UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-5023
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HENRY LEWIS GARLAND, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00015-WO-6)
Submitted: May 23, 2013 Decided: May 28, 2013
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John D. Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High Point,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Graham T. Green, Assistant United States Attorney,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Bethany Corbin, Clinical Program
Law Student, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Henry Lewis Garland, Jr., appeals the sixteen-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised
release. He contends that the upward variance sentence was
unreasonable because the district court did not find that
Garland’s criminal history category understated his criminal
record. We affirm.
We will not disturb a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for [G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Although a district court “ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider
the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Sentencing
Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and
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factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006).
In determining Garland’s revocation sentence, the
district court considered the Chapter Seven policy statements,
the statutory requirements, and the relevant factors in
§ 3553(a). The court noted that the six-month revocation
sentence Garland previously received was insufficient to protect
the public and deter him from future criminal activity. The
court also considered Garland’s continued illegal conduct while
on supervision—including numerous traffic violations and his
pattern of drug use—and concluded that an upward variance to
sixteen months’ imprisonment was appropriate. See United States
v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2011) (providing
that court may vary from Guidelines range based on
considerations other than Guidelines-sanctioned departures).
This sixteen-month sentence is not plainly
unreasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-39. The district
court complied with the requirements of sentencing and did not
abuse its discretion in imposing Garland’s sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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