FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 14 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES JEFFERSON KENNER, No. 13-15481
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00784-RCJ-VPC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
RUBEN VIDAURRI, C.O.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2014**
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner James Jefferson Kenner appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2002), and may affirm
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
on any ground supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,
534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Kenner’s due
process claim concerning his placement in administrative segregation pending
disciplinary charges because Kenner failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether his placement gave rise to a protected liberty interest warranting
due process protections. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)
(administrative segregation by itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest
because it does not impose an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life); see also Cousins v. Lockyer, 568
F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2009) (failure to comply with prison regulations does
not amount to a constitutional violation).
Summary judgment on Kenner’s due process claim concerning his
confinement to disciplinary segregation and loss of good time credits was proper
because, even assuming Kenner raised a triable dispute as to whether these
restraints gave rise to a protected liberty interest, he received all the process that he
was due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67 (1974) (setting forth due
process requirements before imposing sanctions implicating a prisoner’s liberty
interest); Koenig v. Vannelli, 971 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1992) (prison officials
2 13-15481
may limit an inmate’s efforts to defend himself if they have a legitimate
penological reason).
We do not consider issues regarding the dismissal of Kenner’s conspiracy
and Eighth Amendment claims because they are not supported by argument. See
Am. Int’l Enters., Inc. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1263, 1266 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993).
Kenner’s contentions regarding defendants’ alleged failure to give him
Miranda warnings and their alleged decision to place him in the equivalent of
solitary confinement are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3 13-15481