FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 14 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RENEE BISHOP, No. 12-36013
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00493-RSM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SNOHOMISH SUPERIOR COURT; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2014**
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Renee Bishop appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from then pending
state criminal charges against her. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630
F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
To the extent that Bishop sought damages, the district court properly
dismissed Bishop’s claims against the state court judge and prosecutor because
those defendants are immune from liability. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,
1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that judges and prosecutors are immune from
liability for damages under § 1983).
To the extent that Bishop sought prospective injunctive relief, dismissal of
Bishop’s claims against the state court judge and prosecutor was proper because
federal courts may not interfere with pending state court criminal proceedings
absent extraordinary circumstances. We also do not consider Bishop’s contentions
regarding the state court’s denial of her request to represent herself in her criminal
proceedings and to dismiss those proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
43-45 (1971) (holding that, based on principles of federalism and comity, federal
courts should abstain from intervening in ongoing state criminal proceedings
absent extraordinary circumstances); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970-75
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (explaining Younger abstention doctrine).
The district court properly dismissed Bishop’s claims against the public
2 12-36013
defenders because they were not acting under color of state law. See Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that public defenders performing
traditional functions of representation do not act under color of state law for
purposes of § 1983 actions).
Dismissal of Snohomish Superior Court was proper because the court is
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Sacramento
Cnty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (state courts are arms of
the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Bishop’s motion to
change venue because Bishop sought to change the venue of her state court
criminal proceedings. See Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc.,
397 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth standard of review).
AFFIRMED.
3 12-36013