13-3091-cr
United States v. Sealed Defendant 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY O RDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on
th
the 24 day of April, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DENNY CHIN,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
-v- 13-3091-cr
SEALED DEFENDANT 1,
Defendant-Appellant.
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FOR APPELLEE: Andrew Bauer, Brent S. Wible,
Assistant United States Attorneys,
for Preet Bharara, United States
Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: George R. Goltzer, Ying Stafford,
New York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Ramos, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
On December 18, 2012, defendant-appellant Sealed
Defendant 1 ("TW") was charged with acts of juvenile delinquency:
attempting to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1952, and causing the death of another through
the use of a firearm during and in relation to that offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(j)(1) and 924(j)(2). TW appeals
from an oral order of the district court issued on August 2,
2013, granting the government's motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
5032 to transfer TW's case to adult status. We assume the
parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
TW argues that the district court abused its discretion
in granting the government's motion. In particular, he contends
that the district court failed to properly account for his
potential for rehabilitation. We disagree.
After a motion by the Attorney General, a district
court may transfer a qualified juvenile to adult status in the
interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. In determining
whether transfer is appropriate, the district court must consider
six factors: "(1) the juvenile's age and social background; (2)
the nature of the offense alleged; (3) the nature and extent of
any prior delinquency record; (4) present psychological maturity
and intellectual development; (5) the juvenile's response to past
treatment efforts and the nature of those efforts; and (6)
available programs that are designed to treat the juvenile's
behavior problems." United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588
(2d Cir. 1995). The factors "need not be accorded equal weight
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by the district court, which may balance [them] in any way that
seems appropriate to it." Id. As the "decision of the district
court is a discretionary one," we will not disturb it "except
upon our finding of an abuse of discretion." Id.
We find no such abuse in this case. The district court
made careful findings with respect to each of the six statutory
factors and concluded that most warranted transfer.
Specifically, TW was just three months shy of his eighteenth
birthday when he allegedly committed the offense and twenty years
old at the time of the transfer hearing; the crimes TW allegedly
participated in were part of "an inherently lethal plan" and
constituted a "very serious offense" (App. at 99-100); TW had
been arrested for conduct suggesting that he participated in
drug-related activities in the past; TW's behavior since he
allegedly committed the crimes supported his present maturity and
intellectual development; and while TW responded well to periods
during which he was supervised after his arrests in the past, the
district court found that "the beneficial effects of the
supervised periods of rehabilitation had long since dissipated."
(Id. at 105-06). Moreover, contrary to TW's suggestion
otherwise, the district court gave careful consideration to his
rehabilitative potential and concluded that while TW "may be
rehabilitatable," "the extent to which he is rehabilitatable is
not sufficient to warrant keeping him as a juvenile." (Id. at
109). In light of all the factors, the district court reasonably
concluded that transfer was appropriate.
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We have considered TW's remaining arguments and
conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we
AFFIRM the order of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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