SUMMARY OPINION AND ORDER; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ARTHUR WEST,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 10-cv-666 (RLW)
JOHN ROBERTS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, Motion for extension of
time for service of process (Docket No. 3), and Motion for costs of service of process on
defendants Suter, Roberts and Kennedy (Docket No. 4). The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) and denies Plaintiff’s pending motions as moot.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Plaintiff is a resident of the state of Washington. He sues two sitting justices of the
United States Supreme Court (Roberts and Kennedy), clerks of the Supreme Court (Suter and
Atkins), a United States District Judge and clerk for the Western District of Washington (Settle
and Rifkin), the current Washington Secretary of State (Reed), and the current Washington
Attorney General (McKenna). The Complaint arises out of Plaintiff’s failed attempts in other
courts to intervene in a case about and obtain documents relating to a Washington state
referendum. In fact, as best as this Court can discern, Plaintiff’s allegations wholly relate to
Defendants’ acts related to cases in other courts. In short, Plaintiff alleges that the judicial
defendants (Roberts, Kennedy, Settle, Suter, Atkins and Rifkin): 1) rendered erroneous
decisions; 2) denied him the right to file certain pleadings; or 3) denied him the right to intervene
in certain cases where he was otherwise not a party. Plaintiff alleges that the Washington state
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SUMMARY OPINION AND ORDER; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
officials (Reed and McKenna): 1) failed to assert defenses that Plaintiff thinks they should have
asserted in a case in which Plaintiff was not a party; and 2) denied him the right to inspect certain
documents in the state’s possession relating to the referendum. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
conduct violated his constitutional rights, that Defendants discriminated against him due to his
membership in a suspect class (a class that he fails to specify), and that Defendants violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (despite the fact that he fails to allege the nature of his
disability).
ANALYSIS
Despite the favorable inferences a plaintiff receives on a motion to dismiss, in resolving a
question of subject matter jurisdiction, “it is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the federal
court’s limited jurisdiction unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the Court possesses jurisdiction.” Ramer v. United States, 620 F.Supp.2d 90, 95-6 (D.D.C.
2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[w]hile the complaint is to
be construed liberally, the Court need not accept factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those
inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept
plaintiffs’ legal conclusions.” See Speelman v. United States, 461 F.Supp.2d 71, 73 (D.D.C.
2006). Although a pro se Plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, this does not give a pro se plaintiff license to ignore the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not
want to assert. See Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237,
239 (D.D.C. 1987). Thus, although pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard, “even
a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.”
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SUMMARY OPINION AND ORDER; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Curran v. Holder, 626 F.Supp.2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Although Plaintiff claims to sue all officials in their official and personal capacities,
Plaintiff has only alleged facts relating to acts that Defendants have performed in the course of
their official duties as judges, judicial officers or state officials. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
to support a finding that any of the Defendants acted outside their jurisdiction or discretion.
Therefore, all claims against Defendants in their personal capacities are dismissed.
All claims against the judges and clerks must also be dismissed because those defendants
enjoy absolute immunity from acts arising out of their official duties. See Sibley v. U.S. Supreme
Court, 2011 WL 1983343, at *3-4 (D.D.C. 2011). Even if not, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Supreme Court, which Plaintiff asks this Court to do.
In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “It seems axiomatic that a lower court may not
order the judges or officers of a higher court to take an action.” Panko v. Rodak, 606 F.2d 168,
171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980). As such, this Court has no subject
matter jurisdiction over Defendants Roberts, Kennedy, Suter and Atkins.
Similarly, in order to grant the relief sought against Settle and Rifkin, this Court would be
called upon to review and pass on the decisions of its sister court in the Western District of
Washington. A federal district court, however, lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the
decisions of another federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional
provisions); Fleming v. United States, 847 F.Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), cert. denied 513
U.S. 1150 (1995).
Finally, any claims against Reed and McKenna in their official capacities must be
dismissed. A suit against a state official in his official capacity is deemed a suit against the state.
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Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). The Eleventh Amendment immunizes a state
from suit in federal court, unless immunity is waived.1 See College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 675-76 (1999); Keenan v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 643 F. Supp. 324, 327-28 (D.D.C. 1986)
(citing cases). A waiver is found “only where stated by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the test as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.” Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 781 F.2d 218, 221
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged, and
the complaint does not reveal, any facts or other basis from which the Court may find a waiver of
Washington state’s immunity, which extends to its agents sued in their official capacity.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed and his pending motions are
denied as moot. An Order accompanies this Memorandum.
Date: July 26, 2011 /s/
ROBERT L. WILKINS
United States District Judge
1
The amendment provides in pertinent part: “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. It is long established
that this amendment applies equally to suits brought by citizens against their own states. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890).
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