UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
TRACY MCFADDEN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1198 (PLF)
)
SIMON WAINWRIGHT et al., )
)
Respondents. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this action for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner, a District of Columbia
prisoner, challenges the “[t]he Warrant that was used to take [him] into custody and incarcerate
him from [March 9, 2010] to the present [contending that it] was not a Judicial Warrant.” Pet. at
1. Because, as respondents correctly argue, the United States Parole Commission (“the
Commission”) lawfully issued the parole violator warrant underlying the challenged detention,
the Court will deny the habeas petition and dismiss the case.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving an aggregate sentence of 21 years’ imprisonment based on
consecutive sentences imposed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in July and
October 1989. See Resp’t.’s Ex. 1.1 He is no novice to the parole scheme. See McFadden v.
Wainwright, No. 10-0596 (PLF) (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2010) (Mem. Op. at 1-2) (recounting
petitioner’s parole history). Petitioner’s current custody stems from the following.
1
All of the exhibits relied upon are attached to the Federal Respondents’ Opposition to
Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 10].
On March 5, 2010, the Commission issued a parole violator warrant based on
petitioner’s failure to report to his supervising officer and his violation of a parole condition to
participate in anger management. Ex. 26 at 2. Following execution of the warrant on March 9,
2010, and a probable cause hearing three days later, on March 12, 2010, petitioner agreed to an
expedited revocation proceeding where he “accept[ed] an Expedited Decision [to] (1) revoke[]
[his] parole . . . and (2) impose[] a parole date/term of imprisonment . . . no greater than the
bottom of [his] guideline range . . . at least 2 but not more than 5 months.” Ex. 28 at 2.
Petitioner acknowledged that his “guidelines [were] undetermined.” Id. Petitioner also agreed to
“accept whatever decision the Commission [made] with regard to [street-time credit],” id., and
waived his right to appeal the decision. He maintained the right to request amendment of a
determination he believed to be in error with regard to, inter alia, the guideline range. Id. at 1.
Pursuant to the foregoing agreement, the Commission, by Notice of Action dated
April 27, 2010, revoked petitioner’s parole, forfeited street-time credit earned between August
26, 2009 and March 8, 2010, and set a presumptive parole date of March 7, 2011, after
petitioner’s service of 12 months’ imprisonment – the bottom guideline range of 12 to 16
months. Ex. 29. Petitioner, through counsel, sought reconsideration of the guideline range,
claiming that he believed it to be 8 to 12, but the Commission denied his request because the
expedited agreement stated that the guideline range would be determined later. Exs. 30, 31.
Petitioner filed this action on July 15, 2010, from the District of Columbia Jail. See Pet. Caption.
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioner asserts that he was “falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned” because the
Commission’s issuance of the parole violator warrant violated the separation of powers doctrine
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and “the 4th amendment Warrant Clause.” Pet. at 2. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, “[t]he
granting and revocation of parole are matters traditionally handled by administrative [not
judicial] officers.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972). As the paroling authority for
District of Columbia prisoners, the Commission is empowered by D.C. Code § 24-403.01(6) to
grant, deny or revoke a District of Columbia offender's parole supervision and to impose or
modify his parole conditions. See D.C. Code § 24-131(a); Thompson v. District of Columbia
Dep’t of Corrections, 511 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2007). In exercising its authority, the
Commission, upon a credible allegation that a parolee has violated the conditions of his release,
may “[i]ssue a warrant for the apprehension and return of the offender to custody.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.98(a)(2). The warrant “shall be accompanied by a warrant application (or other notice)
stating,” among other information, the charges and documentation “upon which the Commission
intends to rely. . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 2.98(f); see Resp’t.’s Ex. 26 (Warrant Application).
Because the foregoing authority governs the execution of a judicially imposed
sentence, “[t]he Parole Commission does not exercise a judicial function and its decisions do not
violate the separation of powers.” Montgomery v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, No. 06-2133 (CKK),
2007 WL 1232190, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2007) (citing cases); accord Leach v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 522 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251 (D.D.C. 2007); Hammett v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, No. 10-
0442 (JDB), 2010 WL 1257669, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2010) (stating that “[t]his argument, and
similar separation of powers arguments, have been raised often and rejected each
time.”) (citation omitted). As explained by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland,
sentencing decisions have long been a shared responsibility among the legislative,
judicial, and executive branches and, when the legislative branch gave the
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Commission the responsibilities of imposing conditions of release and revoking
supervised release for D.C. felony offenders under the D.C. determinate
sentencing scheme, it was only maintaining the executive branch functions that
had been traditionally and appropriately delegated to that branch of government.
Taylor v. Hollingworth, Civ. Action No. DKC-07-970 (D.Md. Oct. 29, 2007), 2007 WL
5614097, at *2.
Finding no basis for issuing the writ, the Court will deny the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and dismiss the case. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/_______________________
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
DATE: December 1, 2010 United States District Judge