UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
)
JOHN DOE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 08-0656 (PLF)
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter came before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants the
District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Department of Child & Family Services, and the
District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (the “government
defendants”).1 Upon consideration of the government defendants’ motion, plaintiff’s opposition
thereto, the government defendants’ reply and the entire record in this case, the Court by Order of
March 31, 2009 (1) granted the government defendants’ motion to dismiss as non sui juris the
District of Columbia Department of Child & Family Services and the District of Columbia
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, and (2) denied the remainder of the government
defendants’ motion. This Memorandum Opinion and Order explains the reasoning underlying
the March 31, 2009 Order; requires the parties to re-evaluate the feasibility of settlement in light
of a recent legislative enactment; and directs the parties to submit new briefs if settlement fails.
1
The papers submitted in connection with this matter include: Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss (“Mot.”); Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Opp.”); and
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“Reply”).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that in 2004 he was placed in a youth shelter operated by Sasha
Bruce Youthwork, Inc. (“Sasha Bruce”), “a non-profit corporation operating in the District of
Columbia that contracts with [the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation
Services] to provide temporary shelter for juveniles under the jurisdiction of the District of
Columbia Superior Court.” Defendant Sasha Bruce Youthwork’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint ¶ 5.2 According to Mr. Doe, the government defendants placed him in the shelter
after he was charged with assaulting a relative. See Opp. at 2. He was 15 years old at the time.
Mr. Doe claims that he “remained in [the shelter] pending disposition of his [assault] case for
approximately seven months” without receiving a fact-finding hearing as contemplated by
District of Columbia law. First Amended Complaint ¶ 12 (“Compl.”); see also id. ¶ 22 (citing
16 D.C. CODE § 2310). He also claims that he was sexually assaulted by two older children
while in shelter care. See id. ¶ 26. On February 25, 2008, Mr. Doe filed suit in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia against the government defendants and the youth shelter in
which he was placed. The case was subsequently removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 because Mr. Doe’s first amended complaint includes claims under the United States
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doe v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 08-0656,
Notice of Removal at 1-2 (D.D.C. April 15, 2008).
2
Mr. Doe’s first amended complaint improperly identified Reach Youth Shelter,
rather than Sasha Bruce, as a party defendant. On November 12, 2008, the Court granted Mr.
Doe leave to file a motion to amend his complaint for the purpose of substituting Sasha Bruce for
Reach Youth Shelter as a defendant. See Doe v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 08-0656,
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2008). To date, Mr. Doe has failed to do
so. In any event, neither Reach nor Sasha Bruce has filed a dispositive motion in this matter, so
neither figures into this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
2
Mr. Doe asserts four claims against the government defendants. In Count I, Mr.
Doe seeks declaratory relief. Specifically, he seeks (1) “a judicial declaration that [the
government defendants’] policy of holding minor children in shelter detention for undetermined
periods of time greater than 30 days [without providing hearings on the charges for which they
are placed in shelter care] deprived [Mr. Doe] and deprives all other similarly-situated minor
children [of] their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and laws of the
District of Columbia [– in particular, 16 D.C. CODE § 2310],” Compl. ¶ 41; and (2) “a judicial
declaration as to the duties of [the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation
Services] and court social services with respect to the care and supervision of minor children
without parental control.” Id. ¶ 42. In Count II, Mr. Doe seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arguing that he was “deprived of his constitutional rights and due process of law” because he was
forced to remain in the youth shelter without a hearing for an extended period of time and
endured sexual assault while there. Id. ¶ 45. In Count III, Mr. Doe seeks relief under a
negligence theory: that is, he argues that the government defendants’ failure “to properly train,
supervise, control, direct and monitor their agents” proximately caused the physical and
psychological injuries he suffered at the youth shelter. Id. ¶¶ 50-52. Finally, in Count IV
(incorrectly numbered as a second Count III), Mr. Doe asserts a common law claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. See id. ¶¶ 53-56.
The government defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Doe’s claims against
them. They contend that (1) Mr. Doe’s claims against the District of Columbia should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Mr. Doe has
failed to serve the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and (2) Mr. Doe’s claims against the two
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District of Columbia agencies should be dismissed because those agencies are non sui juris. The
government defendants further argue that (3) Counts I and II should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim because Mr. Doe was placed in “shelter care” rather than “secure detention,” and
therefore was not entitled to an expeditious fact-finding hearing under 16 D.C. CODE § 2310 (an
argument explained in greater detail below). Finally, the government defendants argue that
(4) the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Doe’s common law
claims in Counts III and IV, but that even if the Court were to assert supplemental jurisdiction
over those claims, the Court should dismiss them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim because the government defendants cannot be held
liable for the acts or omissions of an independent contractor like the youth shelter in which Mr.
Doe was placed. See Mot. at 1.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Service on the District of Columbia
On July 20, 2008, Mr. Doe filed proof of service upon the Mayor of the District of
Columbia, including an affidavit by the process server stating that service had been effected upon
“Ms. Tabatha Braxton.” Ms. Braxton is one of the individuals designated to receive service of
process on behalf of the Mayor of the District of Columbia. See Mot. at 6. Thus, as it appears
that Mr. Doe has properly served the Mayor – and as the government defendants have failed to
argue otherwise since Mr. Doe filed his proof of service – the Court declines to dismiss Mr.
Doe’s claims against the District of Columbia for lack of proper service.3
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The government defendants do not argue that Mr. Doe’s service upon the District
of Columbia is defective in any other way.
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B. Non Sui Juris Agencies
As noted above, Mr. Doe has asserted claims against two agencies of the District
of Columbia government: the District of Columbia Department of Child & Family Services and
the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services. According to the
government defendants, Mr. Doe’s claims against these two agencies must be dismissed because
they are non sui juris – that is, “not suable as separate entities.” Mot. at 7 (citing several cases
explaining that agencies of the District of Columbia government are non sui juris absent specific
statutory provisions to the contrary). Mr. Doe rightly concedes this point. See Opp. at 4. The
Court therefore dismisses the two agencies as defendants.
C. Other Issues
Counts I and II of Mr. Doe’s first amended complaint are predicated on the claim
that the District of Columbia acted in an unlawful manner by keeping Mr. Doe in a youth shelter
for an extended period of time without a fact-finding hearing. In support of this claim, Mr. Doe
points to 16 D.C. CODE § 2310, entitled “Criteria for detaining children.” At the time Mr. Doe
filed suit, Section 2310 provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) A child shall not be placed in detention prior to a factfinding
hearing or a dispositional hearing unless he is alleged to be
delinquent or in need of supervision and unless it appears from
available information that detention is required [to protect others or
the child, or to secure the child’s presence at the next hearing.]
***
(b) A child shall not be placed in shelter care prior to a factfinding
hearing or a dispositional hearing unless it appears from available
information that shelter care is required [to protect the child, or to
ensure that the child receives adequate supervision and care.]
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***
(e) Fact finding hearings for children placed in secure detention
shall be held within the time limits provided in this subsection.
(1) Except as provided in this subsection, whenever a child has
been placed in secure detention prior to a fact finding hearing
pursuant to §§ 16-2310 through 16-2313, the fact finding hearing
set forth in § 16-2316 shall commence not later than 30 days from
the date at which the Division authorized the child to be detained
pursuant to § 16-2312, unless the child is charged with murder,
assault with intent to kill, first degree sexual abuse, burglary in the
first degree, or robbery while armed, in which case the fact finding
hearing shall commence not later than 45 days from the date at
which the Division authorized the child to be securely detained.
***
(4) Upon motion by or on behalf of the child, a child in secure
detention shall be released from custody if the fact finding hearing
is not commenced within the time period set forth in this
subsection.
16 D.C. CODE § 2310 (2008) (emphasis added).
The government defendants argue that Counts I and II must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim because Section 2310(e) guarantees an expeditious hearing only to
children placed in secure detention, not to children placed in shelter care. More specifically, the
government defendants argue that Mr. Doe’s
procedural due process claims cannot survive unless this Court
determines that the 30-day hearing provision of § 16-2310 creates a
constitutionally protectable life, liberty or property interest
applicable to children placed in shelter care. However, the plain
text of § 16-2310(e)(1) clearly reveals that its 30-day limitation
only applies to children placed in secure detention – not those
placed in shelter care.
Mot. at 10. See also Reply at 3 (arguing that Mr. Doe “is not among the class of persons
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protected by” Section 2310(e)). Alternatively, the government defendants argue that even if
Section 2310 does guarantee an expeditious hearing to children placed in shelter care, Counts I
and II still must be dismissed because Section 2310(e)(4) provides the “sole remedy” for children
denied an expeditious hearing. Mot. at 10. Mr. Doe responds that Section 2310 provides an
adequate basis for Counts I and II because his placement in the youth shelter amounted to a
“secure detention” within the meaning of Section 2310(e). See Opp. at 6.
Oddly, neither party has moved to update or supplement their papers in light of
the Juvenile Speedy Trial Equity Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2009, see D.C. ACT
18-7 (2009) (the “2009 Act”), a piece of emergency legislation passed by the District of
Columbia Council on January 6, 2009 and signed into law by the Mayor on January 29, 2009.
The 2009 Act amends Section 2310 to make clear that a child placed in “shelter care,” like a
child placed in “secure detention,” is entitled to an expeditious hearing. For example, the 2009
Act amends Section 2310(e) as follows: “The lead-in text is amended by striking the phrase
‘placed in secure detention’ and inserting the phrase ‘ordered into secure detention or ordered
into shelter care’ in its place.” Id. (emphasis added). The 2009 Act also adds a new section,
Section 2310(e)(1)(C), which provides:
whenever a child has been ordered into shelter care before a
factfinding hearing pursuant to §§ 16-2310 through 16-2313, the
factfinding hearing set forth in § 16-2316 shall commence not later
than 45 days from the date at which the Family Court ordered the
child to be placed in shelter care pursuant to § 16-2312.
Id. (emphasis added). Also potentially relevant to this case is new Section 2310(f), which
provides that “[n]o provision [of Section 2310] shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial
of speedy trial as required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Id.
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It is difficult to imagine that the 2009 Act does not substantially alter – or at least
inform – the parties’ arguments with respect to Counts I and II. The Court therefore concludes
that it would be unwise to address those arguments without first allowing the parties to update
and supplement their papers. Nor will the Court address the parties’ arguments with respect to
Counts III and IV at this time. It is entirely possible that the parties’ arguments with respect to
those counts might be affected by the 2009 Act as well and might influence this Court’s decision
as to whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In any event, it would be more efficient to
resolve all of the parties’ substantive disputes at the same time. Thus, the Court will (1) deny
without prejudice the remainder of the government defendants’ motion to dismiss, and (2) order
the parties to submit new briefs that include a discussion of the 2009 Act and its import for this
case. The Court will also order the parties to re-evaluate the feasibility of settlement in light of
the 2009 Act.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, on March 31, 2009 the Court issued an Order
granting in part and denying in part the government defendants’ motion to dismiss. Consistent
with that Order, it is hereby
ORDERED that the District of Columbia Department of Child & Family Services
and the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services – but not the District
of Columbia – are dismissed as defendants in this matter; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that on or before May 8, 2009, the parties shall meet and
confer to re-evaluate the feasibility of settlement in light of the 2009 Act; it is
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FURTHER ORDERED that, if the parties do not settle this matter, the
government defendants shall file a new dispositive motion on or before May 22, 2009. That new
dispositive motion must discuss the import for this case of the 2009 Act; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall oppose the government defendants’
new dispositive motion on or before May 29, 2009; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the government defendants shall file a reply in
support of their new dispositive motion on or before June 5, 2009.
SO ORDERED.
/s/_______________________________
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge
DATE: April 21, 2009
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