UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4825
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERTO TEXIDORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cr-00179-MOC-1)
Submitted: June 10, 2014 Decided: June 17, 2014
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Leslie Carter Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roberto Texidore appeals the six-month sentence
imposed upon the district court’s revocation of his supervised
release. Texidore alleges that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In reviewing a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release, we “take[] a more deferential appellate
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, we will affirm a supervised
release revocation sentence if it is not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010).
The first step is to determine “whether the sentence
is unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438
(4th Cir. 2006). Only if the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will the inquiry proceed to the
second step, which is to determine “whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court has considered the policy
statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has adequately explained
the sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in
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as much detail as when imposing the original sentence.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for its
imposition of a sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 440.
We conclude that Texidore’s six-month sentence is
reasonable. A review of the record confirms that the district
court considered the advisory policy statement range and the
applicable § 3553(a) factors and stated a proper basis for the
sentence imposed. See United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d
95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that court “will credit an
articulation [of the § 3553(a) factors] as clear and
appropriate, when the reasons [given by the district court] can
be matched to a factor appropriate for consideration and
tailored to the defendant’s situation”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, the district court’s stated rationale for
Texidore’s sentence was adequate. In this regard, a sentencing
court need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
Thus, for each sentence, the “court must place on the record an
individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the
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case before it.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see
United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting that, “[w]hen imposing a sentence within the Guidelines,
. . . the explanation need not be elaborate or lengthy”).
We conclude that the district court made clear its
reasons for imposing Texidore’s sentence and the § 3553(a)
factors it found relevant to the sentence. Moreover, the need
for explanation was diminished both by the fact that the
district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence and the fact
that the district court was imposing sentence on a revocation
matter. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (“[W]hen a judge decides
simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so
will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”); Thompson,
595 F.3d at 547 (“A court need not be as detailed or specific
when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing
a post-conviction sentence . . . .”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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