UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4325
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
QUINCY WILLIAMS, a/k/a Bandana,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-19)
Submitted: September 12, 2011 Decided: September 27, 2011
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
G. Godwin Oyewole, McLean, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan
Biran, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quincy Williams pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to conspiracy to participate in a racketeering
enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006), and was
sentenced to 121 months in prison. Counsel has filed an appeal
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In the
Anders brief, counsel states that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but nonetheless asks this court to conduct
an Anders review. Counsel has also moved for permission to
withdraw from further representation of Williams. Williams has
not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving notice
of his right to do so. The Government moves to dismiss the
appeal, in part, based on the appellate waiver in Williams’ plea
agreement. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, dismiss the
appeal in part, and affirm in part.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that
waiver is knowing and intelligent. See United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Our independent
review of the record supports the conclusion that Williams
voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to appeal any
sentence within or below an advisory Guidelines range resulting
from an adjusted base offense level of thirty-one. Thus, we
conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable.
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However, even a valid waiver does not waive all
appellate claims. Specifically, a valid appeal waiver does not
preclude a challenge to a sentence on the ground that it exceeds
the statutory maximum or is based on a constitutionally
impermissible factor such as race, arises from the denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, or relates to claims concerning a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in proceedings following the
guilty plea. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151
(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th
Cir. 1993). Moreover, the appellate waiver in Williams’ plea
agreement did not waive any claims Williams may have pertaining
to his conviction or to a sentence calculated based on an
adjusted base offense level greater than thirty-one. Williams
raises no claims that fall outside the scope of his appellate
waiver and does not oppose the Government’s motion. Thus, we
grant the Government's motion to dismiss in part.
Although we are charged under Anders with reviewing
the record for unwaived error, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no unwaived and meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, dismiss
the appeal in part and affirm in part. This court requires that
counsel inform Williams, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
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Williams requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Williams.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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