United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2108
FRANK P. BUTLER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS,
AS TRUSTEE FOR RALI 2007 QS3,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Dyk* and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Glenn F. Russell, Jr., with whom Law Office of Glenn F.
Russell, Jr., was on brief for appellant.
Amy B. Hackett, with whom Richard E. Briansky and Prince Lobel
Tye LLP, were on brief for appellee.
April 4, 2014
*
Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. In the wake of the foreclosure
crisis, litigants have increasingly sought out clarification
regarding the validity of mortgage transfers precipitated by
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). The
general contours of these claims are well known, and many of the
facts underlying this case parallel past foreclosure litigation.
A homeowner, Frank P. Butler ("Butler"), upon falling behind in his
mortgage payments, saw his home foreclosed upon, twice. These
foreclosure sales were not conducted by Butler's original lender,
but by a financial institution that had received his mortgage via
an assignment from MERS. Butler brought suit for wrongful
foreclosure, slander of title, and unfair and deceptive business
practices under Massachusetts law. Finding that the foreclosure
sales were in accordance with all relevant statutory law, the
district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal,
Butler presents a multitude of theories as to why Deutsche Bank
lacked legal possession over both his mortgage and accompanying
note, making it an improper party to foreclose. Concluding, like
the district court before us, that Butler's complaint states no
legally cognizable claim for relief, we affirm.
I. Background
On January 31, 2007, Butler borrowed $370,000.00 from
Homecomings Financial, LLC ("Homecomings"). This loan was secured
with a promissory note and mortgage on his Quincy, Massachusetts
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home. The mortgage document listed Homecomings as "lender" and
MERS as both "mortgagee" and "nominee for [Homecomings] and
[Homecomings]'s successors and assigns." The mortgage further
specified that MERS held the "power of sale."
On December 1, 2009, MERS assigned Butler's mortgage to
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee for an unspecified
trust. The assignment was signed by Jeffery Stephan ("Stephan"),
acting in his capacity as a vice president of MERS, and was
recorded in the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds. Six days later,
Deutsche Bank, acting as trustee for the unspecified trust, filed
suit in Massachusetts Land Court pursuant to the Service Members
Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 533, requesting authority to
foreclose on Butler's property. This authority was granted on
March 30, 2010.
Subsequently, MERS again assigned Butler's mortgage, this
time to Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee for RALI
2007QS3 ("Deutsche Bank").1 Although this assignment was undated,
it was signed by Stephan in his capacity as Vice President of MERS
and notarized on January 22, 2010. The assignment was recorded in
1
Presumably, this second assignment was intended to correct the
earlier assignment's failure to specify a receiving trust. The
district court considered whether such a deficiency rendered the
first assignment void, but ultimately found this point
inconsequential, as both foreclosure sales were carried out only
after the second assignment was complete. On appeal, Butler does
not suggest that any deficiency in the first assignment was of
legal import. Consequently, we do not consider what effect the
failure to name a trust had on the first assignment's validity.
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the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds. Thereafter, on July 15,
2010, Deutsche Bank again sought authority to foreclose from the
Massachusetts Land Court. This authority was granted on
February 7, 2011.
On March 2, 2011, Butler's mortgage was assigned a third
time. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee assigned the
mortgage to Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee for
RALI 2007QS3. This assignment was labeled "confirmatory" and
signed by Michelle Swaim for Deutsche Bank. It too was recorded in
the Norfolk County Registry of Deeds.
Deutsche Bank conducted a foreclosure sale on May 25,
2011, ultimately purchasing Butler's property for $230,327.77. On
November 30, 2011, Deutsche bank filed a foreclosure deed at the
Norfolk County Registry of Deeds. Later determining that this
first foreclosure sale may have been void for failure to provide
Butler with the required fourteen days' notice, see Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 244, § 14, Deutsche Bank conducted a second foreclosure sale on
March 8, 2012. Deutsche Bank was again the highest bidder,
purchasing Butler's home for $200,000.00. An executed deed of
foreclosure was recorded on April 18, 2012.
Butler's complaint, originally filed in state court,
included four counts: (1) unfair and deceptive business practices
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws § 93A ("Chapter 93A"); (2) wrongful
foreclosure based on the May 25, 2011 foreclosure sale; (3)
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wrongful foreclosure based on the March 8, 2012 foreclosure sale;
and (4) slander of title. In support of these claims, Butler
presented a bevy of theories as to why Deutsche Bank did not
validly possess either his mortgage or his mortgage note, making it
unable to foreclose. Finding each of these theories lacking, the
district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim.
On appeal, Butler argues that Deutsche Bank could not
legally foreclose because: (1) MERS lacked legal authority to
transfer his mortgage and, moreover, admits that it only "tracks"
the sale of mortgage notes, but does not undertake assignments; (2)
Stephan, a "robo-signer," could not validly serve as signatory on
the assignments; (3) the assignments violated the RALI 2007QS3
trust's pooling and servicing agreement ("PSA"); (4) Deutsche Bank
did not legally possess Butler's promissory note at the time of
foreclosure; and (5) Deutsche Bank admitted that the first
foreclosure sale was invalid.
II. Discussion
We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss
de novo. Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008). We
take all facts pled, as well as all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
Id. (citing Ramos-Piñero v. Puerto Rico, 453 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir.
2006)). This deferential review, however, does not require that we
accept the complaint wholesale; "bald assertions" and
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"unsupportable conclusions" are properly disregarded. Aulson v.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). We affirm the grant of a
motion to dismiss only where the facts, presumed to be true, fail
to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
All four counts of Butler's complaint rest on the shared
presumption that Deutsche Bank lacked the power to foreclose,
either because it did not legally possess Butler's mortgage or
because it had not unified that mortgage with its underlying
promissory note at the time of foreclosure. In resolving this
case, therefore, we begin by reviewing the common theories
underlying all counts.
A. Deutsche Bank's possession of Butler's mortgage
Butler presents several theories as to why Deutsche Bank
lacked legal possession of his mortgage. We treat each theory in
turn.
1. MERS's authority to assign the mortgage
Butler first attempts to challenge the legality of MERS
head-on, arguing that under Massachusetts law it lacks the ability
to transfer his mortgage. He theorizes that MERS, as "nominee" for
the noteholder, Homecomings, holds the mortgage only as equitable
trustee. In consequence, being able to act solely pursuant to
Homecoming's authority, MERS cannot independently undertake a
mortgage transfer. That MERS is also the mortgagee of record,
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Butler asserts, does not expand the limited nature of its authority
as "nominee." In consequence of the fact that MERS possesses no
separately assignable interest, Butler theorizes, any transfer in
which MERS purports to act as the assignor, or any subsequent
transfer arising thereafter, is necessarily void.
Our court has previously considered, and found wanting,
this precise challenge to MERS's ability to serve as assignor of a
mortgage. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282,
291-93 (1st. Cir. 2013) (analyzing Massachusetts mortgage law to
determine that MERS, as nominee and mortgagee of record, possesses
the ability to transfer its interest in a mortgage); see also Woods
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 2013)
("Culhane made clear that MERS's status as an equitable trustee
does not circumscribe the transferability of its legal interest.").
Because Culhane has previously done the heavy lifting of engaging
with the intricacies of Massachusetts mortgage law, see Culhane,
708 F.3d at 291-93, we will not repeat its detailed explication
here. Suffice it to say, Massachusetts allows a mortgage to be
split from its underlying note,2 see U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Ibáñez, 458 Mass. 637, 652, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53-54 (2011), and where,
2
Butler also argues that the first assignment purported to
transfer not only the mortgage but Butler's promissory note, which
MERS never possessed. Although correct, this fact does not render
the assignment invalid; we have previously dismissed an identical
claim on the grounds that "superfluous language does not affect the
validity of the transfer of legal title to the mortgaged property."
Culhane, 708 F.3d at 293 n.8.
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as here, MERS possesses a legal interest in that mortgage, such an
interest is transferable. See Culhane, 708 F.3d at 292; Woods, 733
F.3d at 355.
Butler further challenges the validity of the transfers
based on a theory that MERS only "tracks" the assignment of
mortgage notes, but does not undertake assignments of the
accompanying mortgages. Citing to the 2011 "MERS Case Law Outline"
-- a document prepared by MERS to familiarize users with its legal
structure -- Butler asserts that MERS itself disclaims any role as
an assignor. This argument both misconceives MERS's business model
and misconstrues the language of the "MERS Case Law Outline."
For one, that MERS separately tracks the transfer of
promissory notes does not call into question the sufficiency of
written assignments duly recorded in a county registry of deeds.
Woods, 733 F.3d at 355. In fact, crucial to MERS's business model
is its ability to remain mortgagee of record, possessing a legal
interest in a homeowner's mortgage, while the beneficial interest
in that accompanying note is transferred among MERS's member
institutions. See Culhane, 708 F.3d at 287 (explaining MERS's
functioning). That MERS electronically records these transfers of
a mortgage note does not affect, much less invalidate, its ability
to separately assign the mortgage. Woods, 733 F.3d at 355 ("[T]he
MERS registry electronically tracks transfers of a mortgagor's
promissory note, a process which is legally distinct from the
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assignment and recordation of mortgage interests in a county
registry of deeds."). For another, no part of the "MERS Case Law
Outline" disclaims MERS's ability to make assignments. That
document states only that the records kept by MERS tracking the
transfer of mortgage notes are "not electronic assignments." That
is quite true. No reasonable interpretation of such a proffer,
however, can lead to the conclusion that MERS lacks the legal
authority to separately transfer a mortgage via a written and
recorded assignment, as it did here.3 In challenging MERS's
authority to act as assignor, Butler has failed to call into
question Deutsche Bank's valid possession of his mortgage.
2. Transfers by "robo-signers"
Butler's next allegation of invalidity stems from the
conduct of Stephan, a "confirmed 'Robo-Signer,'" who signed the
first and second assignments in his capacity as a vice president of
MERS. Stephan's signature, Butler suggests, renders the
3
Citing the RALI Series 2007QS3 trust's PSA, Butler asserts that
there exists a number of unaccounted for "off record" transfers of
the Butler mortgage. At most, however, that PSA proves that the
trust set forth a specified process for the receipt of mortgage
loans. It does not prove such assignments indeed occurred and were
not accounted for in Deutsche Bank's chain of title. In fact,
Butler's brief later forwards the contradictory argument that the
assignment violated the PSA specifically because it never traveled
through these intermediary parties. In any case, recorded in the
Norfolk County Registry of Deeds is an assignment showing that
Butler's mortgage traveled from MERS directly to Deutsche Bank.
This is a complete chain of title, sufficient to prove the validity
of that assignment. See Woods, 733 F.3d 356 (citing Ibáñez, 941
N.E.2d at 53)).
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assignments insufficient to pass legal title. In making this
claim, however, Butler employs the term "robo-signer" without
providing an operative definition and, perhaps more telling,
forwards no particular legal theory as to why a "robo-signed"
document is necessarily invalid.
Faced with a nearly identical claim, our court has
unequivocally "decline[d] to speculate on the meaning . . . [of]
the term ['robo-signing']." See Wilson v. HSBC Mortg. Servs.,
Inc., No. 13-1298, 2014 WL 563457, at *10 (1st Cir. Feb. 14, 2014)
(collecting cases showing the lack of a uniform definition of
"robo-signers" and their precise role in the process of bundling
and securitizing home mortgages). Moreover, we have held that "the
bare allegation of 'robo-signing' does nothing to undermine the
validity" of an assignment. Id.
In fact, Massachusetts statutory law sets forth the
precise requirements for a valid mortgage assignment:
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary . . .
[an] assignment of [a] mortgage . . . executed
before a notary public . . . by a person
purporting to hold the position of president,
vice president, . . . or other officer . . .
of the entity holding such mortgage, or
otherwise purporting to be an authorized
signatory for such entity . . . shall be
binding upon such entity . . . .
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 54B. MERS's assignments of the Butler
mortgage fully abided by these statutory requirements: Stephan, in
his capacity as a vice president of MERS, signed both assignments
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in the presence of a notary public. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 294
(finding that an assignment adhering to the requirements of section
54B is valid); see also Wilson, 2014 WL 563457 at *9.4 Failing to
allege any theory as to how Stephan's role as a "robo-signer" would
invalidate the validity of the mortgage transfers, and pleading no
other failure to abide by section 54B's requirements, this
challenge to the validity of Deutsche Bank's possession fails.
3. RALI 2007QS3's PSA
Butler's complaint next alleges that Deutsche Bank lacked
valid possession of his mortgage, as its receipt of the assignment
was in violation of RALI 2007QS3's PSA. Specifically, the PSA
required that: (1) any mortgage assigned to the trust undergo a
series of transfers through three predetermined parties and (2) all
assignments to the trust be complete by February 27, 2007. That
Deutsche Bank received the mortgage without its first passing
through these required intermediaries, and at a date some two years
beyond the trust's closing date, Butler asserts, are violations of
4
On appeal, Butler argues that the assignments do not meet
section 54B's requirements because they were not undertaken by an
agent with power to bind a principal. Distilling this argument as
best we can from the unclear pleadings, it appears that Butler is
attempting to contest the applicability of section 54B on the
theory that, because MERS never validly held a transferable
interest in his mortgage, Stephan -- as an agent of MERS -- could
not transfer rights never possessed by the principal. Because we
have already dismissed the allegation that MERS did not possess a
transferable interest in Butler's mortgage, we need not consider
this claim further.
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the trust's terms sufficient to render its possession of the
mortgage void.
The contours of this argument have proved a moving target
throughout this litigation, as Butler initially appeared to assent
to the application of Massachusetts law but now, on appeal, argues
that New York law controls. Given this shifting focus, we pause
briefly trace the claim's evolution.
a. The progression of Butler's claim
In support of its motion to dismiss, Deutsche Bank argued
that, under Massachusetts law, a homeowner lacks standing to
challenge assignments that violate a trust's PSA but are otherwise
valid to pass title. Because Butler was neither party to, nor
beneficiary of such an assignment, Deutsche Bank asserted that he
had shown no legally protected interest sufficient for standing.
In his opposition to this motion to dismiss, Butler was
silent on the issue of New York law and, indeed, failed to claim --
under any governing law -- that such assignments would be void and
not voidable. Rather, arguing that "in Massachusetts foreclosure
operates as a 'creature of contract,'" he claimed to derive
standing to challenge Deutsche Bank's possession on the grounds
that only Homecomings, not Deutsche Bank, was party to his original
contract.5
5
Presumably, this argument attempted to suggest that Homecomings
somehow lacked the ability to assign its contractual interest to
another party under Massachusetts law.
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Applying Massachusetts law, the district court dismissed
this claim, reasoning that a homeowner lacks standing to challenge
a mortgage assignment that is voidable, but not void. Although
that decision predated Culhane, the court's conclusion was in line
with our later holding therein: an assignment that is voidable,
but not void, may not be challenged by a homeowner that is not a
direct party to, or beneficiary of, the transfer. Culhane, 708
F.3d at 291 ("[A] mortgagor does not have standing to challenge
shortcomings in an assignment that render it merely voidable at the
election of one party but otherwise effective to pass legal
title."). Thus, the district court reasoned that a failure to
abide by the PSA, while making the transfer of Butler's mortgage
voidable at the behest of the trust beneficiaries, was not the sort
of shortcoming able to create judicial standing for Butler to
challenge Deutsche Bank's possession.
In his opening appellate brief, Butler again argued that
Deutsche Bank's failure to prove that his mortgage transferred
through three intermediary parties -- those named in the trust's
governing terms -- and was received by Deutsche Bank by the
appropriate closing date, would "result[] in a failure of the
trust's interest in the Butler mortgage and note." Here, for the
first time, Butler suggested that New York law generally governs
the transfer of assets into a New York business trust. He
continued on to say, however, that "as an assignment of a mortgage
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is a transfer of an interest in land in the Commonwealth, with
regards to the trust's specific claim of the dominion and control
over the title to the Butler real property, Massachusetts law would
need to be referenced."
It is only in his reply brief that Butler clearly sets
forth his current claim. Therein, Butler asserts that New York
Estates, Powers and Trust Law makes clear that "every . . . act of
the trustee in contravention of the trust, except as authorized by
this article and by any other provision of law, is void." N.Y.
Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 7-2.4 (emphasis added). In support of
this claim, he cites Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Erobobo, No.
31648/2009, 2013 WL 1831799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (unpublished),
which ruled that contravention of a trust's PSA rendered a mortgage
assignment void. Id. at *8-9. While noting that a number of
courts have disclaimed the reasoning of Erobobo, on the grounds
that New York courts commonly allow for the ratification of ultra
vires acts by trustees, Butler asserts that these cases erroneously
interpret New York law. Moreover, although Butler's reply brief
discusses the content and effect of New York law, it wholly
neglects to reference to the predicate question of Massachusetts
choice-of-law rules, stating only that "trust law is state law."
b. The applicability of waiver
Deutsche Bank, at oral arguments and through supplemental
briefing, argues that Butler has waived the ability to claim that
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New York law applies, having failed to raise the issue before the
district court and bringing it, squarely, only in his reply brief.
On appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances counseling
for exception, we routinely deem waived arguments not timely
presented before the district court. Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334
F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2003). This doctrine of waiver applies
with equal force to claims seeking the application of a foreign
state's law. See Ortiz v. Gaston Cnty. Dyeing Mach. Co., 277 F.3d
594, 597 (1st Cir. 2002) (waiving a choice-of-law argument brought
first during post-judgment motions); Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass.
App. Ct. 601, 610, 592 N.E.2d 758, 764 (1992)(refusing to consider
a choice-of-law argument where "there is nothing in the record
before us to indicate that the defendants requested that the judge
take judicial notice of the law of Connecticut or . . . called the
judge's attention to this statute"); cf. Levin v. Dalva Bros., 459
F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (allowing choice-of-law claim that was
raised for the first time at trial, but prior to "the court . . .
issu[ing] any ruling on the issue"); Conn. Nat'l Bank of Hartford
v. Kommit, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 348, 351 n.3, 577 N.E.2d 639, 641 n.3
(1991) (allowing a party to assert the applicability of Connecticut
law for the first time on appeal where "the broader issue of
choice-of-law was squarely raised below").
Here, Butler made no mention of the applicability of New
York state law before the district court. In fact, the argument
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Butler presented in his memorandum in opposition to the motion to
dismiss did not focus on the issue of void versus voidable
assignments at all, and in defense to Deutsche Bank's claims he
argued only that its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss
erroneously interpreted Massachusetts law. This shortcoming was
further compounded on appeal, where Butler's initial briefing
exhibited a marked lack of coherence, appearing to reference New
York law only to then disclaim its application on the question of
Deutsche Bank's "control over the title to the Butler real
property." In sum, the unfocused nature of this brief failed to
squarely call our attention to the claim he now relies on.6 See
Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir.
2011) (concluding that "[j]udges are not mind-readers," and thus,
"arguments confusingly constructed and lacking in coherence" are
appropriately waived (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Even in reply, Butler fails to provide any developed
6
Butler's opening brief states that "under . . . N.Y. Est. Powers
& Trusts Law § 7-2.4 the Butler note and mortgage would not be
legally among [the trust's] corpus." It then continues: "[u]nder
Massachusetts real property law regarding the mortgage itself, as
a transfer of interest in land, [] the Defendant has failed to
produce executed writings evidencing such purported chain of
transfer of the title of the Butler real property. Thus, any
proffered 'assignment' relied upon by [Deutsche Bank] could never
be 'ratified,' as it is 'void.'" This argument does not clearly
challenge, as error, the application of Massachusetts law to the
question of whether the assignment from MERS to Deutsche Bank was
void and not voidable. Rather, ultimately it appears to claim that
Deutsche Bank's failure to prove a complete chain of title, as
required by Massachusetts law, would render the mortgage void.
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analysis of Massachusetts -- the forum state -- choice-of-law
rules, skipping over this predicate question and offering only his
interpretation of the content and effect of New York law. See
Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 1990)
(finding waived an argument "coherently pulled together for the
first time in [a] reply brief"); Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Citigroup
Global Mkts. Inc., 622 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) (same).
The effect of these various insufficiencies is clear. To
reach Butler's claim would require our court to consider an issue
not raised before the district court, presented squarely only in a
reply brief, and -- even then -- missing a discussion of an
elemental aspect of the claim. Such an untimely and incomplete
presentation of arguments deprives this court of the beneficial
insights of the district court and, perhaps more critically,
deprives the appellee of a fair opportunity to respond, leaving our
court with "one side of a two-sided story."7 See Sandstrom, 904
F.2d at 87. On the whole, we believe it unwise to treat these
questions of state law absent coherent and timely briefing. Thus,
we find waived Butler's unseasonably late argument that New York
7
Butler never gave a reason for the late presentation of this
argument nor suggested that the application of New York law was
undiscoverable at earlier stages of litigation. Although we allowed
Deutsche Bank to file a supplemental brief, Butler's dilatory and
unclear briefing still had the effect of circumscribing Deutsche
Bank's ability to respond and leaving key aspects of the claim
underdeveloped. Moreover, we are unconvinced that supplemental
briefing on the part of Deutsche Bank should serve to rescue
Butler's claims from the precipice of waiver.
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law applies to make void Deutsche Bank's receipt of Butler's
mortgage.8
c. Resolution under Massachusetts law
Under Massachusetts law, it is clear that claims alleging
disregard of a trust's PSA are considered voidable, not void. See
Woods, 733 F.3d at 354 ("[C]laims that merely assert procedural
infirmities in the assignment of a mortgage, such as a failure to
abide by the terms of a governing trust agreement, are barred for
lack of standing."); Wilson, 2014 WL 563457, at *6 ("[W]hen a
corporate officer acts beyond the scope of his authority, his acts
in excess of [that] authority, although voidable by the
corporation, legally could be ratified and adopted by it."
(alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comm'r of Banks
v. Tremont Trust Co., 259 Mass. 162, 179-80, 156 N.E. 7, 14-15
(1927)); cf. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291 (allowing for standing where
claims are predicated on the theory that "the assignor had nothing
to assign or had no authority to make an assignment to a particular
assignee"). Thus, having only presented facts sufficient to show
8
We note without decision, however, that the vast majority of
courts to consider the issue have rejected Erobobo's reasoning,
determining that despite the express terms of N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trusts Law § 7-2.4, the acts of a trustee in contravention of a
trust may be ratified, and are thus voidable. See, e.g., Davis v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. H-13-623, 2014 WL 838146, at *4
n.8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014) (collecting cases); Wolff v. Bank of
N.Y. Mellon, No. 13-CV-2175(PJS/JSM), 2014 WL 641510, at *9 (D.
Minn. Feb. 19, 2014) (same); Koufos v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 939 F.
Supp. 2d. 40, 48 n.5 (D. Mass. 2013).
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the assignment was voidable under Massachusetts law, Butler lacks
standing to challenge Deutsche Bank's possession of the mortgage on
this ground. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291. Absent such standing, this
theory as to the invalidity of Deutsche Bank's possession cannot
form the basis for relief.
B. Deutsche Bank's failure to unify the mortgage and note
Butler additionally predicates his complaint on the
theory that Deutsche Bank admittedly lacked possession of his
promissory note at the time it initiated both foreclosure sales.
He argues that, under the reasoning of Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (2012), this failure to
reunify the note and mortgage prior to giving notice of foreclosure
violates Massachusetts foreclosure law.
Butler is correct that Eaton established that, to
properly foreclose on real property in Massachusetts, a party must
possess both the mortgage and underlying note. Id. at 1133. Yet,
recognizing that this holding significantly recast Massachusetts
law, which had long accepted the ability of a mortgage holder to
foreclose absent possession of the note, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ("SJC") applied its ruling prospectively. Id.
Thus, for all foreclosure sales in which notice of the right to
foreclose is given after June 22, 2012 -- the date of Eaton's
publication -- reunification of the mortgage and note is required.
The requirement of reunification was also applied retroactively to
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Eaton herself, but for all other foreclosure sales predating
June 22, 2012, possession of the note was not required. Id.
Notice of foreclosure in this case was given years before
Eaton's publication, and Butler does not claim that Eaton expressly
binds his case. Rather, he relies on subsequent decisions by the
Massachusetts Appeals Court, which applied Eaton retroactively to
litigants who "advanced the same arguments to [the appellate court]
at the same time those arguments were being considered by the
Supreme Judicial Court" in Eaton. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Norris,
No. 11-P-1916, 2013 WL 708944, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 28, 2013)
("For the same reason that the Supreme Judicial Court applied its
ruling retroactively to Eaton [her]self, we apply it to Norris.");
see also Lyons v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 11-P-
650, 2013 WL 2420705, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. June 5, 2013) (same).
Thus, because Butler's claim was in litigation at the time Eaton
was resolved, he theorizes that the rule requiring reunification of
note and mortgage applies to Deutsche Bank's foreclosure.
A subsequent SJC case, Galiastro v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 4 N.E.3d 270 (2014), has
clarified the parameters of Eaton's application, and its holding
guides us here. In Galiastro, the SJC answered, affirmatively, the
question of whether Eaton's retroactive effect extended to other
individuals with cases on appeal at the same time as Eaton. Id. at
277 (applying Eaton's holding "to cases that were pending on appeal
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in the Appeals Court when the rescript in Eaton issued").9 Thus,
Eaton applies to two sets of litigants: (1) those challenging
foreclosures for which the notice of sale was given after June 22,
2012, and (2) those with wrongful foreclosure claims (predicated on
the theory that the foreclosing entity did not possess their note)
that were on appeal as of June 22, 2012. To the claims of all
litigants outside these closed sets, we apply the pre-Eaton rule,
under which reunification is not required. See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d
at 1131.
Turning to the instant case, it is clear that Butler's
claims fall outside even Eaton's newly expanded reach.10 The
district court entered judgment against Butler on August 14, 2012,
and he filed his Notice of Appeal to our court on September 13,
2012. As such, the case was still pending before the trial court
9
Galiastro defined "pending on appeal" as including "those cases
in which the case was docketed in the Appeals Court before June 22,
2012, and the Appeals Court had not yet issued a decision" as well
as cases "where the Appeals Court had issued a decision, . . . [and
the] litigants have filed a petition for further appellate review."
Galiastro, 4 N.E.3d at 277 n.14.
10
In the application of their decisions, state courts "'may make
a choice . . . between the principle of forward operation and that
of relation backward.'" Littlefield v. Caton, 856 F.2d 344, 347
(1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)). Therefore, we follow the guidance
of the SJC in determining whether Eaton should apply retroactively.
See id. (applying state rule on retroactivity); Commonwealth v.
Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10, 818 N.E.2d 527, 533 n.10 (2004)
(holding that Massachusetts' courts are free to give a state law
decision only prospective effect, so long as there is "no
constitutional requirement that the new rule . . . be applied
retroactively.").
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on June 22, 2012, and was not on appeal until some months later.
Applying Galiastro, we necessarily find that Deutsche Bank need not
have possessed Butler's note.
C. Deutsche Bank's alleged admission of invalidity
In short, we have now determined that Butler's complaint
alleged no facts sufficient to suggest Deutsche Bank lacked a
legally valid interest in his mortgage -- that is, an interest
adequate for the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. Still,
Butler asserts one final theory specific to the first foreclosure
sale. Pointing to a statement in Deutsche Bank's memorandum in
support of its motion to dismiss, he alleges that there was a
judicial admission as to the invalidity of the first foreclosure
sale. In explaining why a second foreclosure sale was conducted,
Deutsche Bank stated that "the [first] foreclosure sale may have
been void because Butler may not have received the fourteen (14)
days' notice of sale required." Butler reads this statement to be
an admission of the sale's invalidity, necessarily making his
wrongful foreclosure claim sufficiently plausible to survive a
motion to dismiss.
It is paramount that "[t]o be binding, a judicial
admission must be clear." Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d
24, 31 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, a statement that a foreclosure sale "may" have been void
cannot be treated as an unambiguous admission of the sale's
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definite invalidity. At most, such a statement could be an
admission that the sale was potentially in violation of
Massachusetts statutory notice requirements, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
244, § 14. Nonetheless, in light of Deutsche Bank's statement, we
recognize that a claim that Butler was not provided fourteen days'
notice of the impending foreclosure sale might well have been
plausible, if pled in his complaint. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Unfortunately for Butler, however, that complaint is
wholly silent on the issue of notice, asserting only that the first
foreclosure sale was void because Deutsche Bank was not the
"holder" of his mortgage, and therefore lacked the power to
foreclose under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14. Having made no
allegations of deficient notice in his complaint, Butler has failed
to plead a claim on which relief might be granted. A.G. ex rel.
Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 2013) ("The
critical question is whether the claim . . . is made plausible by
the cumulative effect of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint." (alterations and citation omitted)).
This insufficiency is made even more clear in Butler's
memorandum in opposition to Deutsche Bank's motion to dismiss,
where, far from alleging deficient notice, he attacks Deutsche Bank
for "neglect[ing] to provide any evidentiary foundation for such
'assumption' of defective notice." Perhaps unwittingly, this
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retort highlights the deficiency of Butler's current claim: there
was not a modicum of fact pled before the district court in support
of a claim of deficient notice. Cf. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-
Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st. Cir 2011) (presuming, for the purposes
of a motion to dismiss, the truth of all factual allegations that
are pled). Having put forth no factual allegations to support his
claim and, moreover, having expressly attacked the validity of such
a claim before the district court, Butler cannot now reverse course
and build on appeal a claim he disavowed below.
III. Butler's causes of action
In short, Butler's complaint forwards no facts sufficient
to support a theory that Deutsche Bank lacked the proper authority
to foreclose or that its conduct in foreclosing violated
Massachusetts law. We see no grounds on which to question that
Deutsche Bank validly received an assignment of Butler's mortgage.
Moreover, under governing law, Deutsche Bank was not required to
possess the mortgage note when it initiated foreclosure. On
appeal, Butler has asserted theories not brought, or even
specifically disclaimed, before the district court. Untimely
notice and incomplete pleading, however, have rendered these
theories inadequate. We find, therefore, that Butler has pled no
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wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, or Chapter 93A11 claim on
which relief may be granted.
IV. Conclusion
In sifting through the detritus of the housing market's
collapse, courts have been called upon to answer any number of
disputes regarding the legal rights of homeowners and financial
institutions. Recent litigation in Massachusetts state court has
squared at least one more corner of these ongoing debates, and it
is clear that the holding of Galiastro is fatal to Butler's claim.
Finding that Deutsche Bank need not have possessed Butler's note,
and having located no other colorable claim on which relief might
be granted, we affirm the district court's decision to dismiss.
Affirmed.
11
The district court's opinion went on to discuss alternative
grounds of dismissal, including Butler's alleged failure to abide
by prerequisite notice requirements in bringing a Chapter 93A
claim. The parties spar over whether such notice was required, but
this is a fight we need not referee. We have found no valid basis
on which to challenge Deutsche Bank's ability to foreclose, and
"without factual allegations sufficient to suggest illegality
occurred, we are necessarily left without allegations sufficient to
suggest [the foreclosing entity] knew of such illegality." Woods,
733 F.3d at 358. Butler's Chapter 93A claim would, thus,
necessarily fail for lack of scienter. In any case, "it is not
enough in the context of Chapter 93A to allege that defendants
foreclosed in violation of Massachusetts foreclosure law.
Something more is required." Id. (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted) (quoting Juárez v. Select Portfolio Servicing,
Inc., 708 F.3d 269, 281 (1st Cir. 2013)).
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