FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 14 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAULA SKERSTON, No. 12-56624
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 8:11-cv-00803-DDP-RZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2014**
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Paula Skerston, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of her Fourth
Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009), and we
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Skerston
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. See Liberal v. Estrada, 632
F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasonable suspicion requires that an officer have
“specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable
inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is
engaged in criminal activity” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177,
186 (2004) (inquiry into a suspect’s identity is a “routine and accepted” part of an
investigatory stop and serves important government interests, including informing
an officer that the suspect is wanted for any other offense).
AFFIRMED.
2 12-56624