Rebecca Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0382n.06

No. 13-5747
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 22, 2014
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

Rebecca Shupe, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
v. KENTUCKY
)
Asplundh Tree Expert Company, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION
)

BEFORE: CLAY and DONALD, Circuit Judges; MAYS, District Judge.*

Samuel H. Mays, District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant

Rebecca Shupe (“Shupe”) appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to her former employer, Defendant-

Appellee Asplundh Tree Expert Company (“Asplundh”) in her suit

for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and wrongful

termination. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

I.

Asplundh hired Shupe to work as a Permission Taker/Pre-

Planner in its Lexington, Kentucky offices in August 2008. As a

*
The Honorable Samuel H. Mays, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
No. 13-5747
Rebecca Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company

condition to her at-will employment, Shupe was a required to

sign several forms, including a “Limitation on Time to File

Claims or Lawsuits” (the “Waiver”). Shupe signed and dated the

Waiver on August 15, 2008.

The single-page Waiver provides that:

I agree that any claim, administrative claim or
lawsuit relating to my service with [Asplundh] or any
of its subsidiaries must be filed no more than six (6)
months after the date of the employment action that is
the subject of the claim or lawsuit, except as may be
provided otherwise in a collective bargaining
agreement currently in effect. I waive any statute of
limitations to the contrary.

I have read and understand the contents of this
limitation and am fully able and competent to complete
it.

The words “IMPORTANT NOTICE” in larger font appear at the

top and bottom of the Waiver. The words “LIMITATION ON TIME TO

FILE CLAIMS OR LAWSUITS” and “READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING”

also appear at the top of the Waiver. The words “PLEASE READ”

in larger font appear at the bottom of the Waiver.

Shupe continued to work for Asplundh until she was

terminated in August 2011. Shupe claims that she was wrongfully

terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment

and gender discrimination by her supervisor at Asplundh, who was

also her ex-husband.

Shupe filed a complaint against Asplundh in the Circuit

Court of Fayette County, Kentucky, on August 10, 2012. The

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complaint was filed more than six months after she had been

terminated. Shupe alleged that Asplundh had violated the

Kentucky Civil Rights Act, K.R.S. §§ 344.010, et seq., when she

was (1) subjected to sexual harassment by her supervisor, her

former husband; (2) terminated based on her gender and age; and

(3) terminated in retaliation for complaining about her former

husband’s actions.

When Asplundh removed the action to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Shupe filed

a motion to remand the case to the state court on the basis that

her claims did not meet the minimum amount in controversy for

diversity jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and denied

her motion to remand.

Asplundh then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing

that Shupe’s complaint, filed almost a year after her

termination, was barred by the six-month limitations period in

the Waiver she had signed as a condition of her employment.

The district court granted the motion and Shupe filed this

timely appeal. On appeal, Shupe argues (1) that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because her claims did

not meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for

diversity jurisdiction, and (2) that her waiver concerning the

six-month limitations period was invalid and unenforceable.

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II.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this Court has “jurisdiction of

appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the

United States.” Because the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for Asplundh disposed of all issues relevant to this

appeal, this Court has jurisdiction.

A. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Minimum
Amount-In-Controversy Requirement

The denial of a motion to remand for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Music v. Arrowood Indem. Co.,

632 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

“If removal of a civil action is sought on the basis of the

jurisdiction conferred by [28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)], the sum

demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed

to be the amount in controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

1446(c)(2). A court must conduct a “fair reading” of the

allegations in the complaint to determine the amount in

controversy. Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560,

573 (6th Cir. 2001).

“[T]he notice of removal may assert the amount in

controversy if the initial pleading seeks . . . (ii) a money

judgment, but the State practice either does not permit demand

for a specific sum or permits recovery of damages in excess of

the amount demanded . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii).

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Kentucky has such a practice. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure

8.01(2) states that, “In any action for unliquidated damages the

prayer for damages in any pleading shall not recite any sum as

alleged damages other than an allegation that damages are in

excess of any minimum dollar amount necessary to establish the

jurisdiction of the court . . . .”

A removal action is only proper based on the amount in

controversy asserted in the removal notice “if the district

court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the

amount in controversy exceeds the amount specified in [28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a)].” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B). This Court has held

that federal jurisdiction in a diversity case is determined at

the time of removal. Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield,

100 F.3d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

“The party seeking removal bears the burden of demonstrating

that the district court has original jurisdiction.” Eastman v.

Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal

citations omitted). “The party requesting removal must set

forth, in the notice of removal, specific facts supporting the

assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount

required by statute.” Nat’l Nail Corp. v. Moore, 139 F.Supp.2d

848, 850 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (citing Laughlin v. Kmart Corp.,

50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995)). “[B]ecause lack of

jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the

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continuation of litigation in federal court futile, the removal

statute should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in

favor of remand.” Eastman, 438 F.3d at 549-50 (alteration in

original) (internal citations omitted).

A successful claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act

entitles a plaintiff to “actual damages.” K.R.S. § 344.450.

“Actual damage is most appropriately defined as all those

damages directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course

of events, from the injury in question.” Mitchell v. Seaboard

Sys. R.R., 883 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal citation

omitted). Actual damages include broader relief than Title VII.

Id. at 454 (internal citation omitted). Actual damages include

back pay, front pay, lost benefits, humiliation, emotional

distress, embarrassment, and attorney’s fees. Williamson v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir. 2007);

Mitchell, 883 F.2d at 452-53; Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co.,

Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1992) (internal citation

omitted).

It is appropriate to consider back pay beyond the time of

removal when a plaintiff seeks an award for back pay that

includes future accruals. Weaver v. A.T.&T. Corp., 2010 WL

2521462, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 18, 2010) (citing Gafford v. Gen.

Elec., 997 F.2d 150, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1993)). There is no

statutory limit on damages for “emotional distress” under the

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Rebecca Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company

Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Childers Oil Co., Inc. v. Adkins,

256 S.W.3d 19, 28 (Ky. 2008).

Claims for punitive damages should be included in the

amount-in-controversy, “unless it is apparent to a legal

certainty that such cannot be recovered.” Hayes v. Equitable

Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal

citation omitted). Punitive damages are not available under the

Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v.

McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 139-40 (Ky. 2003).

Punitive damages are available against a defendant who

acted grossly negligently toward a plaintiff. Kinney v.

Butcher, 131 S.W.3d 357, 358-59 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). “[T]he

prevailing understanding defines gross negligence as a ‘wanton

or reckless disregard for the safety of other persons.’” Id.

“It is not necessary that the jury find the defendant to have

acted with express malice; rather, it is possible that a certain

course of conduct can be so outrageous that malice can be

implied from the facts of the situation.” Id. Punitive damages

must be proven by clear and convincing evidence under Kentucky

law. K.R.S. § 411.184(2).

B. The District Court Properly Determined that
Plaintiff’s Claims Exceeded $75,000.00.

In compliance with Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure

8.01(2), Shupe’s complaint does not state an amount in

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controversy. She alleges that her damages exceed the minimum

amount necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Fayette County

Circuit Court. The minimum amount necessary to confer

jurisdiction in Fayette County is $5,000.00.

Shupe’s complaint alleges that she suffered damages for

“embarrassment, physical pain and suffering, and emotional

distress, requiring [her] to incur medical treatment and

expenses for same” as a result of Asplundh’s failure to stop the

sexual harassment to which she was subjected. The complaint

alleges that Shupe is entitled to damages for “loss of wages and

employment benefits, and that she continues and will continue to

suffer said damages . . .” due to her wrongful termination.

Shupe alleges that Asplundh “falsely accus[ed] her of

knowing of the wrongful conduct of Defendant’s supervisor

concerning Defendant’s property.” That conduct was allegedly

“grossly negligent, outrageous, extreme, intentional, [and]

designed to hold her in false light to others within the company

and done with such reckless disregard to the Plaintiff,

entitling her to [p]unitive damages.” Shupe alleges that she is

entitled to attorney’s fees.

Defendant-Appellee’s Notice of Removal states the following

specific facts about the amount in controversy. Shupe was laid

off in August 2011. She was working approximately 42.5 hours a

week when she was terminated. Her pay rate was $15.00 an hour.

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Shupe could have earned approximately $34,123.00 if she had

remained employed from August 2011, to September 10, 2012, when

the action was removed.

Asplundh alleges that trial would not occur until September

2013. Shupe would then be seeking more than two years of back

pay. Two years of unmitigated back pay would be approximately

$68,250.00. Asplundh alleges that this figure and “Plaintiff’s

request for punitive damages, damages for ‘actual damages’ of

emotional distress, humiliation, or embarrassment” and

attorney’s fees total more than $75,000.00.

The district court agreed with Asplundh’s damages

calculation and found by a preponderance of the evidence that

Shupe’s claim for damages exceeded $75,000.00. The calculation

of Shupe’s backpay appropriately included accruals through the

projected trial date, because she alleged that “she continues

and will continue to suffer” damage from her loss of wages. See

Weaver, 2010 WL 2521462, at *2 (citing Gafford, 997 F.2d at 160-

61) (“[Plaintiff] seeks back pay ‘for wages and other monetary

damages incurred and to be incurred in the future.’ . . . Thus,

because at the time of removal [Plaintiff] sought an award for

back pay that included future accruals, it is appropriate to

consider back pay beyond the time of removal.”) Shupe’s damages

for humiliation, embarrassment, and attorney’s fees would be in

addition to that amount.

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Shupe alleges that she is entitled to punitive damages for

Asplundh’s grossly negligent conduct. Although she is not

entitled to punitive damages under the Kentucky Civil Rights

Act, a fair reading of Shupe’s complaint demonstrates that she

brings additional claims for gross negligence. Shupe alleges

that Asplundh’s conduct was outrageous and extreme. If Shupe

presented evidence of that conduct, she could show that Asplundh

was grossly negligent. A plaintiff must prove punitive damages

by clear and convincing evidence. K.R.S. § 411.184(2). That

standard does not amount to a legal certainty.

Evaluating Shupe’s request for damages, it is more likely

than not that the amount in controversy is at least $75,000.00.

The district court did not err in its calculation of the amount

in controversy.

C. Neither the Pre-Suit Demand Letter nor the
Subsequent Affidavit Changes Our Analysis

Shupe relies on her pre-suit settlement demand letter to

show that she does not seek more than $75,000.00 in damages.

The letter states that “Ms. Shupe will waive all claims and

causes of actions arising out of this wrongful termination

matter against Asplundh Company, in exchange for the Company

paying Ms. Shupe her salary through August 31, 2012, back-dated

to her date of termination, commencing immediately.” The letter

states that Shupe will “need to be reimbursed for the value of

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the company’s medical, dental, and other insurance benefits she

did not receive.” Alternatively, “Ms. Shupe will consider

taking a lump sum cash payment in the sum of $60,000.00 . . . .”

“It is settled that, in ascertaining the amount in

controversy for jurisdictional purposes, where the law gives the

rule, the legal causes of action, and not the plaintiff’s

demand, must be regarded.” Smith v. Phillips & Jordan, Inc.,

2011 WL 250435, at *2 (E.D. Ky. January 24, 2011) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “[A] settlement demand

letter is ‘some evidence’ regarding the amount in controversy.”

Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted) “[T]he

fact that Plaintiff attempted to settle the claim for less than

the amount in controversy is not probative of the true amount

because litigants often settle claims for less than the amount

in controversy.” Hollon v. Consumer Plumbing Recovery Ctr., 417

F.Supp.2d 849, 854 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

“[A]n offer falling just below the jurisdictional threshold

tends to suggest that the amount in controversy exceeds this

threshold, especially since parties ‘routinely offer and accept

settlement amounts significantly below the total amount placed

into controversy . . . .’” Osborne v. Pinsonneault, 2007 WL

710131, at *2 (W.D. Ky. March 2, 2007) (quoting Sayre v. Potts,

32 F.Supp.2d 881, 888 (S.D.W. Va. 1999).

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Shupe’s settlement demand letter requested a lump sum of

$60,000.00 to cover her lost pay and benefits. That falls below

the federal jurisdictional limit of $75,000.00. It does not

take into account the request in her complaint for damages for

embarrassment, humiliation, or emotional distress, or for

punitive damages or attorney’s fees. Shupe’s settlement demand

letter is not inconsistent with the district court’s finding

that her claims meet the federal amount-in-controversy

requirement.

Shupe also relies on her post-suit affidavit to limit the

amount of damages she seeks. Shupe states that, “I have never

believed or been led to believe that I could recover or receive

more than $75,000 . . . by asserting this lawsuit.” She also

states that, “I have never demanded, claimed, requested or

otherwise indicated in any way to any person that I seek or

desire more than $75,000 . . . to settle or compromise this

lawsuit.” Finally, Shupe states that, “I have never sought more

than $75,000 . . . for any and all claims which could be, or

have been raised in this lawsuit.”

“[A] post-removal stipulation [or affidavit] reducing the

amount in controversy to below the jurisdictional limit does not

require remand to the state court.” Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff may

stipulate to a claim less than the federal jurisdictional amount

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“where a plaintiff provides specific information about the

amount in controversy for the first time . . . .” Egan v.

Premier Scales & Sys., 237 F.Supp.2d 774, 778 (W.D. Ky. 2002).

That is a clarification rather than a reduction of the amount in

controversy. Id. at 778. “[O]nly unequivocal statement[s] and

stipulation[s] limiting damages will serve this purpose.” Id.

An actual limitation on the amount of a potential judgment “is

essential to any such stipulation.” Id. “To merely say that

one will not accept money in excess of a certain amount limits

neither the judgment nor the demand.” Id.

The district court in Egan found that the statement that

the plaintiff “will accept a sum of $74,999 exclusive of

interest and costs as a judgment regardless of what any court

finds in excess of that amount” was not an unequivocal

stipulation. Id. at 775, 778. The same district court found

that the statement that the plaintiff “hereby certifies to the

Court that he will not be making a claim nor pursuing damages in

amount equal to or exceeding the sum of $75,000.00” was an

unequivocal stipulation limiting damages. Van Etten v. Boston

Scientific Corp., 2009 WL 3485909, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 23,

2009). That district court did find that the statement that the

plaintiff “will not seek or accept an award of damages in excess

of $74,999.00 inclusive of punitive damages, attorney’s fees,

and the fair value of any injunctive relief” was an unequivocal

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Rebecca Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company

stipulation limiting damages. Spence v. Centerplate, 931

F.Supp.2d 779, 780, 782 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (emphasis in original).

Counsel for Shupe argued that there was no guidance about

the words a post-suit limitation on damages should contain when

Shupe filed her affidavit. That argument is not well taken.

Both Egan and Van Etten were decided before Shupe filed her

complaint in Kentucky court. None of the statements in Shupe’s

post-suit affidavit is an unequivocal limitation on damages.

None of her statements is an actual limit on the potential

judgment she would receive. All of Shupe’s statements are

backward looking. She does not mention the potential judgment

in her case at all. Her post-suit affidavit is not an

unequivocal statement limiting her damages to an amount below

the jurisdictional limit. The district court did not err in

denying Shupe’s motion for remand.

III.

We now turn to the merits of the district court’s summary

judgment order. The granting of a motion for summary judgment

is reviewed de novo. Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of City of

Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006).

Waivers of statutes of limitations are valid and

enforceable under Kentucky law. Dunn v. Gordon Food Servs.,

Inc., 780 F.Supp.2d 570, 573 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (citing Edmondson

v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 781 S.W.2d 753, 755-56 (Ky.

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1989)). “[T]his Court determined that there is nothing

inherently unreasonable about a six-month limitations period

contained in an employment agreement.” Thurman v.

DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Kentucky’s highest

court has held that a six-month limitations period is

reasonable. Ashland Fin. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,

474 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Ky. 1971) (internal citation omitted).

Shupe does not dispute the enforceability of a statute-of-

limitations waiver. She admits that she signed the Waiver at

issue. Shupe argues that her acceptance of the Waiver was not

“knowing and voluntary.”

“In evaluating whether a [waiver] has been knowingly and

voluntarily executed, we look to (1) plaintiff’s experience,

background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff

had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether

the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer;

(3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver;

as well as (5) the totality of the circumstances.” Morrison v.

Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003)

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

The record contains no evidence about Shupe’s education or

experience. Courts have upheld statute-of-limitations waivers

when the plaintiff had only a high school education. Sako v.

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Ohio Dept. of Admin. Servs., 278 F. App’x 514, 518 (6th Cir.

2008); Dunn, 780 F.Supp.2d at 577 (internal citations omitted).

Without more, this factor is neutral.

Shupe has stated that she “was presented several documents

and directed to sign them, which were not explained to me nor

did I understand what or why I was signing said documents other

than I was told I had to sign said documents in order to obtain

employment with the Defendant.” (Shupe Aff. ¶ 2.) Shupe stated

that, “I was not allowed an opportunity to have [the Waiver] or

other documents I was forced to sign in order to obtain

employ[ment] reviewed by an attorney of my choosing.” (Id. ¶

3.) Shupe stated that, “I was never provided a copy of the

Waiver or any other document I was required to sign . . . .”

(Id. ¶ 4.)

There is no evidence that Shupe asked for more time to

complete the Waiver or to speak to an attorney. There is no

evidence that Shupe indicated she did not understand the terms

of the Waiver when she signed it. There is no evidence that

Shupe asked for a copy of the Waiver after she signed it. There

is no evidence of fraud when Shupe signed the Waiver.

“In general, a person who has the opportunity to read a

contract, but does not do so and signs the agreement, is bound

to the contract terms unless there was some fraud in the process

of obtaining his signature.” Aytes v. Federal Exp. Corp., 2012

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WL 1831272, at *13 (E.D. Ky. May 18, 2012) (citing Cline v.

Allis-Chalmers Corp., 690 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Ky. 1985)). This

Court has held that a plaintiff “had an obligation to seek

assistance before she signed if she felt she did not understand

the application.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 790 F.2d 453,

461 (6th Cir. 1986). This Court has upheld a statute-of-

limitations waiver when “[t]he [district] court also noted that

despite [the plaintiff’s] claim that he was given only a few

minutes to decide whether or not to sign the waiver, there was

no indication that he had requested more time to consider the

situation or that he was pressured into signing the agreement.”

Sako, 278 F. App’x at 519. “Even assuming the verification of

[the plaintiff’s] . . . inability to consult an attorney,

standing alone these facts do not show lack of knowledge [or]

voluntariness.” Dunn, 780 F.Supp.2d at 577. In the absence of

any evidence that Shupe requested more time to review the

Waiver, indicated she did not understand the Waiver, or asked

for time to have an attorney review the Waiver, this factor

weighs in favor of Shupe’s having knowingly and voluntarily

executed the Waiver.

The district court found that “[t]he waiver is quite clear,

both in content and in form. The font directing the reader’s

attention is bold and capitalized, and the font containing the

actual language of the waiver is clear from a normal reading

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distance. The language itself is relatively plain and clear.”

(Order on Mot. Summ. Judg. at 4, ECF No. 16.) Shupe does not

dispute that the font is appropriate and that the language is

clear and unambiguous.

The Eastern District of Kentucky has upheld a waiver that

stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal

action against Federal Express, I agree to bring that complaint

within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of

the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires

first.” Aytes, 2012 WL 1831272, at *12. The language in

Asplundh’s Waiver is similar to the language in Aytes. This

factor weighs in favor of Shupe’s knowing and voluntary

execution of the Waiver.

Shupe does not dispute that there was consideration for

Asplundh’s Waiver. Asplundh provided consideration when it

employed Shupe and paid her wages. Dunn, 780 F.Supp.2d at 574.

This factor weighs in favor of Shupe’s knowing and voluntary

execution of the Waiver.

Shupe argues that the cases in which courts have upheld

statute-of-limitations waivers have turned on “the negative

circumstances presented in [her] case in isolation, as opposed

to a combination of all of them in one case . . . .” To the

contrary, the court in Dunn upheld a statute-of-limitations

waiver where the plaintiff allegedly “received only a high

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school education, was given insufficient time to review the

Application, and was unable to consult an attorney before

signing [the waiver].” 780 F.Supp.2d at 577. Shupe’s argument

is not well taken.

Shupe also relies on this Court’s decision in Walker v.

Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005).

This Court held that an arbitration agreement was not knowingly

and voluntarily signed when:

Plaintiffs typically were hired on the spot after a
brief interview, during which the hiring manager
hurriedly presented them with various documents that
they were instructed to sign in order to be considered
for a job. According to one . . . plaintiff, Ryan’s
managers would place an ‘x’ in every spot an applicant
is required to sign, and applicants would be told to
sign every ‘x’ without any explanation. The hiring
manager usually would not mention the arbitration
agreement, and Plaintiffs had no opportunity to take
the Arbitration Agreement home or consult an attorney,
even though the agreement purports to afford them that
right. . . . Plaintiffs were given no option to revoke
their consent to the Arbitration Agreement.

Id. at 381-82.

Walker is distinguishable for three reasons. The waiver of

an arbitration agreement involves a substantive right to a

judicial forum. Id. at 382. The shorter statute of limitations

here involves a procedural right. Aytes, 2012 WL 1831272, at

*13. The waiver in Walker was contained in a twelve-page

application packet that contained five pages of single-spaced

rules and procedures governing the arbitration procedure.

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Walker, 400 F.3d at 373. The Waiver in this case was a single

page and was clear and direct. The management in Walker also

provided misleading information about what the arbitration

agreement meant. Id. at 382. Shupe has not provided any

evidence that Asplundh attempted to mislead her in any way.

Walker is not controlling or persuasive in this case.

Shupe also argues that Asplundh should have provided her

with a copy of the Waiver when she was terminated in August

2011. An employer is not required to provide an employee with

notice of a statute-of-limitations waiver at the time of

termination. “One who signs a contract cannot seek to avoid it

on the basis that he did not read it or that he supposed it was

different in its terms.” Mannix v. Cnty. of Monroe, 348 F.3d

526, 533 (6th Cir. 2003). This factor weighs in favor of

Shupe’s knowing and voluntary execution of the Waiver.

The district court did not err in deciding that Shupe

knowingly and voluntarily signed the Waiver. There is no

genuine dispute of material fact about the validity of the

Waiver. Shupe did not bring her claims within six months of her

termination. The district court did not err in granting

Asplundh’s motion for summary judgment.

IV.

The district court properly found that the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000.00. The district court’s order

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denying Shupe’s motion to remand is AFFIRMED. The district

court properly found that Shupe knowingly and voluntarily signed

the six-month statute-of-limitations waiver. The district

court’s order granting Asplundh’s motion for summary judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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