UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1583
SHARON FAYE BRYANT,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Susan K. Gauvey, Magistrate Judge.
(1:11-cv-03083-SKG)
Argued: March 18, 2014 Decided: May 9, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Marcia Ellen Anderson, LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA E. ANDERSON,
LLC, Mount Airy, Maryland, for Appellant. David Nathaniel
Mervis, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Alex S. Gordon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sharon Faye Bryant appeals an adverse ruling on her claim
for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income. We hold that substantial evidence supports the denial
and affirm.
I.
On December 15, 2006, Bryant filed a claim for benefits
with the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”). Bryant contended that she suffered from major
depression, panic disorder, generalized anxiety, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) with a disability onset date
of June 2, 2006. The Commissioner denied her claim initially
and on reconsideration. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
likewise denied her claim and the Appeals Council denied her
request for review. A federal magistrate judge granted summary
judgment to the Commissioner on March 28, 2013, and Bryant
timely appealed.
II.
“This Court is authorized to review the Commissioner’s
denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).” Johnson v.
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We “must uphold the factual findings of the
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[ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were
reached through application of the correct legal standard.”
Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In applying this standard, “we do not
undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the
[ALJ].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate
disability claims.” Id. In sequence, the Commissioner asks
“whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of
disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment
that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4)
could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could
perform any other work in the national economy.” Id. The
claimant bears the burden of proof in steps one through four and
the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five. Id.
Additionally, if the claimant’s disability can be determined at
any step, the inquiry need not continue. Id.
The ALJ found under step one that Bryant was not engaged in
substantial gainful employment during the relevant time period.
Under step two, the ALJ determined that Bryant suffered from
bipolar disorder, PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline
personality disorder, and alcohol abuse disorder, and that these
impairments were “severe.” However, the ALJ found under step
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three that Bryant’s conditions did not meet or equal the listed
impairments under the applicable regulations. The ALJ then
calculated Bryant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which
measured her ability to work despite her impairments. Using
Bryant’s RFC, the ALJ determined under step four that she could
not return to any of her previous jobs but, under step five,
could perform jobs currently available in the national economy
and thus was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act.
Bryant argues that the ALJ erred by not considering “major
depressive disorder” as a severe impairment under step two,
improperly evaluating evidence of Bryant’s impairments under
step three, and failing to properly consider certain medical
reports when calculating her RFC. We address each of these
arguments in turn.
A.
Bryant argues that the ALJ erred in not considering “major
depressive disorder” as a severe impairment under step two of
the disability claim determination process. This step requires
that the ALJ determine whether the claimant suffered from a
“severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that
“significantly limits” the claimant’s “physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).
Contrary to Bryant’s contention, her “major depressive disorder”
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was taken into account. The ALJ found that Bryant satisfied
this step of the disability claims process because she suffered
from five severe impairments, one of which was bipolar disorder.
The magistrate judge noted that, medically speaking, a
“diagnosis of bipolar disorder is inclusive of the symptoms of
major depressive disorder and, therefore, the two disorders are
mutually exclusive.” J.A. 22. Furthermore, the record reveals
that although the ALJ did not specifically find that Bryant
suffered from “major depressive disorder,” the ALJ discussed
Bryant’s history of depression under steps two and three and
when determining her RFC. Thus, we find no merit in this
assignment of error.
B.
Bryant also contends that the ALJ erred under step three,
which requires the ALJ to compare the claimant’s conditions to
the Listings of Impairment (“Listings”) to determine if her
conditions are medically severe enough to warrant a presumption
of disability. Specifically, Bryant maintains that the ALJ
erred under Listings 12.04 (Affective Disorders), 12.06 (Anxiety
Related Disorders), and 12.08 (Personality Disorders) for three
reasons: first, that the ALJ wrongly found her impairments
caused her “moderate” rather than “marked” limitations, second,
that the ALJ did not consider evidence that she had suffered
repeated and extended episodes of decompensation and, third,
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that the ALJ incorrectly ruled that she was capable of working
outside her home.
First, Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.08 each contain an
identical “Paragraph B,” which provides that a claimant may
prove disability by showing, among other things, any two of
these limitations: “(1) [m]arked restriction of activities of
daily living; or (2) [m]arked difficulties in maintaining social
functioning; or (3) [m]arked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4) [r]epeated episodes
of decompensation, each of extended duration.” 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, App. 1. The Listings define “marked” as “more than
moderate but less than extreme.” Id. The ALJ evaluated the
evidence and determined that Bryant suffered only “moderate”
restrictions because she could, among other things, take care of
her personal needs around her house, run short errands on her
own, and focus while watching the news and reading the
newspaper. We decline to disturb the ALJ’s finding that Bryant
failed to prove her disability under Paragraph B because it is
supported by substantial evidence.
Second, Listing 12.04 provides an alternative basis for a
claimant to prove disability, part of which requires the
claimant to prove that she suffered “[r]epeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration.” Id. “Episodes of
decompensation” are defined as “exacerbations or temporary
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increases in symptoms or signs accompanied by a loss of adaptive
functioning, as manifested by difficulties in performing
activities of daily living, maintaining social relationships, or
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. To
qualify as “repeated” and of “extended duration,” the claimant
must suffer “three episodes within 1 year, or an average of once
every 4 months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks.” Id.
The ALJ found that Bryant had experienced only one to two
episodes surrounding her hospitalization in June 2006 for
suicidal thoughts and alcohol abuse. Bryant argues that the ALJ
should have considered a change in her medication that happened
in early 2007. But while episodes of decompensation may be
inferred from “significant alteration in medication,” id., the
ALJ properly declined to analyze Bryant’s change in medication
because it did not result in any exacerbation of her symptoms.
Bryant also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to
consider a series of hospitalizations that allegedly occurred
before the onset of her impairments. The record contains bare
statements that Bryant had been hospitalized on prior occasions,
but no details about them. It was undoubtedly the ALJ’s duty to
consider these statements. Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173
(4th Cir. 1986). However, Bryant bore the burden of proving she
was disabled under step three, and she did not offer any
specific evidence about the alleged hospital stays nor did she
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request that the ALJ seek such evidence. Furthermore, even if
the ALJ had obtained records from the past hospitalizations,
they occurred far enough before the onset of her impairments to
be of limited relevance to her claim. Indeed, the record
already contained Bryant’s medical records from as early as
December 2004, two full years before she filed her claim.
Lastly, Listing 12.06 contains an alternate provision
allowing a claimant to prove disability if she suffers from,
among other things, a “complete inability to function
independently outside the area of [her] home.” 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, App. 1. After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found
that Bryant’s impairments were not so severe. We agree because
the record shows that Bryant could perform limited activities
outside of her home, such as running short errands on her own,
and we thus decline to overturn the ALJ’s finding.
In sum, we uphold the ALJ’s finding that Bryant was not
disabled under step three because her impairments did not meet
or equal any of the Listings.
C.
Finally, Bryant challenges the ALJ’s determination of her
RFC. When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considers all
of her impairments, even if they are not “severe,” and reviews
“all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a). In Bryant’s case, the ALJ evaluated numerous
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medical reports, including those written by Bryant’s treating
physician, Dr. Gergana Dimitrova, as well as two state agency
consultants. Dr. Dimitrova’s report in July 2007 contained a
Psychiatric Note that stated Bryant “continues to not be able to
work due to her paranoia and her depression.” J.A. 29-30. The
ALJ could not determine whether that statement was made by Dr.
Dimitrova or Bryant herself and found that, regardless, the
statement was too ambiguous to provide a useful assessment of
the activities Bryant could or could not perform given her
impairments. Thus, the ALJ gave Dr. Dimitrova’s statement
“little weight.”
The magistrate judge found that, because Dr. Dimitrova was
Bryant’s treating physician, the ALJ erred under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2) by not giving her statement more weight.
However, the magistrate judge found that the error was harmless
because Dr. Dimitrova’s opinions were thoroughly evaluated by
the ALJ, were discussed by the two state agency consultants in
their reports, and were consistent with the other medical
evidence. The magistrate judge also found that the ALJ erred by
failing to discuss a report written by consultative examiner Dr.
Jethalal Harkhani in February 2007. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)
(obligating ALJs to “evaluate every medical opinion” they
receive). The ALJ found this error harmless as well because Dr.
Harkhani’s report was discussed by the two state agency
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consultants and was consistent with the medical evidence on the
record. We likewise find the ALJ errors harmless and affirm the
ALJ’s determination of Bryant’s RFC.
III.
It is the ALJ’s responsibility to find the facts and weigh
the evidence. We decline to overrule those determinations in
this case because substantial evidence supports them.
AFFIRMED
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