UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4743
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRENCESA MARIE-DAWN SHANKLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:12-cr-00193-1)
Submitted: April 22, 2014 Decided: April 30, 2014
Before WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth
Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Monica D. Coleman, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrencesa Marie-Dawn Shanklin pled guilty, without
the benefit of a written plea agreement, to possessing with
intent to distribute a quantity of oxycodone, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). Shanklin asked the district court to
vary downward from her sentencing range of 37–46 months to
impose a probationary sentence. The district court rejected
this request, but agreed that a variant sentence was
appropriate. It accordingly imposed an active term of twenty-
four months’ imprisonment. Shanklin challenges the
reasonableness of this sentence on appeal. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 46, 51 (2007). When a district court imposes a sentence
that falls outside of the applicable Guidelines range, this
court considers “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably
both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and
with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting this review, we “must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, on a whole, justify the
extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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Shanklin’s appellate arguments direct our attention to
the evaluative process engaged in by the district court in
arriving at her variant sentence. * First, Shanklin argues that
changes to the Sentencing Guidelines in terms of the offense
levels applicable to drug offenses demonstrate that the court’s
assessment of the seriousness of her offense was misguided.
Shanklin suggests that the court should have utilized the
Guidelines as they will be modified.
Shanklin is correct in that the Sentencing Commission
has very recently approved an across-the-board two-level
reduction to offense levels applicable to most federal drug
trafficking offenses. But these modifications are not yet
operative, and certainly were not in effect at the time of
Shanklin’s September 2013 sentencing. We thus reject Shanklin’s
contention that the district court abused its discretion in not
prospectively applying these reductions in her case. See Morris
v. Wachovia Sec. Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that this court will find an abuse of discretion if,
after reviewing the record and reasoning of the district court,
it is left with “a definite and firm conviction that the court
below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
*
Shanklin does not challenge on appeal the district court’s
calculation of her advisory Guidelines range.
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reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Shanklin next argues that the district court failed to
give appropriate weight to those sentencing factors relied on to
support the downward variance. Once again, we cannot agree.
Prior to imposing sentence, the district court recited
the facts of this case, noting the scope of Shanklin’s drug
trafficking. The court discussed the seriousness of the offense
in terms of the epidemic of prescription drug abuse in Southern
West Virginia and in terms of the highly addictive nature of
these types of opiates. The court also explained its usual view
that such cases warranted longer sentences.
Here, though, the court found that several of the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors justified a deviation from its
regular practice. The court identified three specific bases for
the downward variance: (1) that Shanklin, at twenty-three years
old, had no criminal history and was the sole parent of a young
child; (2) that Shanklin had been devastated by the recent death
of her mother, causing her to spiral downward into substance
abuse; and (3) that, while on pre-trial release, Shanklin had
taken significant steps towards changing her life, such as
obtaining her high school diploma, maintaining her employment at
a nursing home, and remaining drug free. The court expressed
its appreciation of Shanklin’s rehabilitative efforts and noted
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that they were factored into the sentencing calculus. It was
against this backdrop that the district court elected to give
Shanklin a “break” and sentence her to twenty-four months’
imprisonment, thirteen months lower than the bottom of her
advisory Guidelines range of 37-46 months.
Shanklin contends that “the extent of the variance
does not accurately reflect those factors[]” that the court
identified as supporting the variance (Appellant’s Br. at 10),
and asks that we hold that the twenty-four-month sentence is
greater than necessary. But “district courts have extremely
broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669,
679 (4th Cir. 2011). And, as the Supreme Court has made plain,
we may not reverse a sentence simply because we “might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
At bottom, Shanklin asks us to reweigh the sentencing
factors so to reach a result different than that of the district
court. This we will not do. See id.; United States v.
Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 943-44 (4th Cir. 2014) (“We must defer
to the district court and affirm a reasonable sentence, even if
we would have imposed something different.”). The extent of the
variance reflects the court’s concerted effort to balance the
seriousness of this drug trafficking offense with Shanklin’s
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personal history and circumstances, particularly her lack of
criminal history, family circumstances, and self-rehabilitation.
The district court amply justified its decision to vary downward
from the Guidelines range by thirteen months, rendering the
variance reasonable. See Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d at 123.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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