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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FILED
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AUG 2 5 2010
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Courts for the District of Columbia
Clinton T. Eldridge, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. )
)
Civil Action No.
10 1440
Blake R. Davis, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action, brought pro se, is before the Court on petitioner's application for a writ of
habeas corpus, accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will
grant the application to proceed in forma pauperis and will dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
,
. Petitioner is a prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, serving a
sentence of 40 to 120 years imposed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on July
19, 1984. Pet. at 2. He challenges his convictions on multiple counts of rape, robbery and
burglary following his pleas of guilty. See Pet. at 2 & Ex. A. It is established that challenges to a
Superior Court judgment of conviction must be pursued in that court under D.C. Code § 23-110,
see Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d
34,36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and that absent a showing of an inadequate or ineffective local
remedy, "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum," Garris v.
Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986) (internal footnote
omitted). Under District of Columbia law,
[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to
apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by ... any
Federal ... court ifit appears ... that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless
it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g). Petitioner acknowledges that he has applied for relief under § 23-110
more than once and that "[e]ach time I appeal, the court always deny [sic] my appeal. ... Even
the Supreme Court have [sic] denied appeal." Pet. at 4; see Ex. H (Judgment of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals) (observing in December 2009 that "this appeal represents
appellant's ninth post judgment filing wherein [he] raises issues that have previously been
considered and rejected by the Superior Court and this court"). Petitioner's lack of success in
those courts does not render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective, see Garris v. Lindsay,
794 F.2d at 727; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753,756-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases), and he
has provided no other basis for finding the local remedy inadequate. See Williams v. Martinez,
586 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (concluding that this Court would have jurisdiction over a
"federal habeas petition asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel after [the petitioner
has] moved to recall the mandate in the D.C. Court of Appeals[.]"). This Court therefore lacks
authority to entertain the petition. A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date: August 11 ,2010
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