Case: 13-13271 Date Filed: 04/21/2014 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13271
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20577-RSR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRANDON AGUAYO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 21, 2014)
Before MARTIN, FAY and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Adam Aguayo appeals his below-guidelines sentence of 150
months imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release, imposed
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after pleading guilty to one count of enticement of a minor to engage in sexual
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Aguayo contends that his sentence of
150 months imprisonment followed by a lifetime term of supervised release is
substantively unreasonable even though it is a substantial downward departure
from the guideline range of 210–262 months. According to Aguayo, U.S.S.G. §
2G2.2 is overly harsh and should not be given deference. Additionally, Aguayo
contends that the district court failed to consider various factors in calculating his
sentence. Because Aguayo has not demonstrated that the district court abused its
discretion, we affirm.
I. Standard of Review
We review the reasonableness of a sentence using a deferential abuse of
discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct.
586, 591 (2007). The party challenging the sentence has the burden of
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and factors
outlined in § 3553(a). United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
We will remand for resentencing only if the district court “committed a clear error
of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
We have recognized that “there is a range of reasonable sentences from which the
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district court may choose.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. A sentence that falls within
the guideline range is one indicator of a reasonable sentence. Id. A sentence
imposed well below the statutory maximum may also be an indicator of
reasonableness. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
II. Discussion
First, Aguayo contends that U.S.S.G § 2G2.2 should be ignored because it
has been modified by Congress instead of being independently created by the
Sentencing Commission. Aguayo’s theory has several problems. We have
previously rejected this argument. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1212 n.32.
Even putting that aside, Aguayo’s guideline range was calculated under U.S.S.G. §
2G2.1, not § 2G2.2. Finally, Aguayo fundamentally misunderstands the
relationship between this court and Congress. Congress passes laws, and this court
applies them to the cases before us. The fact that Congress directly intervened to
set this guideline does not give it less legitimacy.
Second, Aguayo contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
because the district court did not give sufficient weight to the nature of the
restraining order against him, his familial support, and his mental health condition.
However, the record reveals that the district court considered all of these factors.
And, the weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322
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(11th Cir. 2008). Aguayo has not shown that the district court abused its discretion
by giving an improper factor significant weight or by committing a clear error of
judgment in balancing the proper factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
Aguayo’s sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. As the district court noted, the offense
was serious due to the age of the minor involved. Furthermore, the need to protect
the public was high due to Aguayo’s troubling stalking behavior. However, in
light of Aguayo’s young age, his lack of criminal history, his promising future, and
his treatable mental health problems, the district court granted a substantial
downward variance and imposed a sentence of 150 months imprisonment, which is
60 months below the low end of the applicable guideline range. See U.S.S.G §
2G2.1. We would ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. See Talley,
431 F.3d at 788. And it is in this case.
Aguayo’s lifetime term of supervised release was also substantively
reasonable, in light of the previously mentioned factors and the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement that “[i]f the . . . offense of conviction is a sex
offense, . . . the statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.”
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2). The lifetime term of supervised release is within the
applicable guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2), (c); see 18 U.S.C. §
3583(k). We would ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable, Talley, 431
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F.3d at 788. Aguayo has not met his burden of showing that it is outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. See Irey, 612 F.3d at
1190.
III. Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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