UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4783
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEFFORY HARRISON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00234-1)
Submitted: April 22, 2014 Decided: April 25, 2014
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.
Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.
Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffory Harrison appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed following the revocation of his term of
supervised release. Before this court, Harrison asserts several
bases for his contention that this sentence is plainly
unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we reject his
arguments and affirm the revocation judgment.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum
and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal. *
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006).
In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for reasonableness,
utilizing “the procedural and substantive considerations”
employed in evaluating an original criminal sentence. Id. at
438.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered both the policy statements
*
Harrison concedes that this is the controlling standard of
review in this circuit, but seeks to preserve the issue for
further review by noting the existence of a circuit split as to
the appropriate standard.
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contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors identified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e) (2012). Id. at 439. The district court must also
explain the chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not
be as detailed or specific” as is required for an original
sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 440.
If, after considering the above, we decide that the
sentence is reasonable, we will affirm. Id. at 439. Only if we
find the sentence to be procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we evaluate whether it is “plainly” so. Id.
Against these well-established principles, we readily
conclude that Harrison’s sentence is reasonable. The sentence
is within the two-year statutory maximum authorized for the
underlying Class C felony offense that resulted in the
supervised release order. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3),
3583(e)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(l) (2012). Our review of the
record confirms that the district court considered the advisory
policy statement range of three to nine months’ imprisonment,
the calculation of which was not disputed in the district court
and is not challenged on appeal, and heard the parties’
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arguments regarding the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Furthermore, the district court drew upon the § 3553(a) factors
enumerated in § 3583(e) in sentencing Harrison. The transcript
makes clear that, despite the court’s prior lenient treatment
and strong admonitions, Harrison simply could not (or would not)
abide by the terms of his supervised release. The court’s
decision to impose the statutory maximum in this case was driven
by Harrison’s repeated drug use, his ongoing failure to present
himself for drug testing at the pre-assigned time and place, and
his non-compliance with his drug treatment plan. We thus cannot
accept Harrison’s claim that his sentence is “unduly punitive.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 8); see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding
that imposition of statutory maximum term of imprisonment was
substantively reasonable, given that the district court
expressly relied on defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating
numerous conditions of his supervised release,” despite numerous
extensions of leniency by the district court).
Harrison also argues that the revocation sentence is
unreasonable because it “does nothing to address the source of
Harrison’s problems on supervised release — his drug use.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 8). But this argument fails to acknowledge
the court’s continuous efforts to aid Harrison in overcoming his
substance abuse issues, all of which he spurned. As the
district court noted, the probation office did everything within
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its power to help Harrison conquer his addiction, but it was
incumbent upon Harrison to avail himself of the treatment
options secured for and provided to him, which he would not do.
By the time he last appeared in court, there simply was nothing
left for the court to do in this vein.
Finally, Harrison suggests that the purpose of
supervised release — “to ease a defendant’s transition back into
the community” — would have been better served by “[a] much
shorter sentence[.]” (Appellant’s Br. at 9). We reject this
argument as it improperly conflates the purposes that underlie
the imposition of a term of supervised release in the first
instance with the purpose for penalizing the defendant’s
violation of those terms. The revocation sentence is designed
to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the terms of his
supervised release, see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438 (“‘[T]he
sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the
violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-
ordered supervision.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt.
3(b))), and the district court’s comments make plain that it
chose the twenty-four-month sentence to sanction Harrison’s
substantial breach of the trust and leniency that the court
previously afforded him.
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Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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