UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-6093
LAWRENCE LEO HAWKINS, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNKNOWN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief
District Judge. (2:13-cv-00027-RBS-DEM)
Submitted: May 22, 2014 Decided: May 29, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lawrence Leo Hawkins, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Leo Hawkins, Jr., seeks to appeal the
district court’s order dismissing his action for failure to
comply with its order to particularize his claims. We remand
for consideration of whether reopening of the appeal period is
merited.
Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of
the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal,
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends
the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). When the United
States or its officer or agency is a party, and unless the
district court extends or reopens the appeal period, the notice
of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry
of the district court’s final judgment or order. Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(B). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a
civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
The district court’s order was entered on the docket
on July 31, 2013. Hawkins filed his notice of appeal on
December 10, 2013. 1 Regardless of which appellate period applies
1
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
2
to this appeal, 2 Hawkins’ notice of appeal is clearly untimely.
However, under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), the district court may
reopen the time to file an appeal if: (1) the moving party did
not receive notice of entry of judgment within twenty-one days
after entry; (2) the motion is filed within 180 days of entry of
judgment or within fourteen days of receiving notice from the
court, whichever is earlier; and (3) no party would be
prejudiced.
In his notice of appeal, Hawkins stated that he did
not receive notice of the district court’s order dismissing his
action, and he suggests he has had difficulty receiving his mail
while incarcerated. Moreover, the district court’s docket
indicates that the district court’s dismissal order was returned
to the district court as undeliverable. Accordingly, we remand
for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to
determine whether Hawkins’ notice of appeal should be construed
as a motion to reopen the appeal period, and if so, whether
reopening is merited. The record, as supplemented, will then be
returned to this court for further consideration.
REMANDED
2
It is unclear whether the United States or its officer or
agency is a party to Hawkins’ action.
3