Ai Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr.

Filed: May 30, 2014

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2279

AI HUA CHEN; JIN XIU LI,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed February 5, 2014,

as follows:

On page 12, footnote 2, all language following the

sentence, “The BIA did not address this holding, and neither

party briefed the issue on appeal” is deleted.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
 PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2279

AI HUA CHEN; JIN XIU LI,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Argued: September 19, 2013 Decided: February 5, 2014

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.

Petition for review granted in part and denied in part by
published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Motz and Judge Keenan concurred.

ARGUED: Alexa Taiz Torres, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD TARZIA, Belle
Mead, New Jersey, for Petitioners. Walter Bocchini, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
ON BRIEF: Gregory Marotta, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD TARZIA, Belle
Mead, New Jersey, for Petitioners. Stuart F. Delery, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Carl H.
McIntyre, Jr., Assistant Director, Christina J. Martin, Office
of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Petitioners Ai Hua Chen and Jin Xiu Li, both natives of

China’s Fujian Province, met and married in the United States

and are the parents of two children born to them here. Chen and

Li admit they are subject to removal, but seek asylum and

withholding of removal on the basis that one or both of them

will be persecuted for having violated China’s one-child policy.

The couple also seeks asylum and withholding of removal on the

grounds that they will face persecution for their Christian

faith upon returning to China. Despite finding both Chen and Li

to be credible witnesses, the immigration judge (“IJ”) and the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), relying on an often-cited

2007 State Department report, China: Profile of Asylum Claims

and Country Conditions (“2007 China Report”), concluded that

neither petitioner established a well-founded fear of

persecution.

For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition for

review to the extent Chen and Li seek relief based on China’s

one-child policy and remand that claim for further consideration

by the agency. We deny the petition for review to the extent it

is grounded on the religious faith of the petitioners.

2
 I.

A.

Li arrived in the United States in June 2001 without valid

entry documents and was placed in removal proceedings by the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Li sought political

and religious asylum, but an immigration judge denied his

application in 2003 and the Board affirmed in 2005. In 2010,

however, the Board granted Li’s motion to reopen.

Chen entered the United States in January 2003 on a

nonimmigrant K-1 visa. A K–1 nonimmigrant visa, known

colloquially as a “fiancé visa,” permits the foreign-citizen

fiancé of an American citizen to travel to the United States to

marry his or her citizen sponsor within ninety days of arrival.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i). Chen’s fiancé sponsor, as it

turned out, decided not to marry her. Chen, however, remained

in the United States after the expiration of the ninety-day

period. Chen and Li eventually met in 2005 and married in 2007.

Also in 2007, Chen gave birth to petitioners’ two children—

the first in January and the second in December. Chen did not

have legal status in the United States, however, and she worried

that if she were ever forced to return to China, she and Li

would be considered violators of China’s infamous one-child

policy. Thus, in August 2007, while pregnant with petitioners’

second child, Chen applied for political asylum, which led to

3
the DHS initiating removal proceedings against her for

overstaying her visa. In 2011, the proceedings against Chen

were consolidated with Li’s reopened proceedings.

Chen and Li seek asylum on two identical grounds. First,

Chen and Li claim that even though their children were born

abroad, Chinese family planning officials would still consider

the pregnancies to have been “out-of-plan” pregnancies and in

violation of China’s family-planning regulations. Chen and Li

believe that they would face fines, imprisonment and involuntary

sterilization upon their return to China. On this basis, they

seek political asylum, which is potentially available for any

person who establishes “a well founded fear that he or she will

be forced to undergo [involuntary sterilization]” or will be

“subject to persecution” for “other resistance to a coercive

population control program.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Li and Chen also seek religious asylum. As practicing

Christians, Li and Chen claim that, if removed, they would be

compelled by their beliefs to attend a “house church,” which is

illegal in China. They fear that participation in such a church

would result in their arrest and detention and that they would

be coerced by the government to renounce association with the

church.

4
 B.

1.

Although the IJ found both Li and Chen to be credible

witnesses, he concluded that they failed to prove that their

genuine fear of future persecution under the family-planning

policy was objectively reasonable. The IJ’s reasoning was two-

fold. First, he determined that Li and Chen failed to prove

they are in violation of China’s family-planning policies.

According to the 2007 China Report, upon which the IJ heavily

relied, each married couple in the Fujian Province “is allowed

to have one child without a birth permit.” J.A. 419. A second

child, therefore, is not allowed unless the government grants

permission ahead of time by issuing a birth permit. But the IJ

found that children born abroad are not counted against the

number of children allowed unless the returning parents choose

to register them as part of the household registration. The

2007 China Report states that

U.S. officials in China are not aware of the alleged
official policy, at the national or provincial levels,
mandating the sterilization of one partner of couples
that have given birth to two children, at least one of
whom was born abroad.

. . .

. . . [T]he Population and Family Planning
Commission of Fujian Province stated in an October
2006 letter that children born abroad, if not
registered as permanent residents of China (i.e., not
entered into the parents’ household registration), are

5
 not considered as permanent residents of China, and
therefore are not counted against the number of
children allowed under China’s family planning law. .
. .

J.A. 421-22.

Second, the IJ found that even if petitioners’ children

“counted” for purposes of China’s family-planning law, Li and

Chen would merely face fines or other economic penalties that do

not rise to the level of persecution. Again, the IJ rested his

factual determination on the 2007 China Report, which states

that “[a]ccording to the Fujian Provincial Birth Planning

Committee (FPBPC), there have been no cases of forced . . .

sterilization in Fujian in the last 10 years.” The Report,

however, also acknowledges that “[i]t is impossible to confirm

this claim” and cited reports of forced sterilizations in 2006.

J.A. 418. The 2007 China Report notes that the FPBPC claims

provincial officials impose only economic penalties—“social

compensation fees”—upon violators, not physically coercive

sanctions. J.A. 419. According to the 2007 China Report,

however, for returning Chinese nationals who are the parents of

U.S.-born children, even such economic penalties would be

triggered only if the parents decided “to register their

children as Chinese permanent residents in order to gain free .

. . educational and other social benefits.” J.A. 422.

6
 The IJ noted some of the contradictory evidence submitted

by Li and Chen, but indicated without explanation that the 2007

China Report was simply “more persuasive.” The contradictory

evidence from Chen and Li included (1) an affidavit (and

supporting documents) from Renzun Yuan stating that immediately

after removal to the Fujian Province, he was sterilized for

having violated China’s family-planning law even though his sons

were born in the United States; (2) a 200-page scholarly

critique of the 2007 China Report from Dr. Flora Sapio

concluding that it was outdated, inaccurate or based on

anecdotal or unverifiable evidence; (3) written certifications

issued by the applicants’ respective local family planning

officials in Mei Hua Town, Chang Le City, and Ma Wei District of

Fuzhou City indicating that Li and Chen would be sterilized upon

returning to China under the circumstances; and (4) written

affirmations from Chen’s father and Li’s mother stating that the

certified statements from the family-planning officials were

issued at their request. The IJ also dismissed written

affirmations from two of the petitioners’ cousins and two

friends, all of whom attested to having undergone forcible

sterilization after having unauthorized children in China. The

IJ found such evidence lacking in probative value because the

children were not born abroad.

7
 Finally, as described in greater detail below, Li and Chen

submitted evidence that the IJ either failed to mention or

ignored altogether. This evidence included the 2009 Annual

Report from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(“2009 CECC Report”). The CECC Report states that, as of 2009,

forced abortions and sterilizations were still occurring. While

acknowledging that Chinese law prohibits official abuses

relating to population control, the 2009 CECC Report notes that

the law also requires local officials to carry out regular

pregnancy tests on married women and administer unspecified

“follow-up services” to the extent needed to meet planning

goals. More specifically, local family-planning officials in

the Fujian Province are authorized to take “remedial measures”

for out-of-plan pregnancies, which the 2009 CECC Report

interprets as a euphemism for compulsory abortions.

Additionally, this report states that local authorities

continued to require sterilization as a means of enforcing birth

quotas.

The IJ also ignored or failed to mention evidence of a

webpage maintained by the Fuzhou City (Fujian) Family Planning

Committee which apparently provides a forum for citizens to

submit questions about the family-planning policy and receive

responses from the government. Li and Chen submitted a copy of

a screenshot from this website, dated June 16, 2010, showing an

8
April 2008 inquiry from “Robert Lin” about the consequences

faced by Chinese nationals who have out-of-plan children abroad

and the Committee’s response that “sterilization is mandatory”

for violators of the one-child policy in this situation. J.A.

824.

2.

The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision that the

petitioners did not meet their burden of proving that there is

an “objectively reasonable possibility” that Li or Chen would be

“forcibly sterilized, excessively fined, or otherwise persecuted

for having two children without permission while in the United

States.” J.A. 4. The BIA offered additional reasons for

discounting the evidence offered by Li and Chen. For example,

the BIA observed that the certifications issued by family-

planning officials in Mei Hua Town, Chang Le City, and the Ma

Wei District of Fuzhou City, were entitled to little weight

because they were unauthenticated, unsigned, did not identify

the author, and were procured for litigation purposes. 1

1
The BIA also dismissed these certifications on the basis
that the 2007 China Report indicates that village committees are
“not authorized to make any decisions pertaining to family
planning issues.” According to the BIA, such documents should
therefore “be deemed ineffective.” JA 5. This conclusion badly
misses the mark. The relevant question for asylum purposes is
not what local authorities are authorized to do; the question,
particularly given the pressure local authorities face to meet
birth targets, is what they actually do. As discussed in
(Continued)
9
Likewise, the BIA found the statements from the petitioners’

family and friends claiming to have suffered forcible

sterilization to be unworthy of extended consideration because

the statements contained unsworn assertions from typically

biased witnesses and lacked sufficient detail to demonstrate

that the witnesses were subject to persecution. And, like the

IJ, the BIA was unpersuaded by the documents related to the case

of Renzun Yuan because they were submitted to support an

unrelated asylum applicant and the applicants offered no

explanation as to how their attorney obtained the documents.

Relying exclusively on the 2007 China Report, the BIA

concluded that there was no basis for believing that government

officials in the Fujian Province use coercive measures rising to

the level of persecution in circumstances such as these. The

BIA acknowledged that “there undoubtedly have been instances of

forced abortion and sterilization imposed on the parents of

children conceived and born [out-of-plan] in China,” J.A. 6, but

the BIA distinguished the petitioners’ claim on the basis that

their children were born abroad in the United States. The BIA

found that “[t]he evidence submitted in this case does not

greater detail below, petitioners’ evidence highlights the
importance of this distinction, demonstrating that local
practice does not always correspond with national policy.

10
document any instance where enforcement measures rising to the

level of persecution have been imposed on the parents of

children who are United States citizens.” Id. Finally, the

BIA, relying on the 2007 China Report, restated the IJ’s finding

that the only scenario in which sanctions might be imposed for

unauthorized overseas births would arise from the parents’

registration of their children as members of their households

upon returning to China in order to secure free public benefits.

Even then, the BIA found, the parents would face only economic

penalties.

The BIA did not mention the 2009 CECC Report or the Fuzhou

City (Fujian) Family Planning Committee’s response to Robert Lin

on its webpage that sterilization is mandatory for violators of

the one-child policy even when the out-of-plan children were

born abroad.

II.

Because the BIA “adopted and affirmed” the decision of the

IJ but supplemented that decision with its own opinion, “the

factual findings and reasoning contained in both decisions are

subject to judicial review.” Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505,

511 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007). And, because the denial of asylum was

based on the conclusion that Li and Chen failed to satisfy their

burden of proving a well-founded fear of future persecution, we

review these decisions under the “substantial evidence”

11
standard. Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 119 (4th Cir.

2007). 2 Under this deferential standard, “administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). In other words, we cannot disturb the

agency’s “decision that an applicant is ineligible for asylum

unless we determine that the applicant’s evidence ‘was such that

a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the

requisite fear of persecution existed.’” Djadjou v. Holder, 662

F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).

In order to establish eligibility for asylum under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), an applicant must

demonstrate that he or she is entitled to refugee status. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Under the INA, a refugee is someone

“who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his or her]

country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Petitioners “may satisfy this burden

2
The IJ also held that petitioners’ asylum claim was time-
barred because they filed their applications after the usual
one-year deadline of arriving in the United States. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The BIA did not address this holding,
and neither party briefed the issue on appeal.

12
by showing either that they were subjected to past persecution

or that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution on

account of” one of the enumerated grounds. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at

272 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The INA

specifically permits victims of China’s population control

policy to seek political asylum:

[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program, shall be deemed to have
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a
person who has a well founded fear that he or she will
be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Li and Chen do not claim to have suffered past persecution,

but seek asylum based on their fear of future persecution. The

“well-founded fear of persecution” standard set forth in §

1101(a)(42) has subjective and objective elements. The

subjective component requires the alien to “present[] candid,

credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of

persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The objective

element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that

would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear

persecution.” Id. at 187-88. Li and Chen’s asylum claim

13
faltered on the objective component. Although the IJ found both

Chen and Li to be credible witnesses, he concluded that they did

not prove their fear of future persecution was an objectively

reasonable possibility.

III.

Chen and Li contend that the IJ’s decision, as supplemented

by the BIA’s order, lacked substantial evidence. In their view,

the denial of asylum was unsupported by substantial evidence

because the IJ and BIA relied almost exclusively on cherry-

picked statements from the 2007 China Report and failed to

consider compelling contradictory evidence suggesting that

forced sterilizations are still a reality for Chinese nationals

such as Chen and Li.

Typically, we have approved of the BIA’s proclivity for

finding State Department Country Reports to be the definitive

word in asylum cases. After all, such reports are rightly

considered to be “highly probative evidence in a well-founded

fear case. Reliance upon these reports makes sense because this

inquiry is directly within the expertise of the Department of

State.” Gonahasa v. U.S. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 1999)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the

context of substantial-evidence review, “[a]bsent powerful

contradictory evidence, the existence of a State Department

14
report supporting the BIA’s judgment will generally suffice to

uphold the Board’s decision.” Id.

On the other hand, the BIA should avoid treating these

Country Reports “as Holy Writ” immune to contradiction. Galina

v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.).

Although “our job as a reviewing court is not to reweigh the

evidence,” we must “ensure that unrebutted, legally significant

evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the factfinder” and that

the agency does not “base [its] decision on only isolated

snippets of [the] record while disregarding the rest.” Baharon

v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009). The BIA may not

“selectively consider evidence, ignoring that evidence that

corroborates an alien’s claims and calls into question the

conclusion the judge is attempting to reach.” Tang v. U.S.

Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In order for us to discharge “our responsibility to ensure

that unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily

ignored by the factfinder,” Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233, we require

the IJ and the BIA to “offer a specific, cogent reason for

rejecting evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, because

it lacks credibility,” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 720 (4th

Cir. 2011). We recognize that the BIA and IJ are not required

to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, but they must

15
“announce their decision[s] in terms sufficient to enable a

reviewing court to perceive that they have heard and thought and

not merely reacted.” Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941,

948 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted); see Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356, 1368 (11th

Cir. 2011).

We believe Chen and Li offered “powerful contradictory

evidence,” Gonahasa, 181 F.3d at 542, for which the BIA and the

IJ failed to adequately account. As previously noted, Li and

Chen submitted the 2009 CECC Report. 3 The BIA’s failure to

account for the reports of the CECC is not unprecedented. See,

e.g., Qiu Yun Chen v. Holder, 715 F.3d 207, 209 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“We note with disapproval that the Board without explanation

systematically ignores the annual reports of the Congressional–

Executive Commission on China, several of which we have cited,

even though they are pertinent official publications of the

federal government.”); Ji Cheng Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 627

(7th Cir. 2013) (“The Board’s ongoing refusal to respond

meaningfully to [CECC reports] is difficult to understand.”);

3
Congress established the Congressional–Executive
Commission on China in 2000 “as a bipartite body, consisting of
federal legislators and executive-branch officials, whose
purpose in part is to ‘monitor the development of the rule of
law in the People’s Republic of China.’” Jiali Tang v. Synutra
Int’l, Inc., 656 F.3d 242, 247 n.4 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 22
U.S.C. § 6912(c)).

16
see also Zhu Ying Dong v. U.S. Atty. Gen., No. 12-13673, 2013 WL

6511992, at *1 (11th Cir. December 13, 2013). The 2009 CECC

Report states that “[t]he use of [coerced abortions and

sterilizations] in the enforcement of population planning

policies remains commonplace despite provisions for the

punishment of official abuse outlined in the PRC Population and

Family Planning Law.” J.A. 759. According to this report,

population planning officials in the Fujian Province “are

authorized to take ‘remedial measures’ to deal with ‘out-of-

plan’ pregnancies”; “remedial measures” is “synonymous[] with

compulsory abortion.” Id. In 2008 and 2009, moreover, “[l]ocal

authorities continue[d] to mandate surgical sterilization and

the use of contraception as a means to enforce birth quotas.”

J.A. 215 (emphasis added).

The 2009 CECC Report appears to contradict the 2007 China

Report upon which the IJ and BIA rely so heavily in concluding

that compulsory sterilization for violators of the one-child

policy is rare. Yet, neither the IJ nor the BIA explains why

the 2009 CECC Report, a more recent official government

publication, is less persuasive than the 2007 China Report, nor

was there any attempt to reconcile these reports. There may be

a perfectly reasonable explanation for favoring one report over

the other, or there may be a way to reconcile these seemingly

contradictory documents. But the BIA has not revealed its

17
reasoning, and we are not permitted to guess what the BIA or the

IJ were thinking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196

(1947) (“[A] reviewing court . . . must judge the propriety of

[agency] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”).

Second, Li and Chen submitted a copy of a screenshot from a

Fujian Province government webpage dated May 6, 2008, as

evidence that Fujian family planning officials consider all

couples who have multiple unauthorized births to be in violation

of the one-child policy, even if such births occurred overseas.

See www.fjjsw.gov.cn:8080/html/5/383/9626_200856322.html. This

evidence suggests that the Fujian Province “Population and

Procreation Planning Committee” provided a forum for citizens to

submit questions and receive responses about the family planning

policy. J.A. 824. In response to a query about the

consequences a returning Fuzhou couple would face after having

two children in the United States, the committee indicated that

they were in violation of provincial family planning regulations

and that “sterilization is mandatory.” J.A. 825. This evidence

is significant in that it purports to come directly from the

same Fujian “Population and Procreation Planning Committee” that

is referenced in the 2007 China Report, but it upends the BIA’s

conclusion that there is no danger of sterilization where the

would-be violator’s children were born abroad. See Qiu Yun

Chen, 715 F.3d at 212 (explaining that the same Fujian webpage

18
“cuts the ground out from under what the Board called the ‘key

aspect of this case’—that because [petitioner’s] children were

born abroad, she is in no danger of being forced to undergo

sterilization”). To be sure, this document may not expressly

contradict the BIA’s finding that “the evidence submitted in

this case does not document any instance where enforcement

measures rising to the level of persecution have [already] been

imposed on the parents of children who are United States

citizens.” But it certainly portends forced sterilization of

the inquiring couple and suggests that other parents of U.S.-

born children have faced similar persecution. 4

In our opinion, the foregoing contradictory evidence is

strong enough that it requires the agency to account for it in a

meaningful way. The boilerplate language used by the BIA in

discounting Li and Chen’s evidence was insufficient to

demonstrate that the agency gave it more than perfunctory

consideration. Presented with a record containing virtually

4
Moreover, the affidavit of Renzun Yuan does flatly
contradict the BIA’s characterization of the record evidence, as
it documents an instance of forced sterilization of the father
of U.S.-born children. We also note that the BIA has used this
precise language before when relying on the 2007 China Report to
reject an asylum application from a similarly situated applicant
on the grounds that the record “does not document any instance
where enforcement measures rising to the level of persecution
have been imposed on the parents of children who are United
States citizens.” Li Ying Zheng v. Holder, 722 F.3d 986, 989
(7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

19
identical contradictory documentary evidence, the Seventh

Circuit has on more than one occasion rejected the BIA’s

exclusive reliance on the 2007 China Report and remanded for the

BIA to offer an explanation that accounts for such evidence.

See Li Ying Zheng, 722 F.3d at 991; Qiu Yun Chen, 715 F.3d at

214; Ji Cheng Ni, 715 F.3d at 630-31; see also Zhu Ying Dong v.

U.S. Atty. Gen., 2013 WL 6511992, at *1. We agree with the

thrust of these decisions that petitioners are “entitled to have

the expert agency, the BIA, evaluate in a transparent way the

evidence that [they have] presented” and that “[s]imply stating

that a 2007 document defeats a claim . . . will not do.” Ji

Cheng Ni, 715 F.3d at 631.

IV.

Chen and Li also seek asylum and withholding of removal

based on their Christian faith. Again, both Li and Chen were

found to be credible witnesses. Their task, therefore, was to

establish that their genuine subjective fear of persecution

based on their religious faith is objectively reasonable, i.e.,

that “[t]here is a reasonable possibility of suffering such

persecution,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(B), and that “a

reasonable person in like circumstances” would fear religious

persecution. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187-88.

Chen testified that when she met Li in 2005, he indicated

he was a practicing Christian and he invited her to attend

20
church services with him. Chen did not convert to Christianity,

however, until 2009 after talking to her neighbors in

Greensboro, North Carolina. Chen was baptized in 2010 and began

regularly attending a Chinese Christian Church in Greensboro

with Li and their children. Chen testified that if she is

removed to China, she would be compelled by her beliefs to

attend an unsanctioned “underground” or “house” church rather

than an “official registered church” that “preach[es] about the

. . . government’s policies.” J.A. 139, 140. Chen fears that

her participation in such a church would be discovered by the

government, subjecting her to arrest, torture, and fines. She

also fears that the government would force her to renounce her

participation in any unsanctioned church. Chen’s fear is based

to a great extent on the experience of her mother, who Chen

testified was persecuted based on her church affiliation in

2009. According to Chen, her mother was one of eight members of

an underground church to be arrested. Chen testified that her

mother was detained for six days, during which time she was

slapped in the face and forced to sign a written guarantee that

she would cease participating in her church. Chen indicated the

government also imposed on her mother a significant fine of

2,500 renminbi (RMB).

Li testified that he was a practicing Christian before he

left China and attended an unsanctioned house church in the

21
Fujian Province. Li testified that in March 2001, officials

from the Public Security Bureau came to his home to arrest him

for participating in the church but that he was able to elude

arrest. Li left China shortly thereafter and arrived in the

United States in June 2001. He testified that he subsequently

learned from his sister that authorities looked for him after

the 2001 incident, but that he did not have any information

suggesting that they have looked for him recently. Li was

baptized in September 2001 after arriving in the United States,

and he verified that he attends church with Chen and their

children.

Like Chen, Li indicated that his fear of being persecuted

on account of his religion was made real because of what he and

Chen were told happened to his mother-in-law in 2009 as a result

of her affiliation with an unsanctioned church. And, like Chen,

Li stated that if he returns to China, he will attend an

unsanctioned house church, for which he believes he will suffer

official retribution including arrest and torture.

Li and Chen also called their pastor, Steven Chang, to

testify at the hearing. Chang confirmed that he is the pastor

of a non-denominational Chinese Christian church in Greensboro

and that, as of the date of the asylum hearing, Chen and Li had

been attending the church for approximately one year. Chang

indicated that he was generally familiar with the plight of

22
Christian house churches because Chang had visited in China with

missionaries financially supported by his church. Based on his

experience, Chang indicated that government interference and

harassment of unsanctioned congregations tended to increase

proportionally with the visibility of the congregation. Thus, a

house church with fifty congregants or fewer might conduct its

services relatively unimpeded by the government, especially if

it operated in a large metropolitan area. In less populated

areas, Chang observed, it is more difficult to congregate

without attracting attention. Chang noted additionally that the

zealousness with which government officials police unsanctioned

religious activities varies by location. Chang indicated he had

never been to Chen and Li’s native Fujian Province, and he did

not offer observations specifically regarding the treatment of

Christians who attend unsanctioned churches there.

The IJ found that the applicants failed to establish that

their fear of future persecution on account of their Christian

faith was objectively reasonable. Relying on background

materials published by the State Department, the IJ found that

“while participation in unsanctioned Christian churches, such as

house churches, is not approved by the Chinese government, those

that do participate are not generally persecuted.” J.A. 83.

The IJ noted that according to the 2007 China Report, house

churches, though not officially approved, are “quietly

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tolerated” as long as they remain “small and unobtrusive.” J.A.

83. Citing estimates from the State Department’s 2010

International Religious Freedom Report, the IJ observed there

are as many as 50-70 million Christians in China who practice

their faith in connection with unsanctioned house churches.

Additionally, the IJ was unconvinced that the treatment suffered

by Chen’s mother reflected widespread persecution of house

church congregants in Chen’s home town because, according to the

IJ, Chen’s mother continued to attend a house church after her

arrest and experienced no further trouble.

Relying on the same background materials reporting on

religious freedoms in China, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding

that Li and Chen failed to establish a reasonable possibility

that they would be persecuted because of their Christian faith.

The BIA noted that the record did not support the IJ’s statement

that Chen’s mother had continued to attend a house church in

China, but it concluded that this error “[did] not undercut the

[IJ]’s reasoned conclusion that the respondents do not have an

objectively reasonable fear of persecution in China based on

their religion.” J.A. 7.

Chen and Li argue that they established an objectively

reasonable fear of religious persecution through both the

general background materials published by the State Department

and specific evidence that they will risk persecution by

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attending home churches in their respective home towns in the

Fujian Province. Because the BIA denied asylum based on the

conclusion that Chen and Li failed to carry their evidentiary

burden, we must not only conclude that the evidence presented

sufficed to prove an objectively reasonable fear of religious

persecution, but also that the “evidence presented was so

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find”

that a reasonable possibility of such persecution existed.

Dankam, 495 F.3d at 119 (emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

While Chen and Li presented some contrary evidence, that

evidence is not so compelling that we cannot defer to the

agency’s factual determinations. First, we disagree with Chen

and Li that the State Department’s 2010 International Religious

Freedom Report and 2007 China Report support their claim for

religious asylum. Although these materials certainly reported

isolated cases of official harassment, the general picture

presented by both reports was simply that official treatment of

Christians who attend unregistered house churches varies

substantially based on locale and that such Christians in many

regions practice their religion without interference. As noted

by both the IJ and the BIA, Steve Chang, the applicants’ pastor

who testified on their behalf at the asylum hearing, agreed with

the general assessment that house churches are able to operate

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undisturbed in many areas of China. Moreover, Chen and Li have

not directed us to any portion of these reports suggesting

widespread persecution of Christians attending house churches in

the Fujian Province.

There was scant evidence presented specifically showing the

persecution of Christians attending house churches in the Fujian

Province. Primarily, this included the testimony of the

petitioners themselves regarding the arrest and abuse of Chen’s

mother, as well as her mother’s written statement regarding the

incident. Chen’s mother, however, attended a house church in

Chen’s hometown of Mei Dong Village in the Mei Hua Town area of

Chang Le City; Chen testified that if she and Li are removed,

they will live in and attend a house church in Li’s hometown of

Shangdao Village of the Mawei District of Fuzhou City. Li

testified that officials unsuccessfully attempted to arrest him

in 2001 for attending a house church while he still lived in

China. Li provided no testimony indicating that house church

congregants in the Mawei District were persecuted regularly or

even intermittently, and he conceded that he had no reason to

believe that government officials were still looking for him.

In sum, viewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that

the evidence compels us to conclude that there is a reasonable

possibility that either Chen or Li will suffer persecution on

account of their religious faith if they return to China. Thus,

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we cannot disturb the BIA’s conclusion that Li and Chen failed

to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.

Consequently, Chen and Li are not entitled to relief on the

BIA’s denial of religious asylum.

On a final note, having found substantial evidence supports

the agency’s denial of religious asylum, we necessarily uphold

the denial of Chen and Li’s application for withholding of

removal on account of their religious faith. See 8 U.S.C. §

1231(b)(3). “Because the burden of proof for withholding of

removal is higher than for asylum—even though the facts that

must be proved are the same—an applicant who is ineligible for

asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal

under § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th

Cir. 2004).

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review

as it relates to the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of

removal based on the petitioners’ fear of being subjected to

involuntary sterilization under China’s one-child policy, and we

remand that particular claim for the agency to reevaluate it in

accordance with this opinion. In conducting its analysis on

remand, the BIA should account for, at a minimum, (1) the 2009

CECC Report, (2) the evidence relating to the “Robert Lin”

inquiry on the website of the Fujian Province Population and

27
Planning Committee, and (3) the affidavit of Renzun Yuan. We

deny the petition for review, however, as it relates to the

BIA’s denial of relief based on petitioners’ claim that they

will be persecuted on account of their Christian faith if they

return to China.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

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