UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4857
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GEORGE SCOTT GARMON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:94-cr-00029-FDW-5)
Submitted: December 7, 2010 Decided: December 21, 2010
Before WILKINSON and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Ross Hall Richardson,
Assistant Federal Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne
M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
George Garmon appeals the four-year sentence he
received upon revocation of his supervised release. He contends
that the district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence
because it failed to address mitigating factors and to provide a
sufficient reason for a sentence above the six to twelve month
revocation range set forth in Chapter 7 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (2009). For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we
will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release unless it is “plainly unreasonable” in light of the
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). Before
determining whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable” we
must decide whether it is unreasonable. Id. at 438. In doing
so, we “follow generally the procedural and substantive
considerations” used in reviewing original sentences. Id.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter
7 of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, id. at 440, and has adequately explained the
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sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as
much detail as when imposing the original sentence. Thompson,
595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for its imposition of a
sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
If, after considering the above, we are convinced that the
sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm.
Under this court’s deferential standard of review,
Garmon’s sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively
unreasonable. After the district court expressly considered the
advisory Guidelines sentencing range of six to twelve months, it
determined that the Guidelines range did not adequately account
for Garmon’s history and characteristics, which reflected a
manifest disrespect for the law and an inability to avoid
criminal activity for any significant period of time. Moreover,
there is nothing in the record to support Garmon’s assertion
that the district court ignored his claim that he was
institutionalized and required placement in a half-way house.
Instead, the court clearly rejected that argument, and
determined in its discretion that imprisonment was a better
option for Garmon.
Finally, the district court more than adequately
communicated the basis for the sentence in this case. The court
relied upon several of the relevant § 3553(a) factors and
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underscored Garmon’s history of violating the terms and
conditions of his supervised sentence, his substantial criminal
history, the need to protect the public from Garmon and Garmon’s
“desperate[] need” for the vocational and educational training
afforded through the Bureau of Prisons. The court also stressed
that Garmon had only been out of custody from his previous
revocation sentence for seven days when he was arrested for
assault with a deadly weapon. Thus, the district court met its
obligation to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority,” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), and
stated a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the
statutory maximum, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Accordingly, we conclude that Garmon’s four-year
sentence was not unreasonable. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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