FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JAN z7 2009
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk, U.S. District and
Bankruptcy Courts
)
ERIC RODNEY HILL, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. O~ 0143
)
SCOTT A MIDDLEBROOKS, Warden, )
)
Respondent. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner is a prisoner under sentence imposed by the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia on May 11, 2005. He has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a pro
se habeas petition challenging his conviction. Specifically, he asserts that he was denied the
right to cross-examine his accusers and the right to present evidence at his criminal trial. (See
Pet. at 5-6; see also, generally, Attachment to Pet.) The application to proceed in forma pauperis
will be granted, but the petition will be dismissed without prejudice because this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider it.
Collateral challenges to sentences imposed by the Superior Court must be brought in that
court by a motion made under D.C. Code § 23-110. See Blair-Bey v. Ouick, 151 F.3d 1036,
1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (§ 23-110 is exclusive remedy for such challenges). Such a motion "may
be made at any time." D.C. Code § 23-11 O(b). It is unclear from the petition whether or not the
petitioner has sought relief by filing a motion under § 23-110. In either case, however, this court
has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition. "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion [under § 23-110] shall not be
entertained by ... any Federal ... court ifit appears ... that the applicant has failed to make a
motion for relief under [§ 23-110] or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention." D.C. Code § 23-110(g). Unlike other prisoners convicted in state courts or those
convicted in a United States District Court, "District of Columbia prisoner[ s] ha[ ve] no recourse
to a federal judicial forum [under either Section 2254 or Section 2255] unless [it is shown that]
the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." Garris v.
Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal footnote and quotation marks omitted); see
Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("In order to collaterally attack his
sentence in an Article III court a District of Columbia prisoner faces a hurdle that a federal
prisoner does not.")
Generally,"[s]ection 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effective because it is
coextensive with habeas corpus." Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992); accord
Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d at 1042 (describing § 23-110 remedy as "analogous to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 for prisoners sentenced in D.C. Superior Court who wished to challenge their conviction
or sentence.").
In determining whether the local remedy is 'inadequate or ineffective,' we
are guided by judicial interpretations of the statutory provisions enabling federal
prisoners to challenge their convictions. The federal and local statutes are nearly
identical in language, and functionally they are equivalent. The remedy now
available to District of Columbia prisoners was patterned after that conferred upon
federal prisoners, and both remedies are commensurate with habeas corpus. That
judges of the Superior Court do not have the tenure and salary protection afforded
federal judges does not call for a different conclusion. "[T]he judges of the
Superior Court ofthe District of Columbia must be presumed competent to decide
all issues, including constitutional issues, that routinely arise in the trial of
criminal cases."
Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d at 726 (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.372, 382-83 (1977))
2
, ,
(footnotes omitted). The mere denial of relief by the local courts does not render the local
remedy inadequate or ineffective. See id. at 727; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756-58 (6 th
Cir. 1999) (citing cases); Wilson v. Office ofthe Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C.
1995).
Petitioner has not claimed, and it does not appear, that a motion under § 23-110 is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention. Therefore, his
habeas petition before this court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.