NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 13-2215
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RYAN SEALS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 12-CR-00206-01)
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 14, 2014
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, and CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 8, 2014)
OPINION OF THE COURT
McKEE, Chief Judge
Ryan Seals appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence and conviction for
illegally possessing a firearm. He argues that the District Court abused its discretion by
permitting the Government to present inadmissible hearsay, and by excluding potentially
exculpatory evidence. For the following reasons, we will affirm the order of the District
Court.1
I.
As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case, we need not reiterate them.
Seals first argues that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the
Government to present hearsay testimony in the form of a statement by Seals’ brother,
Bryan. However, the District Court properly concluded that the disputed statement was
not being offered to prove the truth of the declaration (that police where in the area).
Rather, it was offered to show its effect on Seals. Accordingly, it was not hearsay under
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
The statement was also admissible as a present-sense impression under FED. R.
EVID. 803(1) to reflect his spontaneous observations about police presence, and the court
properly allowed police to explain the meaning of the street phrase. See United States v.
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 3742(a). We generally review a trial court’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Green, 556 F.3d
151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir.
1996)). In the event that the evidentiary determination is premised upon an interpretation
of the federal rules of evidence, however, our review of the determination is plenary. Id.
2
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999) (officers with particularized knowledge may
explain the meaning of certain street terms).
Seals’ also argues that he should have been allowed to admit a statement made to a
detective during a photo array. The declarant did not testify and was apparently not
available because he would have asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. Seals
first contends that Detective Cremen’s observation of Reginald Gibbons’ failure to
identify Ryan Seals was admissible as a non-hearsay description under FED. R. EVID.
602. In the alternative, Seals claims that Detective Cremen’s testimony regarding
Reginald Gibbons’ written statement qualifies as a hearsay exception under 803(b)(3) or
804(b)(5).
Seals’ first argument confuses the purpose of FED. R. EVID. 602. As a result, it
fails. FED. R. EVID. 602 functions as pre-requisite for the introduction of testimony. A
witness may not testify about an event s/he does not have personal knowledge of. The
Rule does not supplant the hearsay rules.
Seals’ second argument is similarly misplaced. Gibbons’ statement was made
while police considered him a complainant, not a suspect. Given the circumstances
surrounding the disputed statement, and the fact that it was neutral, rather than
incriminating, it cannot reasonably be viewed as an “admission” against interest and is
therefore not admissible under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Although Gibbons did later
3
confess to possessing a gun, that does not transform the nature of statements he made
when police viewed him as a victim.2
Seals’ final argument likewise fails. As a general matter, we have reserved
application of the residual hearsay exception—Rule 807—to instances when “exceptional
guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and necessity
are present.” United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks
omitted). Gibbons’ statement lacked any degree of trustworthiness because of its
surrounding circumstances. He was not under oath nor subject to cross-examination. It
was rather a voluntary statement made soon after the shooting.
Moreover, not only is there no corroboration of the statement’s reliability, there is
a wealth of evidence suggesting that he likely could have identified Seals. In the end, all
of this evidence points to the conclusion that the District Court did not commit reversible
error by excluding this evidence for lack of trustworthiness.3
II.
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of the District Court.
2
Because we find that the statements were not against Gibbons’ penal interest, it is
unnecessary to examine the indicia of reliability.
3
Seals’ due process argument also fails as the evidentiary ruling concerning Gibbons’
statement did not impede his right to present a defense. Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223,
232 (3d Cir. 2003).
4