13‐619‐cv
John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
________
AUGUST TERM, 2013
ARGUED: SEPTEMBER 19, 2013
DECIDED: MAY 2, 2014
No. 13‐619‐cv
JOHN BETTS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
MARTHA ANNE SHEARMAN, CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICER
PABLO RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants‐Appellees,
POLICE OFFICER JANE DOE,
Defendant.
________
Before: WINTER, WALKER, WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
________
Plaintiff John Betts filed this suit seeking damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his arrest based on allegedly false
accusations made by a complaining victim. The United States
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John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken,
District Judge) granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint.
We hold, first, that because arguable probable cause existed to
arrest Betts, his claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution were properly dismissed.
Second, we hold that Betts’s claim for denial of his right to a fair trial
was properly dismissed because he failed to meet the required
pleading standards. Finally, we hold that Betts’s claims against
defendant‐complainant Martha Anne Shearman were properly
dismissed because she did not act under the color of state law.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
MICHAEL H. JOSEPH, Law Office of Michael H.
Joeseph, P.L.L.C., White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff
Appellant.
MICHAEL J. PASTOR, (Kristen M. Helmers, on the
brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation
Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY,
for Defendants‐Appellees City of New York and Police
Officer Pablo Rodriguez.
CHARLES E. DORKEY, III, McKenna Long &
Aldridge LLP, New York, NY (Rebecca Tingey, on
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John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
the brief), for Defendant‐Appellee Martha Anne
Shearman.
________
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
In this appeal we consider whether the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, District
Judge) erred in granting defendants’ motions to dismiss the
complaint in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which the plaintiff seeks
damages arising from his arrest based on allegedly false accusations
made by a complaining victim.
We hold, first, that because arguable probable cause existed to
arrest Betts, his claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution were properly dismissed.
Second, we hold that Betts’s claim for denial of his right to a fair trial
was properly dismissed because he failed to meet the required
pleading standards. Finally, we hold that Betts’s claims against
defendant‐complainant Martha Anne Shearman were properly
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John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
dismissed because she did not act under the color of state law.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Because this appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal
on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we accept as true the
following allegations set forth in Betts’s complaint. See Doe v. City of
New York, 15 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1994).
On January 20, 2011 at approximately 11:30 p.m., while
Shearman was under the influence of alcohol and other controlled
substances, she became verbally combative towards her then
husband Betts. To avoid her, Betts locked himself in a spare
bedroom. Shearman tried to force her way in and threatened Betts
that if he did not let her in, she would call the police. Shearman then
called the police and falsely accused Betts of assaulting her.
At approximately 1:00 a.m., Police Officers Rodriguez and
Doe responded to the call. In their presence, Shearman accused Betts
of assault, harassment, and of slamming her arm against the ground,
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John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
causing her substantial pain. The officers forcibly entered the spare
bedroom where Betts was sleeping and arrested him.
Betts alleges that the officers then assisted Shearman in
making a false accusation and coached her in fabricating a version of
the events to justify the arrest. Betts also alleges there were reasons
for the officers to doubt Shearman’s credibility: Shearman was
obviously intoxicated, high, and appeared strung out; she had made
false accusations against Betts in the past; and there was a lack of
physical evidence to support an assault charge.
The officers charged Betts under New York law with assault
in the third degree, harassment in the second degree and resisting
arrest. Eventually the state court dismissed these charges with
prejudice.
In April 2012, Betts filed a complaint in the district court
against Shearman, Officers Rodriguez and Doe, and the City of New
York. Betts brought claims against Officers Rodriguez and Doe for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law
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John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
violations for false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
prima facie tort, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. His
claimed constitutional violations against Shearman alleged that she
was a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983. Betts also brought a claim
under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690‐91
(1978), against the City of New York for allegedly having a “custom,
policy, and practice” that permitted the constitutional violations.
On January 24, 2013, the district court granted the defendants’
motions to dismiss. Betts v. Shearman, No. 12‐cv‐3195(JPO), 2013 WL
311124 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013). The district court held that Officers
Rodriguez and Doe were entitled to qualified immunity on Betts’s
claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution because the officers had “arguable probable cause” to
arrest Betts. Id. at *9‐10, *12. The district court also dismissed Betts’s
claim for excessive force on the basis that he failed to meet the
required pleading standards by alleging nothing more than that his
shoulder was somehow injured during the arrest. Id. at *10‐11. The
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district court dismissed the abuse of process claim for failing to
plead a “nefarious aim” behind his prosecution, id. at *12, and the
fair trial claim on the basis that the allegations were implausible, id.
at *13. The district court dismissed Betts’s § 1983 claims against
Shearman because she was not a state actor and the pleadings were
insufficient to establish that Shearman conspired with the officers or
participated willfully in joint activity with them. Id. at *13‐14. And
finally, the district court dismissed Betts’s claim against the City of
New York because Betts’s allegations that the officers acted in
accordance with a City custom, policy, or practice were conclusory.
Id. at *16.
The district court dismissed all of the federal claims with
prejudice except Betts’s excessive force claim against Officer
Rodriguez, which was dismissed without prejudice. Id. The district
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Betts’s
state law claims. Id.
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DISCUSSION
Betts does not appeal the dismissal of his excessive force
claim, his claim against the City of New York, or his claims against
Officer Doe. Rather, Betts urges this court to reverse the dismissal of
the other claims. We hold that the district court neither erred in
granting defendants’ motions to dismiss nor abused its discretion in
denying Betts leave to replead.
I. Dismissal of Betts’s Claims
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo and, in doing so, we “view the
pleadings in the light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable
inference in favor of, the non‐moving party.” Doe, 15 F.3d at 266
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious
Prosecution
Probable cause is a complete defense to a constitutional claim
of false arrest, Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.
1995), and false imprisonment, Zanghi v. Vill. of Old Brookville, 752
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John Betts v. Martha Anne Shearman, et al.
F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985). And continuing probable cause is a
complete defense to a constitutional claim of malicious prosecution.
Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 143‐44 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that
probable cause is a defense to a claim of malicious prosecution if it is
not later nullified by information establishing the defendant’s
innocence). “Probable cause exists when one has knowledge of, or
reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances
that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person
to be arrested.” Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 79 (2d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
More specifically, probable cause exists if a law enforcement
officer “received [] information from some person, normally the
putative victim or eyewitness, unless the circumstances raise doubt
as to the person’s veracity. The reliability or veracity of the
informant and the basis for the informant’s knowledge are two
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important factors.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Even in the absence of probable cause, a police officer is
entitled to qualified immunity where “(1) [her] conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was ‘objectively
reasonable’ for [her] to believe that [her] actions were lawful at the
time of the challenged act.” Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76,
87 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution claims therefore turn on whether the defendant officers’
probable cause determination was objectively reasonable—that is,
whether there was “arguable” probable cause to arrest. Id. For the
following reasons, we agree with the district court that the arresting
officers had arguable probable cause and were entitled to qualified
immunity.
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As Betts alleged in his complaint, Shearman called the police
and reported that Betts had, among other things, assaulted her. Betts
also alleged that once the officers arrived at the apartment,
Shearman again accused Betts of assault and harassment, although it
is unclear from the complaint whether Shearman made this
allegation before or after allegedly being “coached” by the officers to
lie.
In any event, Officers Rodriguez and Doe responded to a
domestic disturbance based on Shearman’s report over the phone
that she had been assaulted and found Betts locked in a bedroom.
Betts alleged, and now argues, that the officers had reason to doubt
Shearman’s credibility because she was visibly intoxicated and had
made false accusations against Betts in the past, and because there
was a lack of physical evidence to support an assault charge.
Shearman’s past false accusations, however, do not
undermine a finding of arguable probable cause because Betts
nowhere alleged that the officers knew of the prior accusations on
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the night Betts was arrested. See Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395. “When
determining whether probable cause exists courts must consider
those facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and
immediately before it . . . .” Id. (quoting Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298
F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002). Likewise, the lack of physical evidence
of an assault on Shearman’s body is not fatal to finding arguable
probable cause when Shearman had reported that she had been
assaulted. See Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989) (A
police officer’s purpose “is to apprehend those suspected of
wrongdoing, and not to finally determine guilt through a weighing
of the evidence.”).
Additionally, Betts alleges that Shearman was “obviously
intoxicated and high, in that she appeared to be strung out,” but fails
to allege any facts regarding how Officers Rodriguez and Doe
would have known this at the time Shearman made accusations
against Betts. Even assuming that the officers were aware that
Sherman was intoxicated, absent other indicia raising concerns of
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reliability, the officers were not unreasonable in surmising that an
offense had been committed by Betts. And Betts’s allegations that
Shearman was coached by the officers into making false allegations
are, as discussed below, implausible.
In sum, the arresting officers had arguable probable cause to
arrest Betts because they were entitled to believe Shearman’s
accusation of assault absent credible reasons not to. Given the facts
available to the officers, it was “objectively reasonable for the
officer[s] to believe that probable cause existed.” Golino v. City of
New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991).
B. Right to a Fair Trial
Betts argues that the district court erred in dismissing his fair
trial claim on the basis that his allegations were insufficient to
support it. “When a police officer creates false information likely to
influence a jury’s decision and forwards that information to
prosecutors, he violates the accused’s constitutional right to a fair
trial, and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is
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redressable in an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997).
We agree with the district court that Betts’s complaint failed to
plausibly plead this claim as required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Factual allegations must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face,” which requires pleading facts that “permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), 679.
Betts alleges that Officers Rodriguez and Doe, upon arriving
at the apartment he shared with Shearman, “assisted Shearman in
making a false allegation and . . . coached her in fabricating a
contrived version of the events to justify a baseless and false arrest.”
Betts, however, also alleges that Shearman initially phoned the
police and made the same “false” accusations that, among other
things, Betts assaulted her. The original accusation without the
possibility of any police complicity was sufficient to sustain the
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arrest, thereby undermining the claim that it was the police whose
false accusation denied Betts a fair trial. Moreover, it is not plausible
that, without more, a complaining witness who had originally
conceived of false accusations on her own accord also required
“coaching” in making substantially the same accusations again.
Betts’s claim that his right to a fair trial was violated was thus
properly dismissed by the district court.
C. State Action by Shearman
Betts alleges in his complaint, and now argues on appeal, that
Shearman engaged in joint action with Officers Rodriguez and Doe
to violate Betts’s civil rights such that Shearman acted under color of
law.1 Specifically, he argues that Shearman became a state actor by
“knowingly making false allegations and jointly acting with the
1 Betts also alleged that Shearman conspired with the officers to violate
his constitutional rights. A Section 1983 conspiracy claim is distinct from
one of joint action. See Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324‐25
(2d Cir. 2002). We conclude that the district court correctly held that Betts
failed to sufficiently plead a conspiracy, both because the pleading was
conclusory, and because, as described above in Section I.B, his allegations
that the police coached Shearman were implausible. See Betts, 2013 WL
311124 at *14.
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police defendants to fabricate a contrived version of the facts . . . for
the purpose of having [Betts] baselessly arrested.” We disagree.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, constitutional torts are only actionable
against state actors or private parties acting “under the color of”
state law. Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323. We have said that a claim
against a private entity must “allege facts demonstrating that the
private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an
unconstitutional act.” Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68
(2d Cir. 1992). “Put differently, a private actor acts under color of
state law when the private actor ‘is a willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents.’” Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 324
(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)).
A private actor can only be “a willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents” if the two share some common
goal to violate the plaintiff’s rights. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Southlake
Center for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A
charge of joint action amounts to alleging some agreement between
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private and public actors to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. A
requirement of the joint action charge therefore is that both public
and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.” (internal
citations omitted)); Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189
F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999).
In Ginsberg, plaintiff Ginsberg, upon returning a truck rented
from defendant Healey Leasing, got into a verbal altercation with a
manager at Healey Leasing over whether, as Ginsberg insisted, the
two had agreed that Ginsberg’s automobile insurer would pay the
rental fee. Id. at 270. After Ginsberg left, the Healey Leasing manager
called the police and reported the payment dispute and altercation.
Id. The police arrived and threatened to arrest Ginsburg for larceny
or breach of peace if he did not pay the rental fee to Healey Leasing.
Id. Ginsberg paid the fee and later sued Healey Leasing and the
police under Section 1983 alleging that he was deprived of property
without due process and that Healey Leasing, acting under color of
state law, was complicit in the deprivation. Id.
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On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Healey Leasing. We held that Healey Leasing’s
requesting police assistance and providing information that led to
police action did not make Healey Leasing a joint participant in state
action. Id. at 272. “Where . . . a police officer exercises independent
judgment in how to respond to a private party’s legitimate request
for assistance, the private party is not ‘jointly engaged’ in the
officer’s conduct so as to render it a state actor under Section 1983.”
Id. In Ginsberg, state action could not be inferred because, absent
“evidence that [the officer] undertook to resolve the dispute
pursuant to any agreement or plan with Healey,” id., it could not be
shown that Healey and the officer shared a common goal of
violating Ginsberg’s rights.
The operation of this principle is illustrated by two district
court decisions that found state action complicity by a private party.
In Bang v. Utopia Restaurant, the district court held that state action
by a restaurant owner was adequately pleaded when, absent
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probable cause, the police arrested the plaintiffs after speaking to the
restaurant owner for twenty minutes. 923 F. Supp. 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). The Bang court stated that “it would be reasonable to infer
that during the conversation, [the restaurant owner] urged the
officers to arrest both plaintiffs, without probable cause, in
furtherance of what became the shared goal of depriving plaintiffs of
federally guaranteed rights.” Id. The court pointed out, however,
that had the officers arrested plaintiffs immediately upon arriving
on the scene based on information of illegality given over the phone,
“it would be difficult to infer joint action because . . . it would not
appear that the officers shared the unlawful goal of [the restaurant
owner].” Id. at 50.
Similarly, in White v. Moylan, the district court found that the
plaintiff properly pleaded state action by two private security
guards who substituted in plaintiff’s bag unpurchased store
merchandise for goods already purchased, resulting in plaintiff’s
arrest for shoplifting. 554 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267 (D. Conn. 2008). The
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plaintiff alleged that the security guards and arresting officer
reviewed surveillance footage, discovered that the plaintiff’s
merchandise was not, in fact, stolen, and worked in tandem to
“fabricate[] a reason to arrest [plaintiff] for shoplifting.” Id. at 265,
267. Plaintiff’s complaint thus alleged that the police officer did
more than simply arrest plaintiff based on information from the
security guards. Id. at 267. By jointly working to fabricate evidence
of a crime, the private actors and the police officer shared the
common goal of violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Here, Betts alleges that Officers Rodriguez and Doe “assisted
Sherman in making a false allegation and . . . coached her in
fabricating a contrived version of the events to justify a baseless and
false arrest.” As explained above in Section I.B, however, Betts’s
allegation that Shearman was coached by the Officers into making
false accusations is not plausible given that Shearman first called the
police and reported that she was assaulted prior to her interaction
with the officers.
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Betts’s claim against Shearman as a state actor boils down to
the fact that he was arrested upon the false accusation of assault
made against him by a private citizen to the police. This is
insufficient to state a plausible claim that Shearman and the
arresting officers shared a common goal of violating Betts’s rights.
The district court properly granted defendant Shearman’s motion to
dismiss.
II. Leave to Replead
We review a district court’s denial of leave to replead for
abuse of discretion. Williams v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212 (2d
Cir. 2011). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion
because any amendment to the complaint on the claims discussed
herein would be futile. See Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 310
F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002).
No changes to the complaint would undermine the existence
of arguable probable cause for Officers Rodriguez and Doe to arrest
Betts. Additionally, Betts has identified no facts that, if alleged,
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would bolster his allegations that the officers coached Shearman to
make false accusations. Likewise, Betts has identified no facts that
would sufficiently allege that Shearman should be treated as a state
actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order is
AFFIRMED.
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