UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2502
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION; JOHN DOE, as parents and
next friends of their minor child; JANE DOE, as parents and
next friends of their minor child; JILL DOE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
GREENVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
JENNIFER GIBSON, in her individual capacity; BURKE ROYSTER,
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
--------------------------
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM,
Amicus Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:13-cv-02471-GRA)
Submitted: April 25, 2014 Decided: May 16, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Aaron Joel Kozloski, CAPITOL COUNSEL, LLC, Lexington, South
Carolina; Monica Lynn Miller, AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Thomas K. Barlow, John M.
Reagle, CHILDS & HALLIGAN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; R.
Douglas Webb, GREENVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellee. Kevin H. Theriot, Jeremy D.
Tedesco, Scottsdale, Arizona; David A. Cortman, J. Matthew
Sharp, Rory T. Gray, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, Lawrenceville,
Georgia; Matthew G. Gerrald, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Amicus Supporting Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Three pseudonymous individuals—Jill Doe, a former fifth-
grade student at Mountain View Elementary School (the “School”),
and her parents, John and Jane Doe—and the American Humanist
Association (AHA) (altogether, “Plaintiffs”) sued the Greenville
County School District (the “District”), alleging that the
District violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Specifically, Plaintiffs
contend that the District infringed upon their First Amendment
Establishment Clause right by holding the School’s graduation
ceremony at a religious venue and by incorporating prayer as a
part of the official graduation program. 2 Plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs also moved to continue to
proceed pseudonymously and to keep their true identities under
seal.
I.
After a hearing, the district court denied both motions
without written order. Plaintiffs appeal the denial of both
motions and request that this case be reassigned to a different
district judge upon remand.
1
Plaintiffs also sued the District’s superintendent and the
School’s principal in their individual capacities but have since
dismissed those defendants from the lawsuit.
2
John and Jane Doe are members of AHA, and AHA brought suit
to assert the First Amendment rights of its members.
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II.
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. Dewhurst v. Century
Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 2011). “[T]o receive
a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ‘must establish [1] that
he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that
an injunction is in the public interest.’” W. Va. Ass’n of Club
Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298
(4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
Additionally, Rule 52(a)(1) and (2) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
(a) Findings and Conclusions.
(1) In General. In an action tried on the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
must find the facts specially and state its
conclusions of law separately. The findings and
conclusions may be stated on the record after the
close of the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a
memorandum of decision filed by the court. Judgment
must be entered under Rule 58.
(2) For an Interlocutory Injunction. In
granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction, the
court must similarly state the findings and
conclusions that support its action.
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In denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
the district court provided no analysis of the law and made no
attempt to apply the four factors mentioned above to the facts
as alleged in the complaint. Thus, we are constrained to remand
the case for reconsideration of the issue. Id. at 242–43. We
likewise conclude that in denying the unopposed motion to
proceed pseudonymously, the district court erred for the same
reason stated above. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of
Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction and to proceed
pseudonymously and remand for reconsideration and for the
opportunity for the district court to provide an analysis
supporting any subsequent rulings.
III.
Finally, we agree with Plaintiffs that the case be
reassigned to a different district judge on remand and so order.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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