The Court will
consider the Picayune Tribe’s brief in elaborating upon the Stand Up plaintiffs’ argument
regarding “infringement upon . . . tribal sovereignty.” See Pls.’ Mem. at 23. In its brief, the
Picayune Tribe argues first that the Secretary “arbitrarily accorded a ‘diminished weight’
35
standard in considering” potential economic harms to the Picayune Tribe. See Picayune Mem. at
5. The Picayune Tribe also contends that the Secretary “discounted entirely the devastating loss
of revenue that Picayune would suffer from the proposed casino,” id., and that “[t]he competitive
harms [were] not taken into account” in the Secretary’s ROD, see Tr. of Oral Argument at 35
(Jan. 25, 2013) (unofficial transcript). Neither of these arguments, however, is likely to succeed
on the merits.
First, the Picayune Tribe’s criticism, that the Secretary “accorded a ‘diminished weight’
standard” to the Picayune Tribe’s concerns, is unavailing. Picayune Mem. at 5. Once again, it is
helpful to consult the IGRA and its implementing regulations to clarify the scope of the
Secretary’s inquiry. The IGRA’s implementing regulations define “nearby Indian tribe” as any
tribe within a 25-mile radius of the proposed development, see 25 C.F.R. § 292.2, but the
Picayune Tribe indisputably falls outside that radius because its lands are located “approximately
39 miles from the [Madera] Site,” IGRA ROD at 370. Therefore, the Secretary was not required
to consider the Picayune Tribe’s concerns at all, though the Secretary observed that “the relative
proximity of Picayune’s lands, headquarters, and existing class III gaming facility to the Site has
led me to consider their comments in making my determination.” Id. Although the Secretary
concluded that the aforementioned considerations “compel[led] [him] to accord some weight to
Picayune’s concerns,” the Secretary also concluded that “[t]hose comments must be accorded
less weight than comments submitted by communities and tribes that fall within the definition of
‘surrounding community.’” Id. The weight accorded to the Picayune Tribe’s comments was
based on the logical premise that “[t]he weight accorded to the comments of tribes and local
governments outside the definition of ‘surrounding community’ will naturally diminish as the
36
distance between their jurisdictions and the proposed off-reservation gaming site increases.” Id.
at 371.
Thus, the Picayune Tribe’s contention that “[i]t was improper for the Assistant Secretary
to accord anything other than full weight to” the Tribe’s comments, see Picayune Mem. at 5, is
erroneous because, as the DOI noted when it adopted its final IGRA regulations, it is rational and
in keeping with congressional intent to accord weight to an entity’s concerns in proportion to the
entity’s physical proximity to the development in question. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 29,356–57.
Although the Picayune Tribe is correct that the Secretary concluded that the Tribe had rebutted
the 25-mile radius presumption contained in the IGRA regulations, see 25 C.F.R. § 292.2, that
conclusion only meant that the Secretary was required to consider the Picayune Tribe’s
comments at all, not that the Secretary was compelled to afford those comments a weight that
was equal to all other comments. The Secretary, in accord with his regulations, “consider[s]
detrimental impacts on a case-by-case basis,” 73 Fed. Reg. at 29,356, and he need not accord
equal weight to all comments regardless of the commenter’s proximity to the proposed gaming
establishment.
As to the Secretary’s consideration of the financial impact that development of the
Madera Site would have on the Picayune Tribe, the Secretary’s conclusion that “competition
from the [North Fork] Tribe’s proposed gaming facility in an overlapping gaming market is not
sufficient, in and of itself, to conclude that it would result in a detrimental impact to Picayune”
was supported by the evidence in the record. IGRA ROD at 371. In particular, the FEIS cited a
“gravity model impact analysis,” performed by a gaming and entertainment consulting firm
called the Innovation Group, which evaluated the gaming market in and around Madera County.
See FEIS at 4.7-61. That analysis concluded that Alternative A on the Madera Site would result
37
in “a market share decline of approximately 19 percent at [the Picayune Tribe’s casino].” Id.
The analysis also predicted that the development of Alternative A would increase “total gaming
expenditures at venues in the immediate market area by over $90 million.” Id. Most
importantly, the analysis observed that “[a] 19% revenue decline is . . . commonplace for
incumbents in expanding gaming markets,” and “even in the worst case, should market share at
competing facilities decline by the above percentages, all of the facilities are expected to remain
open and to continue to generate sustainable profits for their tribal owners.” Id. at 4.7-61 to 62.
In sum, the Innovation Group’s analysis concluded that permitting a class III gaming
establishment on the Madera Site would result in the Picayune Tribe having a smaller slice of a
larger gaming pie, and that the net economic effect of the North Fork Tribe’s entry into the
market would be that “the impact on the viability of operations” from the Picayune Tribe’s
resulting market-share decline “is not one that jeopardizes the casino’s ability to remain open.”
Id. at 4.7-61. From this economic analysis, the Secretary was likely rational in concluding that
such competition would not be significantly detrimental to the Picayune Tribe. Furthermore, the
gaming compact between the North Fork Tribe and the State of California requires the North
Fork Tribe to pay the Picayune Tribe what will likely amount to millions of dollars each year
until 2020 “[t]o mitigate the potential economic impact of the Tribe’s proposed Gaming
Facility.” See Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and the North Fork
Rancheria of Mono Indians of California (“North Fork Compact”) at 15–16 (Aug. 30, 2012),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Final_Compact_--__North_Fork.pdf. 24
24
These payments would, until gaming commences on the Madera Site, be equal to the amount that the Picayune
Tribe is obligated to pay to California under its own gaming compact (up to $768,750 per quarter). See North Fork
Compact at 15. After gaming commences, these payments would be equal to between 2.5% and 3.5% of the North
Fork Tribe’s net gaming profits. Id. at 16. The compact also provides, however, that these mitigation obligations
shall be terminated if the Picayune Tribe “pursues in any way or finances, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
any lobbying, administrative, legal, judicial, or other challenge to the Secretary’s decision to accept the 305-Acre
Parcel in trust for the Tribe.” Id. at 17.
38
Although the Picayune Tribe clearly disagrees with the predictive analysis of the
Innovation Group and believes that development of the Madera Site will be “devastating” to the
Picayune Tribe’s operations, see Picayune Mem. at 1, 3, 5–6, the Picayune Tribe offers no
concrete alternative analysis of Alternative A’s economic impacts that would suggest that a
gaming complex on the Madera Site would impair the Picayune Tribe’s ability to remain
profitable and self-sufficient. The IGRA was intended to allow Indian tribes like the North Fork
“to engage in gaming on par with other tribes,” Citizens Exposing Truth, 492 F.3d at 468, not to
insulate Indian gaming from normal market forces. Therefore, absent any evidence supporting
the prediction that development of the Madera Site would have a destructive competitive impact
upon the Picayune Tribe, the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in arguing that the Secretary’s
analysis of the economic effects on the Picayune Tribe was improper.
4. The Secretary’s Compliance with the NEPA
Finally, the Court will discuss the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Secretary’s
determinations ran afoul of the requirements contained in the NEPA.
a) Failure to Consider Reasonable Alternatives
The plaintiffs’ most forceful objection under the NEPA is that the Secretary failed to give
adequate consideration to a reasonable range of alternative sites for the proposed gaming
establishment, as required by the NEPA. See Pls.’ Mem. at 25–29; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (requiring agencies to consider “alternatives to the proposed action”). The
NEPA’s implementing regulations provide that, in considering alternatives, an agency must,
inter alia “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for
alternatives which are eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having
been eliminated.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (a). For those alternatives not eliminated from detailed
study, the agency must “[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative . . . so that reviewers
39
may evaluate their comparative merits.” Id. § 1502.14(b). “An alternative is ‘reasonable’ if it is
objectively feasible as well as ‘reasonable in light of the [the agency’s] objectives.’” Theodore
Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting City of
Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(b)
(defining “reasonable alternatives” as “alternatives that are technically and economically
practical or feasible and meet the purpose and need of the proposed action”).
In this regard, the Secretary considered five alternatives in detail: (1) Alternative A was
the full development of the Madera Site, as discussed above; (2) Alternative B was “a smaller-
scale version of Alternative A, but without hotel or pool components,” FEIS at 2-37;
(3) Alternative C was “a mixed-use retail development” on the Madera Site that “would include
several larger retail outlet stores and smaller storefronts, including food and beverage
establishments,” but would not include any gaming, id. at 2-45; (4) Alternative D would be
located on the North Fork Rancheria and would “consist of a smaller-scale version of Alternative
A, without retail, high-limit gaming, entertainment, hotel, or pool components,” id. at 2-54; and
(5) Alternative E would have been the status quo, or the “no-action alternative” required to be
considered under NEPA regulations, under which “neither site would be developed,” see id. at 2-
67; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d) (requiring EIS to “[i]nclude the alternative of no action”).
The plaintiffs have two primary claims regarding the Secretary’s consideration of
alternative sites. First, they argue that the Secretary failed to consider certain sites in detail that
the plaintiffs say were reasonable and viable alternatives. See Pls.’ Mem. at 26–29. In
particular, the plaintiffs focus on a 135-acre tract of land, known as the “Old Mill site,” which
“housed a working lumber mill between 1941 and 1994.” IGRA ROD at 291. The plaintiffs
argue that the Old Mill site “is viable as a site for a casino,” and the Secretary arbitrarily and
40
capriciously erred to eliminate it from further consideration as a reasonable alternative to the
Madera Site. See Pls.’ Mem. at 26. The plaintiffs observe that although “the Secretary focused
on environmental problems with the site and the purported claim that the site’s owner would not
sell the property for the purposes of developing a casino,” the plaintiffs nevertheless contend that
“[n]one of these reasons . . . was a proper basis for eliminating this alternative from
consideration.” Id. at 27.
None of the plaintiffs’ objections, however, are likely to succeed on the merits. First, the
Secretary observed a number of potential environmental problems with developing the project on
the Old Mill site, namely, that the soil on the site had been contaminated with various potentially
harmful compounds such as petroleum hydrocarbons, asbestos, lead-based paint, and diesel
fuels. See IGRA ROD at 292. Although the plaintiffs note that the Secretary concluded that this
contamination could be remedied through various clean-up efforts, see Pls.’ Mem. at 27, the
Secretary also observed that “the potential for the presence of unknown contamination related to
past uses on the site remains,” IGRA ROD at 292. More importantly, the Secretary observed
that the owners of the Old Mill site “sent two letters to the BIA stating that the site would not be
sold for the development of a casino project.” Id. The plaintiffs’ argument that the owner’s
refusal to sell the site for gaming purposes “is insufficient to reject the site,” Pls’ Mem. at 27,
makes little sense. Although gaming was not the express purpose of the proposed action, it was
a central focus of the proposed action because it was the use of the land that was most likely to
provide the revenue needed to meet the purpose and need of the project, see IGRA ROD at 287
(listing purpose and need), and therefore it was likely rational, for all of the reasons stated in the
IGRA ROD, for the Secretary to reject the Old Mill site as a reasonable alternative.
41
The plaintiffs also complain that the Secretary improperly rejected the North Fork
Rancheria and other sites closer to the North Fork Tribe’s historic area. They contend that the
reason for this “was ultimately about windfall profits” to the North Fork Tribe. See Pls.’ Mem.
at 28–29. They also argue that the Secretary’s analysis on economic impacts was inconsistent
because, on the one hand, sites near the North Fork Rancheria were rejected because of the
potential economic impact on neighboring tribal gaming operations, while on the other hand the
Picayune Tribe’s economic concerns regarding development on the Madera Site were found to
be insufficient. See id. The plaintiffs’ arguments in this regard are unlikely to lead to success on
the merits because they fail to appreciate that the purpose and need of a proposed action is a
cornerstone of whether an alternative is reasonable under the NEPA. 25 See, e.g., 43 C.F.R.
§ 46.420 (defining “reasonable alternatives” as “alternatives that are technically and
economically practical or feasible and meet the purpose and need of the proposed action”
(emphasis added)). Thus, it was rational for the Secretary to reject potential alternatives if they
would not, in the Secretary’s informed judgment, allow for a large enough development to
provide the North Fork Tribe with revenues that would meet the purpose and need of the
proposed action. It was not inconsistent with this rationale for the Secretary to refuse to
eliminate the Madera Site because, although it would meet the purpose and need of the proposed
action, it would have a competitive economic impact on neighboring gaming operations. In sum,
based upon the partial administrative record currently before the Court, the Secretary appears to
have considered a reasonable range of alternatives and provided a rational and concise
explanation of why each potential alternative was rejected from further consideration.
25
The plaintiffs’ argument also does not account for other reasons cited in support of rejecting the North Fork
Rancheria and other nearby sites, including most notably the fact that the “particularly varied and steep topography”
would inflate construction costs in that area, leading to the conclusion that a casino development in that area “could
not be successfully financed.” See IGRA ROD at 295.
42
b) Failure to Take “Hard Look” at Environmental Impacts
The plaintiffs also contend that the Secretary “failed to take a ‘hard look’ at the impacts
of the proposed action,” as required by the NEPA. Pls.’ Mem. at 30. In this regard, the plaintiffs
either rehash the same arguments they made regarding the Secretary’s consideration of detriment
to the surrounding community (e.g., crime, problem gambling, impacts on local governments,
environmental impacts), see supra Part III.B.3, or they offer conclusory statements about the
Secretary “stack[ing] the deck in favor of the [Madera Site]” and “minimiz[ing] how the
proposed mega-casino development will negatively impact water resources, protected species
and associated critical habitat and air quality and land resources,” Pls.’ Mem. at 31. This sort of
cursory, undeveloped argument does not state a colorable claim that an agency violated the
NEPA, particularly in this case where the Secretary’s two RODs discussed at some length the
exact issues the plaintiffs say were minimized. See IGRA ROD at 300–09 (discussing
environmental impacts); IRA ROD at 397–406 (same).
c) Adequate Public Participation
The plaintiffs also argue briefly that “the BIA failed to allow adequate participation by
the general public” throughout the North Fork Tribe’s application process. Pls.’ Mem. at 30.
They argue that the “public hearing facility” was “too small,” that seating and speaking
preference was given to the North Fork Tribe and other proponents of the casino development,
and that the BIA has “attempted to evade public scrutiny for its unlawful decision by making it
difficult for interested parties to review the Secretary’s decision.” Id. None of these arguments
has any likely merit. The public comment period in this case was robust, allowing for hundreds
of written comments as well as 101 spoken comments at the public hearing. See Defs.’ Ex J
(listing all public comments). Written comments came from a variety of sources, including 62
comments from government agencies, 21 comments from businesses and non-governmental
43
agencies, 109 comments from individuals, and even 39 comments that were accepted after the
close of the comment period. See id. Most notably, although the plaintiffs claim that the public
hearing was biased, the record demonstrates that the plaintiffs accounted for seventeen spoken
comments, while the North Fork Tribe accounted for only twelve. 26 See id. at 7–10. The
plaintiffs’ contention about the availability of the IRA ROD likewise appears unsupported. It
appears that the IRA ROD has been made available to the public via the website dedicated to the
North Fork casino development, http://northforkeis.com/. That site contains all of the relevant
documents related to the Secretary’s decision to take the Madera Site into trust, including the
DEIS, FEIS, Federal Register notices, and the IRA ROD. From all of this, it appears clear that
the plaintiffs “had a substantial opportunity to comment on the proposals before they were
approved.” Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 525 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2007).
d) Conflict of Interest
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Secretary violated the NEPA by having the FEIS
“prepared in violation of the conflict of interest provisions of 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5.” Pls.’ Mem. at
30. The cited provision provides that “any [EIS] prepared pursuant to the requirements of NEPA
shall be prepared directly by or by a contractor selected by the lead agency,” and “[i]t is the
intent of these regulations that the contractor be chosen solely by the lead agency . . . to avoid
any conflict of interest.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c). The regulation goes on to require that
“[c]ontractors shall execute a disclosure statement prepared by the lead agency . . . specifying
that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.” Id. The plaintiffs’
objection stems from the fact that the contractor that prepared the FEIS in this case—a firm
called Analytical Environmental Services (“AES”)—was retained by the North Fork Tribe to
26
The seventeen comments included three comments from representatives of the Chukchansi Gold Resort Casino,
which is owned and operated by plaintiff Picayune Tribe. See Defs.’ Ex. J, at 9.
44
conduct an environmental assessment prior to the EIS process, implying that AES may have had
a conflict of interest and a plain motive or incentive to please its tribal client.
The Court is satisfied, however, that the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of
their conflict-of-interest argument regarding AES’s involvement in the preparation of the EIS for
the Madera Site. First, the North Fork Tribe, AES, and the BIA all signed a disclosure
agreement prior to the development of the EIS, which stated, in compliance with 40 C.F.R.
§ 1506.5(c), that “AES has no financial interest in the results of the environmental analysis or the
BIA’s decision regarding the approvals for the project” and that “North Fork Rancheria will be
solely responsible for payment of all AES fees.” Defs.’ Ex. L, at 1, ECF No. 30-12. Second, the
D.C. Circuit has held that “there is no cause to invalidate [an] EIS” unless “any error in the
selection of the contractor . . . compromise[d] the objectivity and integrity of the NEPA process,”
which requires demonstrating “substantive flaws in the EIS itself.” Cmtys. Against Runway
Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 686–87 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As discussed above, the Court has concluded that none of the purported substantive
flaws identified by the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, and therefore, the plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate any likely prejudice that could have resulted from an error in the
selection of AES as the contractor in this case. Thus, the Court need not determine whether the
DOI erred in selecting AES in the first place. See id. at 686 (concluding that, without any
showing of “substantive flaws” in the EIS, “[w]e need not determine the [agency’s] precise role
in [the contractor’s] selection”).
***
As the foregoing discussion establishes, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have not
established a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims against the defendants.
45
Nevertheless, in keeping with the traditional “sliding scale” consideration of the preliminary
injunction factors, the Court will proceed to analyze the likelihood of irreparable harm, the
balance of harms, and the public interest in determining whether to grant the plaintiffs’ request
for preliminary injunctive relief.
C. Irreparable Harm
Although the plaintiffs’ failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits weighs
heavily in the preliminary injunction calculus, “[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the
applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.”
11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 29481.1 (3d ed. 2012).
The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel
Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “The moving party must show ‘the
injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable
relief to prevent irreparable harm.’” Id. (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Additionally, as the term “irreparable injury” implies, “the
injury must be beyond remediation.” Id.
In this case, the plaintiffs contend that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm if the fee-
to-trust transfer is not enjoined because “[i]t is unclear whether a transfer into trust can be
reversed,” thereby rendering inevitable the irreparable harm associated with the construction and
operation of the casino complex (e.g., environmental and aesthetic changes to the land and
surrounding community). See Pls.’ Mem. at 35–38. Additionally, the plaintiff raise the concern
that the Court may lack jurisdiction to enjoin construction or gaming activities on the Madera
Site once the land is transferred into trust because the North Fork Tribe will then be able to
46
“claim that any suit to enjoin the development on the [Madera Site] or to reverse the trust
acquisition is barred by tribal sovereign immunity.” Id. at 39; see also Tr. of Oral Argument at
22 (unofficial transcript) (counsel for Stand Up plaintiffs stating that “we believe most of the
harms are to the plaintiffs’ ability to fully adjudicate this case”). Thus, there are two potential
irreparable injuries that could, according to the plaintiffs, occur if the Court does not enjoin the
transfer before it is consummated on February 1, 2013: (1) the loss of any available remedy to
prevent the physical alteration of the Madera Site post-transfer; and (2) actual physical alteration
of the Madera Site. 27
The Court will first address the plaintiffs’ concern with the potential “inability of the
Court to remedy this [fee-to-trust-transfer] down the road.” Tr. of Oral Argument at 22
(unofficial transcript). Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak, there remains a level
of uncertainty regarding how courts are to approach challenges to the transfer of land into trust
under the IRA. The Patchak Court suggested, without holding, that courts would retain
jurisdiction to vacate a trust transfer after it is consummated. See Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2204,
2212 (permitting petitioner-plaintiff’s post-trust-transfer APA claim to proceed where “the suit
now effectively seeks to divest the Federal Government of title to the [Indian trust] land”
(emphasis added)). This conclusion makes sense because, as the Patchak Court held, the
27
The plaintiffs also argue that they “are entitled to an order mandating that the Secretary adhere to his regulations
and stay the trust transfer during the pendency of this case.” Pls.’ Reply at 2. This argument is based on the
Secretary’s refusal to comply with DOI’s stated policy to self-stay the trust transfer upon timely initiation of
litigation challenging the validity of the fee-to-trust determination. See supra BIA HANDBOOK at 15. Specifically,
the plaintiffs contend that “25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) imposes a non-discretionary duty the Secretary is required to
follow and which the Court may order him to follow, as an alternative to entering a preliminary injunction.” Id. at
7 (emphasis added). Although the Court fully appreciates the plaintiffs’ frustration with the Secretary’s staunch
refusal to self-stay the transfer and permit an adjudication of the plaintiffs’ claims based upon the full administrative
record, the plaintiffs simply have no basis to contend that the Court can order the Secretary to stay the transfer “as
an alternative to entering a preliminary injunction.” Id. The plaintiffs did not raise the Secretary’s refusal to self-
stay in their Complaint, and they have not filed a motion for injunctive relief, independent of a preliminary
injunction, that is based on the Secretary’s refusal to self-stay. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b) (“A request for a court order
must be made by motion.”). Therefore, the Court will not consider the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief based
solely on the Secretary’s refusal to self-stay.
47
government can no longer avoid such post-transfer relief on the ground of sovereign immunity,
see id. at 2212, and the IRA makes clear that the title to all lands held in trust are in the name of
the United States, see 25 U.S.C. § 465. Therefore, the Court sees no cognizable limit to its
jurisdiction that would preclude a future order vacating the trust transfer in this case after the
transfer has already been made. Also, for what it is worth, the government has repeatedly
assured the Court, both in its briefs as well as at oral argument, that “the Department of the
Interior will take the land out of trust if ordered to do so by the Court.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 39.
Furthermore, although tribal sovereign immunity might in some circumstances prevent a
court from enjoining tribal activities on lands held in trust for an Indian tribe, the North Fork
Tribe has provided an explicit waiver of its sovereign immunity as it relates to the claims in the
instant action. According to the North Fork Tribe, it “understands that the limited waiver of
sovereign immunity effected by its intervention would make it subject to any permanent
injunctive relief that might be entered by the Court . . . including relief that would prevent or
limit activities on the property or require the United States to transfer the land out of trust.”
Intervenor’s Opp’n at 39; see also Tr. of Oral Argument at 16 (unofficial transcript) (government
counsel stating that North Fork Tribe “are going into this with their eyes wide open”). The
plaintiffs are perhaps justified in their concerns, on a general level, because “[a]ny waiver of a
tribe’s sovereign immunity, whether by Congress or by the tribe itself, ‘cannot be implied but
must be unequivocally expressed.’” Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1498
(D.C. Cir. 1997). Even so, the North Fork Tribe’s waiver of immunity in this case, although
somewhat limited, has been unequivocally expressed and would, by its terms, extend to any
future order of this Court that the Tribe cease construction or gaming activities on the land. See
Intervenor’s Opp’n at 39 (waiving sovereign immunity as to “any permanent injunctive relief
48
that might be entered by the Court . . . including relief that would prevent or limit activities on
the property or require the United States to transfer the land out of trust” (emphasis added)).
Thus, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood that they will be deprived of any future
remedies to enjoin the fee-to-trust decision or any construction or gaming activities on the trust
land absent preliminary injunctive relief. 28
Similarly, the plaintiffs have also not demonstrated a likelihood that any tangible
alteration to the Madera Site will take place if no preliminary injunctive relief is granted. The
plaintiffs focus heavily upon what the North Fork Tribe will have the ability to do once the land
is transferred. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mem. at 38 (“If the Secretary is allowed to take the land into trust,
the Tribe may immediately begin offering gambling or begin construction.” (emphasis added));
id. at 40 (“Here, the Tribe has full authority and power to commence development and
construction of the casino immediately after the fee-to-trust transfer occurs . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Pls.’ Reply at 20 (“Once the [Madera Site] goes into trust, the Tribe will have sovereign
authority to alter the land . . . .” (emphasis added)). Yet, the Supreme Court has clearly held that
“[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent
with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
The North Fork Tribe has also represented numerous times that, once the transfer is completed, a
number of steps will need to be taken before any actual construction or gaming activities can
28
The Court’s conclusion that it would have jurisdiction to vacate a transfer of trust land or to enjoin the North Fork
Tribe from engaging in construction or gaming activities on the Madera Site does not preclude the possibility that, in
the event the government is ordered to take the Madera Site out of trust, the government may have to contend with
legal claims against it by third parties, including, for example, claims by the North Fork Tribe for interference with
their right to the beneficial use of the Madera Site or a breach of the government’s fiduciary duties as a trustee of the
land. See, e.g., Hydaburg Co-op Ass’n v. United States, 667 F.2d 64, 68 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“[T]he ‘trust’ established by
section 5 of the [IRA] imposes . . . a duty on the United States to hold the acquired Indian lands so as to prevent
continued alienation.”); Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1017–19 (8th Cir. 1978) (recognizing Indian’s “right
under [25 U.S.C.] § 465 to enjoy the beneficial use of land held in trust” and holding that Indian could state claim
for infringement of that right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
49
feasibly begin. See, e.g., Intervenor’s Opp’n at 37 (“Under the most optimistic assumptions, the
Tribe could not begin actual operation of a casino for many months.”); id. at 38 (“[T]here are
many steps to be taken after the land is taken into trust but before construction could begin.”).
The plaintiffs have offered nothing more than speculation and mere possibility to rebut the
Tribe’s representations in this regard.
As a result, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood
of irreparable harm that would occur absent preliminary injunctive relief. Despite the plaintiffs’
insufficient showing of irreparable harm, the Court is mindful that, once the transfer occurs, the
likelihood of irreparable harm will increase as this litigation continues. Therefore, the Court will
require, during the pendency of this case, that the North Fork Tribe provide notice to the parties
and the Court at least 120 days prior to any physical alteration of the land at the Madera Site. To
be clear, “physical alteration” includes anything that could reasonably be considered construction
activities, the breaking of any ground at the site, or the destruction of any structures that
presently exist on the land.
D. Balance of Harms
Having concluded that the plaintiffs have demonstrated neither a likelihood of success on
the merits of their claims nor a likelihood of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, the Court
is persuaded that the grant of preliminary injunctive relief would be unwarranted. See Davis,
571 F.3d at 1295 (“Because the [plaintiffs] have failed to demonstrate either a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, we affirm the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction.”). Nevertheless, the Court will also consider the other two preliminary
injunction factors—the balance of harms and the public interest—lest the Court run afoul of the
D.C. Circuit’s admonition that district courts “consider meaningfully [all of] the preliminary
50
injunction factors.” See Gordon, 632 F.3d at 725; see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 26 (“Despite the
importance of assessing the balance of equities and the public interest in determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction, the District Court addressed these considerations in only a cursory
fashion.”).
As already discussed above, little if any harm would inure to the plaintiffs if no
preliminary injunctive relief were granted. This conclusion is buttressed by the Court’s directive
that the North Fork Tribe provide 120 days’ notice before any physical alteration of the Madera
Site. Absent a preliminary injunction, the transfer of the trust lands will occur on February 1,
2013, and the North Fork Tribe will continue on its odyssey to make its long-awaited gaming
complex a reality. Yet, none of the tangible harms identified by the plaintiffs (e.g., traffic
congestion, increased crime, problem gambling, environmental effects) would be remotely likely
to occur for some time. Indeed, the plaintiffs would have four months’ notice before any such
harms ever commenced, which would provide ample opportunity for them to renew their request
for preliminary injunctive relief if this case is still pending.
On the other side of the scale, the intervenor-defendant North Fork Tribe will be at least
incrementally harmed by the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. As recited in the Tribe’s
briefing, the North Fork people are in “dire economic straits” with higher than a 16%
unemployment rate, and any preliminary injunctive relief would bring to a screeching halt the
process of the Tribe obtaining the economic benefits contemplated by the IGRA. See
Intervenor’s Opp’n at 42–43. Comparing the relative tangible harm that would be imposed upon
the North Fork Tribe if a preliminary injunction were granted with the purely symbolic injury
suffered by the plaintiffs if a preliminary injunction were not granted, the Court concludes that
the balance of equities tips in favor of not granting a preliminary injunction.
51
E. Public Interest
Finally, the Court must also consider whether the granting of an injunction would be in
the public interest. First, in evaluating the public interest, it is important to observe that the
government defendants have compelled the Court to consider the merits of the Secretary’s
“extraordinary assertion of power,” 29 which was over seven years in the making, on a less-than-
full administrative record. This clearly puts the plaintiffs and the Court at a disadvantage in
evaluating the potential merits of the plaintiffs’ arguments, particularly in the face of a statute
(the IGRA) that expressly disfavors the type of off-reservation Indian gaming that will result if
the Secretary’s determinations are ultimately upheld. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (prohibiting off-
reservation gaming on lands acquired in trust after October 17, 1988 unless certain exceptions
are satisfied); see also IGRA ROD at 367 (noting “the intent of Congress, which favors tribal
gaming on existing and former reservations, and on lands acquired in trust prior to October 17,
1998”). Thus, the litigation strategy of the government defendants, in refusing to self-stay for a
period sufficient to afford submission and consideration of the full administrative record,
disserves the public interest.
Nevertheless, absent a demonstrated likelihood that the Secretary has acted improperly in
transferring the Madera Site into trust for the purpose of developing a gaming establishment,
enjoining that agency action would not be in the public interest. Since the agency’s actions were
ostensibly in furtherance of Congress’ judgment that Indian tribes must, in appropriate
circumstances, be given the opportunity to pursue economic self-sufficiency and strong tribal
government through gaming, the Court would be remiss to stand in the way absent a showing
that the agency has acted in likely contravention of its statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the
29
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (No. 07-526), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-526.pdf.
52
Court concludes that, on balance, the public interest would not be served by a grant of
preliminary injunctive relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion makes plain, all four of the preliminary injunction factors
weigh against the granting of a preliminary injunction in this case. Therefore, the Court will
deny the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Additionally, for the reasons discussed
above, the Court will deny the government defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: January 29, 2013
/s/ Beryl A. Howell
BERYL A. HOWELL
United States District Judge
53