UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4769
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEFFORY HARRISON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:09-cr-00234-1)
Submitted: February 17, 2012 Decided: February 23, 2012
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffory Harrison appeals the eighteen-month sentence
the district court imposed after revoking Harrison’s probation.
Harrison argues his sentence is plainly procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to articulate why
a sentence within the three- to nine-month policy statement
range applicable to his probation violations was insufficient to
achieve the statutory sentencing objectives set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Because we discern no procedural error
in the district court’s sentencing, we affirm.
A sentence imposed after revocation of probation
should be affirmed if it is within the applicable statutory
maximum and not plainly unreasonable. See United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2007). In reviewing a
revocation sentence, this court “takes a more deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines
sentences.” Id. at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We first determine whether the revocation sentence is
procedurally or substantively unreasonable. * See United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). A revocation
*
Because Harrison does not challenge the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence, we limit our discussion to the
procedural reasonableness inquiry.
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sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court
considered the advisory policy statement range based on Chapter
Seven of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the
applicable § 3553(a) factors. See Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656
(noting that in probation revocation context, sentencing court
must assess all of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors); Crudup,
461 F.3d at 438-39. Furthermore, the district court must state
a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the
sentence imposed, “but this statement need not be as specific as
has been required for departing from a traditional [G]uidelines
range.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Only if the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable do we assess whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Based on our review of the transcript of the
revocation hearing, we readily conclude the district court
adequately explained the reasons for the sentence it selected
for Harrison. Furthermore, the district court’s explanation
implicitly addresses why it rejected a within-policy statement
range sentence. We thus conclude that the eighteen-month
sentence Harrison received was procedurally reasonable and
affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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