UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4942
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JASON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00123-D-1)
Submitted: May 27, 2014 Decided: June 4, 2014
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
David L. Neal, Hillsborough, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Jason Williams appeals his 540-month
sentence following his guilty plea to two counts of sex
trafficking of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1),
(b)(2) (2012). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Williams’
sentence is reasonable. * Although advised of his right to file a
supplemental pro se brief, Williams has not done so. The
Government seeks to dismiss the appeal based on the appellate
waiver provision in the plea agreement.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013). We “generally will enforce a
waiver . . . if the record establishes that the waiver is valid
and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A
defendant’s waiver is valid if he agreed to it “knowingly and
*
Specifically, counsel questions whether the district court
imposed “an unreasonable sentence by treating the Guidelines
provisions for sexual exploitation as reasonable, by not giving
sufficient weight to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2012] factors,
and by not downwardly departing given Williams’s history of
traumatic sexual abuse as a four-year-old boy.” (Anders Brief
at 1).
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intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2010). “Although the validity of an appeal waiver
often depends on the adequacy of the plea colloquy, the issue
ultimately is evaluated by reference to the totality of the
circumstances,” United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 355 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), such as “the
experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s
educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea agreement.” Thornsbury, 670 F.3d at 537 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Williams knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal
his sentence. Because the issues he seeks to raise on appeal
fall within the scope of the waiver, we grant the Government’s
motion to dismiss Williams’ appeal of his sentence and dismiss
this portion of the appeal.
Although the waiver provision in the plea agreement
precludes our review of the sentence, the waiver does not
preclude our review of any errors in Williams’ conviction that
may be revealed pursuant to the review required by Anders. In
accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and
have found no meritorious issues that are outside the scope of
the appeal waiver. We therefore affirm the district court’s
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judgment as to all issues not encompassed by Williams’ valid
waiver of his right to appeal.
This court requires that counsel inform Williams, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Williams requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Williams. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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