UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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LEE O. HUDSON, )
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Petitioner, )
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v. ) Civ. Action No. 12-1193 (ESH)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., )
)
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Respondents. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Government’s Opposition to the Petitioner’s
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Because, as the government argues, D.C. Code
§ 23-110 deprives this Court of jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition, this case will be
dismissed.
In his sparsely worded habeas application, which is clarified somewhat by his affidavit
filed in response to the government’s opposition, petitioner states that on March 6, 2008, he was
sentenced by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to “36 months[,] 18 months
probation” for cocaine distribution. (Pet. at 2.) On February 9, 2011, the Superior Court
revoked petitioner’s probation and sentenced him to “20 months imprisonment, with credit for
time served, followed by 2 years of supervised release.” (Pet’r’s Affidavit [Dkt. 12].) Petitioner
claims that he is wrongfully imprisoned because the new sentence subjected him to double
jeopardy. (Id.)
Under District of Columbia law, a prisoner convicted and sentenced in the Superior Court
may file a motion in that court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence “upon the ground that
(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of
the District of Columbia [or] (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,
[or] (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” D.C. Code § 23–110(a). It is
established that claims arising out of a Superior Court judgment of conviction must be pursued in
that court under D.C. Code § 23-110. See Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997). An "application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to
this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the
Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” D.C. Code §23-110(g). Absent a
showing of an inadequate or ineffective local remedy, “a District of Columbia prisoner has no
recourse to a federal judicial forum.” Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986) (internal footnote omitted); see accord Adams v.
Middlebrooks, 810 F. Supp. 2d 119, 124 (D.D.C. 2011). “A remedy is inadequate or ineffective
if it deprives the petitioner of ‘any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a
defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.’” Adams, 810 F.
Supp. 2d at 124 (quoting In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (other citation omitted).
Since petitioner has not claimed, let alone shown, that his remedy under D.C. Code § 23-
110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the challenged sentence, this case will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
Date: September 20, 2012
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