UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4951
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MAURICE TERRELL GENERAL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:05-cr-00125-D-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2013 Decided: July 16, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Devon L. Donahue,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Terrell General appeals from his 60-month
sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised
release. On appeal, General argues that his sentence was
plainly unreasonable, as the district court failed to give
appropriate reasoning for an upward variance from the Guidelines
policy statement range of 30-37 months and improperly relied too
heavily on the seriousness of the revocation violation conduct.
We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In this inquiry, we
“take[] a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues
of fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness
review for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478
F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Only if we find the sentence procedurally or
substantively unreasonable must we decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
We “may consider the extent of the deviation [from the
recommended Guidelines range], but must give due deference to
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the district court’s decision that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2006)] factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The Carter rationale applies to
revocation hearings; however, “[a] court need not be as detailed
or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be
when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a
district court’s reasoning may be “clear from context” and the
court’s statements throughout the sentencing hearing may be
considered).
General argues first that the sentence imposed is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
provide sufficient reasoning for its upward variance from the
policy statement range. However, the court clearly heard
General’s arguments for leniency, but found that the other
factors in the case outweighed these circumstances.
Specifically, the court explicitly relied upon General’s
untruthfulness at the hearing, the fact that he committed two
violations, the need to deter General from further egregious
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criminal behavior, and the fact that society needed to be
protected from General. The record reflects that the district
court properly calculated the advisory policy statement range,
considered the parties’ arguments and the relevant policy
statements and statutory factors, and adequately explained the
reasons for the upward variance. Accordingly, the sentence is
not procedurally unreasonable.
Next, General argues that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable because the court considered and
weighed an improper factor when determining his sentence.
Specifically, General avers that the court relied almost
exclusively on the seriousness of the criminal conduct forming
the basis for his supervised release violation. Although a
district court “ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation
marks omitted), the court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements in the federal sentencing guidelines manual, as well
as the statutory requirements and factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006).
Chapter Seven provides, “at revocation, the court should
sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking
into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2011).
Section 3583 approves consideration of a majority of the factors
listed in § 3553(a), omitting only two. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
Among the omitted factors is the need “to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A).
Here, the district court considered General’s breach
of trust and the need to deter him from future criminal conduct,
as well as other appropriate factors. While General accurately
states that the court noted the nature of his revocation
offense, the court clearly considered these facts in the context
of assessing the need to protect the public from General's
future crimes and to deter future conduct, required
considerations for revocation sentences. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B),(C). Moreover, to the extent the court
emphasized the seriousness of the revocation conduct, viewed as
a whole, we find that any such consideration was only one of
many factors considered by the court and such consideration did
not render General's sentence unreasonable. Furthermore, the
court's comments explicitly stated that it imposed a sentence
above the advisory policy statement range as a result of
General's extraordinarily egregious breach of trust.
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Accordingly, we affirm General’s sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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