UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4619
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAURICE DEWAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:04-cr-00144-H-1)
Submitted: May 16, 2014 Decided: May 21, 2014
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Dewar appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to an eleven-
month term of incarceration. On appeal, Dewar argues that the
district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence because
the court should have ordered that he undergo substance abuse
treatment rather than imposing a term of incarceration. We
affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly,
in examining a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised
release, we “take[] a more deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We will affirm a revocation sentence
that falls within the statutory maximum, unless we find the
sentence to be “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation
sentence, we first consider “whether the sentence is
unreasonable,” following the same general principles we apply to
our review of original sentences. Id. at 438. Only if we find
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a sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will
we determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors and the policy statements contained in
Chapter Seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. The district court also must provide
an explanation of its chosen sentence, although this explanation
“need not be as detailed or specific” as is required for an
original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547
(4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
We cannot conclude that Dewar’s eleven-month
revocation sentence is unreasonable, much less plainly so. Our
review of the record reveals that the district court provided
Dewar several opportunities to participate in substance abuse
and mental health treatment but that, despite these
opportunities, Dewar was unable to refrain from using marijuana
and, later, cocaine. Although Dewar requested that he be placed
in a more intensive treatment program, the court was not
required to select treatment over incarceration, particularly in
light of Dewar’s history of failed efforts to achieve sobriety.
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In any event, the court fully recognized Dewar’s drug addiction,
recommending that Dewar “be exposed to the most intense drug
treatment possible during the term of this incarceration.”
Finally, we conclude that the court properly imposed a
term of incarceration “to sanction [Dewar] for failing to abide
by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision and to punish
the inherent breach of trust indicated by [his] behavior.”
Moulden, 478 F.3d at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the sentence imposed by the district court was not plainly
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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