UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4275
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEANDER SHERROD HANDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:11-cr-00098-FL-1)
Submitted: April 29, 2014 Decided: May 29, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leander Sherrod Hands appeals from his convictions and
300-month sentence following his conditional guilty plea to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute a
quantity of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012);
possession with intent to distribute a quantity of heroin and
cocaine base and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012); and
possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012). Hands
preserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. Hands argues that the police officer who
stopped his vehicle did not have reasonable suspicion to do so.
We affirm.
We review the district court’s factual findings
regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and the
court's legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Burgess,
684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 490
(2012). When, as here, a motion to suppress has been denied, we
view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
2013).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
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has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts “that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968)). Whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
information known to the officer and any reasonable inferences
to be drawn at the time of the stop. Id. at 273-74; United
States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). The
reasonable suspicion determination is a “commonsensical
proposition,” and deference should be accorded to police
officers’ determinations based on their practical experience and
training. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir.
2004). Moreover, the collective knowledge doctrine provides
that an officer may act on the instruction of another officer
“if the instructing officer had sufficient information to
justify taking such action [himself].” United States v.
Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 492 (4th Cir. 2011).
Hands first contends that Detective Sellers’ and
Lieutenant Hart’s testimony was not credible because the
confidential informant (“CI”) stated that the Chevrolet Impala
driven by Hands was brown or tan, whereas the officers reported
that the CI had described the Impala as gold. Although
Detective Sellers and Lieutenant Hart incorrectly reported that
the CI described the Impala as gold, we conclude that this error
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is neither fatal to the reasonable suspicion analysis nor
completely undermines the officers’ testimony, which the
district court found credible. See United States v. McGee, 736
F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is the role of the district
court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a
pre-trial motion to suppress.”).
Lieutenant Hart was armed with sufficient knowledge to
form a reasonable suspicion that the Impala was involved in
criminal activity even without a description of its color. He
reasonably relied on the information provided by the CI, whom he
knew to be reliable and truthful, and by Detective Bacon, who
recently had participated in surveillance involving a controlled
purchase by the CI in the same area. See United States v.
Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
“[i]nformation of criminal activity given by a known reliable
informant is enough to sustain a Terry stop”). The CI informed
Lieutenant Hart (through Detective Sellers) that the Impala he
was trailing contained the heroin, and Detective Bacon confirmed
that the license plate of that Impala matched the one he had
spotted traveling toward the location of the drug transaction.
Further, Lieutenant Hart’s familiarity with the history of the
case and his knowledge (through the CI and Detective Sellers)
that the driver of the Impala had recently been released from
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prison and was known to carry firearms bolstered his conclusion
that criminal activity was afoot.
We also find no merit to Hands’ argument that
Detective Bacon’s testimony was not credible. Contrary to
Hands’ contention, Detective Bacon identified the individual
with whom the CI’s contact met as an “unknown black male” in his
report. Moreover, Hands’ counsel stipulated below that any
reference to an “unknown white male” in the transcript of the
suppression hearing was in error.
In sum, we conclude that Lieutenant Hart had
sufficient information to form more than an “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.”
United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 218 (2013).
He was therefore justified in stopping the Impala. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s denial of Hands’ motion to
suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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