UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
GLENNA LEWIS, as Personal Representative )
of the Estate of Mark Anthony Harris, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 07-1663 (ESH)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant District of Columbia has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to
Counts I and III of plaintiff’s complaint. Count I, alleging violations by the District of the due
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is plaintiff’s only
federal claim. In her opposition, plaintiff concedes the District’s motion as to Count I, expressly
stating that she “shall not be pursuing her constitutional tort claim under Count I of her complaint.”
(Opp’n at 1.) Accordingly, the Court will grant as conceded the District’s motion with respect to
Count I and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law
claims.
When the federal-law claims on which the court’s original jurisdiction is based have been
dismissed, the court has discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban
Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the
court balances the traditional “values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). However, “in the usual case in which
all federal-law claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Id. at 350 n.7; see also
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should
be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”). This action is clearly the “usual case,” and
in light of the dismissal of plaintiff’s federal claim against the District, the Court sees no reason to
retain jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the District’s motion for partial
summary judgment and will dismiss Count I of the complaint with prejudice and the remaining
counts without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
Date: May 28, 2009