People v. Morrow

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Morrow, 2013 IL App (1st) 121316

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption MITCHELL MORROW, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fifth Division
Docket No. 1-12-1316

Filed December 31, 2013
Rehearing denied January 30, 2014

Held Defendant’s convictions and sentences for armed robbery and murder
(Note: This syllabus were upheld notwithstanding his contention that the trial court erred in
constitutes no part of the denying him leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging
opinion of the court but that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a
has been prepared by the second-degree murder instruction, since the evidence at trial did not
Reporter of Decisions support a finding of second-degree murder.
for the convenience of
the reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 94-CR-26967
Review (03); the Hon. Evelyn B. Clay, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
 Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Caroline E. Bourland, all
Appeal of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Jon
Walters, and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel),
for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices McBride and Taylor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant Mitchell Morrow was convicted of the August 28, 1994,
armed robbery and murder of Kazmierz Kosinski. After considering factors in aggravation and
mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, to be served concurrently with a 20-year sentence for armed robbery. On direct
appeal, we reversed defendant’s armed robbery conviction, but we affirmed his conviction and
sentence for murder. People v. Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d 671 (1999). Defendant next filed his
first postconviction petition in which he raised numerous claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and trial court errors. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, and we
affirmed the dismissal on appeal. People v. Morrow, No. 1-00-3878 (2002) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶2 Afterwards, defendant requested leave to file his second postconviction petition in which
he claimed for the first time that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel when he failed to argue on direct appeal that defendant’s trial counsel ineffectively
failed to request a second-degree murder jury instruction. The trial court found that, although
defendant established cause to file a successive petition, he did not show prejudice to support
his claim because the evidence at trial did not support a finding of second-degree murder. As a
result, the trial court denied defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition, and
defendant now appeals. On this appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred since he
established both cause and prejudice required to file a second postconviction petition. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

-2-
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 I. Trial
¶5 The State’s evidence at trial relied primarily on the prior statement and grand jury
testimony of Ramona Siler, an alleged eyewitness to the murder. Siler told detectives that she
was a prostitute and that defendant was her boyfriend and pimp. In August 1994, Siler was five
months pregnant with defendant’s child, and she had previously told him that he was the father.
On August 28, 1994, Siler was performing sex acts for Kazmierz Kosinski, the victim, in his
vehicle with another prostitute, Birandi Paschal, when Paschal reached for Kosinski’s wallet.
A fight ensued, and Siler called for the help of defendant and Alanda McComb, Paschal’s
pimp, both of whom were sitting in their vehicle nearby. McComb ran toward Kosinski’s
vehicle and punched him. McComb then instructed Siler and Paschal to exit Kosinski’s
vehicle, and as the two women ran away, defendant approached Kosinski, pulled out a gun, and
shot him twice as he sat in the driver’s seat. Defendant, Siler, Paschal, and McComb then
returned to their own vehicle and McComb drove away with Kosinski’s wallet. At some point,
McComb hid the gun under the hood of his vehicle, and the four equally split $160 in cash
recovered from Kosinski’s wallet.
¶6 Siler repeated essentially the same account of events in both her written statement to the
police and in her grand jury testimony. However, she recanted her story at trial, explaining that
she lied because she was addicted to heroin and that she wanted to go home as soon as possible
so that she would not suffer from withdrawal. Defendant testified in his own defense and
claimed that he did not shoot Kosinski and that he was not with Siler, Paschal, or McComb on
the night of the shooting. Defendant also claimed that Siler was no longer his prostitute in
August 1994; that they were no longer in a relationship; and that he was not the father of Siler’s
child.
¶7 At opening argument, defendant’s counsel told the jury, “[Defendant] was not at the scene
of this crime, did not ask [Siler] to do anything to Kazmierz Kosinski, did not derive any
benefit from this crime, and is absolutely innocent of these charges.”

¶8 A. Autopsy, Ballistics, and Other Evidence
¶9 Forensic investigator Carl Brasic testified that, on August 28, 1994, he processed the crime
scene. There, Brasic observed Kazmierz Kosinski’s body in the driver’s seat of his vehicle,
which was parked on Leclaire Avenue near Blackhawk Park in Chicago. Both of the vehicle’s
front seats were reclined, and Brasic recovered a condom wrapper on the floor of the vehicle.
Brasic recovered three .25-caliber cartridge cases inside the vehicle. One cartridge case was
recovered on the floor of the front passenger seat, another was on the floor of the rear
passenger seat, and a third was found on the driver’s seat after Kosinski’s body was removed.
No weapons were recovered in the vehicle or on Kosinski’s person. Kosinski appeared to have
a gunshot wound on his left chest and right wrist, but his face did not appear to be injured.
Brasic recovered several palm prints on the outside of Kosinski’s vehicle.

-3-
¶ 10 Dr. Mitra Kalelkar testified that she performed the autopsy on Kosinski’s body. Prior to the
autopsy, Kalelkar observed a used condom inside Kosinski’s clothing and a bullet on the cart
on which Kosinski’s body was lying. Kosinski did not have any bruises or injuries to his face,
but he had three apparent gunshot wounds to his body. Kosinski was shot once in the left chest
wall, and the bullet traveled to the right and down to his spinal cord, where the bullet was
recovered. Due to the path of the bullet, Kalelkar opined that the gun was positioned to the left
and slightly above the victim. Kosinski also sustained a gunshot wound to his right wrist, and
the bullet entered his inside palm and exited through the wrist. Kalelkar observed evidence that
both gunshots were contact wounds, meaning that the barrel of the gun was touching
Kosinski’s skin when it was fired. Kosinski had a third gunshot graze wound on his right hip,
but there was no evidence that the shot was fired from close range. A toxicology test revealed
that Kosinski’s blood alcohol level was twice the legal limit at the time of his death. Kalelkar
opined that Kosinski died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds and that the manner of his
death was a homicide.
¶ 11 Police officer Richard Chenow, a ballistics expert, testified that he examined the three
cartridge cases recovered from the vehicle, but he could not determine whether they were fired
from the same gun. Also, he examined two bullets recovered from the crime scene, but they
were mutilated and unsuitable for comparison.
¶ 12 The parties stipulated that Victoria Psichalinos would testify that she is an expert
fingerprint examiner, and that she examined the palm prints recovered from the outside of
Kosinski’s vehicle. Psichalinos compared those prints to individual palm prints taken from
defendant, Siler, McComb, Paschal, and Kosinski, and she opined that they did not match the
prints recovered from the vehicle.
¶ 13 The parties also stipulated that a pedestrian recovered Kosinski’s wallet and placed it in a
mailbox on August 28, 1994. Psichalinos examined three fingerprints recovered from inside
the wallet and opined that they did not match the individual fingerprint samples provided by
defendant, Siler, McComb, Paschal, or Kosinski.

¶ 14 B. Interview of Ramona Siler
¶ 15 Detective William Johnston testified that he investigated Kosinski’s murder, and that he
initially thought it was related to prostitution since the victim was found near Blackhawk Park,
a place known for prostitution, and a used condom was recovered inside Kosinski’s clothing.
On September 5, 1994, Johnston learned that a prostitute named Ramona “Tracy” Siler, who
usually worked nearby at the intersection of Dickens and Cicero Avenues, had not been
observed for several days following the murder. Police officers later observed Siler at 8:30
p.m. that evening and arrested her on a bond forfeiture warrant.
¶ 16 Following her arrest, Siler was placed in an interview room at the 25th District police
station and Detective Johnston and his partner, Detective Stephen Gawrys, questioned her
concerning Kosinski’s murder. Siler initially told Johnston that she did not know anything
about Kosinski’s death, and that she needed to be released from custody so that she could
attend to her children, who were alone in a hotel room. Johnston did not release Siler and

-4-
 instead sent two police officers to check on the children. The officers later telephoned Johnston
from the hotel and told him that Siler’s pimp, defendant, was alone in the hotel room, and that
defendant stated that Siler’s children did not live there. Johnston instructed the officers to ask
defendant to accompany them to the police station for an interview, and defendant arrived at
the Area 5 police station later that evening. Johnston identified defendant in court.
¶ 17 Johnston resumed the interview with Siler, and she received her Miranda warnings. This
time, Siler admitted that she did have information concerning the murder near Blackhawk
Park. On the night of the shooting, Siler was working “her corner,” which was the intersection
of Dickens and Cicero Avenues, with another prostitute, named Birandi “Brittany” Paschal.
Defendant, Siler’s pimp, and Alanda “JR” McComb, Paschal’s pimp, were also present that
evening.
¶ 18 Siler told Johnston that, at 2 a.m., a prior customer pulled up to Siler and motioned for her
to approach his vehicle. The customer told Siler that he wanted to hire two prostitutes that
evening, and he pointed to Paschal. Siler and Paschal both entered the customer’s vehicle, and
he drove to a location near Blackhawk Park. Defendant and McComb followed behind them in
their own vehicle and parked ahead of the customer.
¶ 19 After the customer parked his vehicle, Siler and Paschal performed sex acts on him. Siler
eventually stopped and told the customer that his “time was up,” but he reached into the
vehicle’s visor and handed Siler $10, and she resumed. Shortly thereafter, Paschal reached into
the customer’s pants for his wallet, and an argument ensued. The customer became physical
with Paschal and called her a “black bitch,” so Siler shouted for defendant and McComb to
come help. Defendant and McComb ran to the customer’s vehicle, and McComb punched him.
Defendant then pulled out a small, semiautomatic handgun and shot the customer twice. Siler
observed the muzzle of the gun flash, and she heard both shots.
¶ 20 After the shooting, Siler and Paschal returned to McComb and defendant’s vehicle, and
they drove away1 with the victim’s wallet. McComb handed the customer’s wallet to Paschal,
who then removed $160 in cash and divided it equally amongst the group before throwing the
wallet out the vehicle’s window. While they were in the vehicle, Siler observed the victim’s
blood on defendant’s shoes. At some point, they stopped and McComb hid the gun underneath
the hood of the vehicle, and they continued to drive away.
¶ 21 Siler told Johnston that, at the time of the shooting, she had been using $40 of heroin per
day and that defendant used $200 of heroin daily. Up until this point in the interview, Johnston
had not shown Siler any photographs of the crime scene or potential suspects.
¶ 22 Siler remained in police custody overnight following her interview. The next day,
Assistant State’s Attorney Myles Hahn arrived at the Area 5 police station and spoke with
Siler. Afterwards, Siler provided a written statement in the presence of Johnston and Hahn.
Siler remained in police custody a second night, and Johnston arranged to have her testify
before the grand jury the next day.

1
Johnston did not testify whether Siler identified who drove the vehicle or where they drove.
-5-
¶ 23 C. Ramona Siler’s Prior Statement
¶ 24 The parties stipulated that Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Myles Hahn would testify that
he interviewed Siler on September 6, 1994, and that he summarized what she told him in a
written statement. Siler’s prior statement was offered into evidence and published to the jury at
trial. In the statement, Siler stated that she received her Miranda warnings and that she
understood them. She then described the shooting that took place on August 28, 1994, and her
account was substantially similar to what she told Detective Johnston. Siler stated that she
worked as a prostitute at the time, and that defendant was her protector and pimp, as well as her
boyfriend of two years. At 2 a.m., she was standing at the corner of Dickens and Cicero
Avenues with another prostitute, named Brittany, when a man drove up and propositioned
them for sex. Siler did not know the man’s name at the time, but she identified him as the
victim, Kazmierz Kosinski, in a Polaroid photograph, which she signed. Siler and Brittany
accepted Kosinski’s offer and they entered his vehicle. Kosinski then drove to Leclaire Street
near Palmer Street, and defendant and “JR,” a man that Brittany stayed with, followed.
¶ 25 Siler stated that she and Brittany performed sexual acts for Kosinski for five minutes, at the
conclusion of which Kosinski negotiated Siler for extra time in exchange for more money. At
the same time, Brittany reached into Kosinski’s pocket, and he responded, “Stop that, black
bitch,” and hit Brittany on the side of her head. Siler then yelled to defendant and JR for help,
both of whom were sitting in their vehicle parked three parking spaces away. JR, the driver,
exited his vehicle and ran toward Kosinski and punched him as he sat in his vehicle. Defendant
then approached Kosinski, pulled out a gun, and shot him twice. Defendant, JR, Siler, and
Brittany returned to JR’s vehicle, and JR drove away. As they drove away, defendant told
Brittany to split up the money that she recovered from Kosinski’s wallet amongst the four of
them. Defendant then asked Siler if he had any blood on him, but Siler’s statement does not
include her response.
¶ 26 Siler’s statement concluded with an acknowledgement that she was treated well by ASA
Hahn and the police, and that she was not threatened in any way. Siler also stated that she was
not offered any promises in exchange for giving her statement and that she was not under the
influence of any drugs or alcohol at the time. No corrections were made to the statement, and
Siler, Hahn, and Johnston signed each page.

¶ 27 D. Ramona Siler’s Grand Jury Testimony
¶ 28 ASA Ray Regner testified that he spoke with Siler concerning Kosinski’s murder, and she
agreed to testify before the grand jury on September 7, 2004. Regner testified that Siler was
coherent when he spoke with her and that he did not offer her any promises in exchange for her
testimony. Specifically, Regner did not promise Siler that she could go home after she testified.
¶ 29 Siler’s grand jury testimony was also offered into evidence and published to the jury at
trial. Siler testified that defendant had been her boyfriend for four years and that they had lived
together for the past two years. Siler made a living as a prostitute, and defendant was her
“protector,” meaning that if she ever fought with a man she was “dating,” then defendant

-6-
 would “jump in” and help her. On the evening of September 6, 1994, 2 Siler was at the
intersection of Dickens and Cicero Avenues with a woman that Siler knew only as “Brittany.”
Defendant was there that evening to protect Siler, and JR was there to protect Brittany. At 2
a.m., Siler observed a blue vehicle that she had observed three times before, so she flagged it
down. She recognized the driver as Kazmierz Kosinski, the victim. Kosinski pulled over and
Siler offered him sex in exchange for money. Kosinski told her that he wanted the services of
two women that evening, and Brittany agreed to the offer. Siler and Brittany entered
Kosinski’s vehicle and he drove them to a location near Blackhawk Park. Siler observed that
defendant had followed them and was parked in front of Kosinski’s vehicle.
¶ 30 Siler testified that she and Brittany began to perform sex on Kosinski, and that Siler
stopped after six minutes and told him that he needed to pay her more money if he wanted her
to continue. Kosinski agreed and paid Siler, and he placed his wallet on the side of his seat.
Brittany then reached for his wallet, but Kosinski caught her. He grabbed Brittany’s hair, hit
her head, and called her a “black bitch.” At that point, Siler, Brittany, and Kosinski started
fighting, but defendant was too strong for the two women, so Siler exited the vehicle and called
for defendant to help by yelling his name and urging him to “come on.” JR ran to the vehicle,
pulled Kosinski halfway out of the vehicle, and punched him. JR then told Siler and Brittany to
exit Kosinski’s vehicle. Siler testified that she assumed JR was searching for Kosinski’s
money since she thought she heard JR say, “Give me the money,” though she was not sure.
¶ 31 Siler testified that she and Brittany then ran to JR’s vehicle and passed defendant on their
way. Defendant had a gun in his hand and Siler urged him to “come on” and “get in the car.”
Siler had observed the gun before and knew that defendant was armed that evening; however,
Siler did not observe a weapon in Kosinski’s possession. Defendant continued running to
Kosinski’s vehicle, faced him, and shot him once. Siler and Brittany then entered JR’s vehicle
and Siler backed it up to pick up defendant and JR. As she was backing up, she heard a second
gunshot. Siler exited the vehicle to find out what happened, and she observed defendant and JR
running back toward their vehicle. Siler reentered the vehicle and sat in the backseat with
defendant, and JR drove away. JR stopped the vehicle nearby on Palmer Street and hid the gun
under the hood, and then continued to drive away. Defendant asked Siler if she observed any
blood on him, and she responded that he had a little bit on his shirt. JR handed Kosinski’s
wallet to Brittany and, on his instructions, she removed the money and threw the wallet out the
window. Brittany handed the money to JR, and he handed $40 to defendant, who later used the
money to buy drugs. JR drove to North Avenue and Siler finished working that evening at that
location.
¶ 32 Siler testified that she provided this information in a prior written statement to ASA Hahn
and Detective Johnston on September 6, 1994. Siler identified the statement and

2
ASA Regner testified that he mistakenly asked Siler about the events of September 6, 1994,
instead of August 28, 1994, the actual date of the murder. However, Regner testified that when he
spoke with Siler prior to her grand jury testimony, they discussed the events that occurred on the night
of the murder, not September 6, 1994. Also, Siler was taken into custody at the Area 5 police station on
September 5, 1994, and released on September 7, 1994, after she testified before the grand jury.
-7-
 acknowledged that she signed each page. The statement contained a true and accurate account
of what happened the night of the murder, and no threats or promises were made to Siler in
exchange for her statement. Siler was read her Miranda rights and she was treated well by the
ASA and the police. Siler also testified that she was not made any threats or promises in
exchange for her grand jury testimony and that her testimony was true and accurate.

¶ 33 E. Ramona Siler’s Testimony at Trial
¶ 34 At trial, Ramona Siler testified that she is a 25-year-old high school dropout with seven
children. In August 1994, Siler worked as a prostitute and defendant was her pimp. Defendant
was also her boyfriend of nearly four years at that time, and they had lived together in a hotel
for two years. That month, Siler was pregnant with her sixth child, of whom defendant was the
father. Siler told defendant that he was the father of the child, the first and only child that they
had together. Siler testified that she and defendant used heroin every day, and that she would
typically spend over $50 to support her habit. Siler identified defendant in court.
¶ 35 Siler testified that she has been arrested for prostitution at least 30 times, and that she has
used 8 false names. Siler typically performed sexual acts for customers in their vehicles, while
defendant would “protect” her, meaning that he would follow Siler and park nearby and help
her if she ever fought with a customer. In August 1994, Siler worked at the intersection of
Dickens and Cicero Avenues with another prostitute, Birandi “Brittany” Paschal, whom she
identified in court. Paschal’s boyfriend, Alanda “JR” McComb, was also Paschal’s pimp, and
would also protect Brittany when she was working.
¶ 36 Siler first testified that she was working as a prostitute at the intersection of Dickens and
Cicero Avenues during the early morning hours of August 28, 1994, but then stated that she did
not remember the exact dates when she was working. Siler then denied knowing who
Kazmierz Kosinski was and testified that she was not with Kosinski, defendant, Paschal, and
McComb on the night of Kosinski’s death.
¶ 37 Siler admitted that she provided a prior written statement to ASA Hahn and Detective
Johnston and that she testified before the grand jury. The State asked Siler about a number of
specific statements she made in her prior written statement and grand jury testimony, and Siler
admitted to providing the statements. Siler acknowledged that she was treated well by both
ASAs and the police and that she was never made any promises or threats in exchange for her
written statement and grand jury testimony.
¶ 38 On cross-examination, Siler testified that, at the time of the shooting, she had five children
from three different fathers, and that her heroin addiction was so strong that her first priority
was to become high before taking care of her children. Siler admitted that she used heroin even
though she knew that it could harm her unborn child. Siler was six months pregnant with
defendant’s child in August 1994, and defendant repeatedly told her that he was not the father.
Defendant has two other prostitutes, Gina and Rhonda. Like Siler, Rhonda has a child with
defendant as well as a tattoo of defendant’s nickname on her hand.
¶ 39 Siler also testified that she lied to the police because she was a heroin addict and she did not
want to suffer from withdrawal in jail. When Siler was arrested, she lied to the police that she

-8-
 had five children alone in her hotel room because she thought that they would release her from
custody. Detective Johnston then interviewed Siler concerning Kosinski’s death, and Siler was
not released from custody even though she told him that she did not know anything about the
murder. Siler then made up a story based on the photographs that Johnston showed her, and she
implicated defendant and McComb, the only two pimps she knew, in the shooting. Siler was
still in custody when she testified before the grand jury, and she was going through heroin
withdrawal at the time. She admitted that she lied under oath because she thought she would be
able to go home and avoid a murder charge if she testified. Siler was in fact released without
charges after she testified before the grand jury.

¶ 40 F. Defendant’s Testimony at Trial
¶ 41 Defendant testified in his own defense and denied shooting Kosinski. Defendant admitted
that he was Siler’s pimp and that she frequently worked at the intersection of Dickens and
Cicero Avenues. Defendant would sometimes follow Siler to protect her from other pimps, but
he denied being present the night Kosinski was murdered. Defendant explained that he was
previously in a relationship with Siler, but that he told her in August 1994 that he could not
support her once she became pregnant since her stomach was showing and she did not make
enough money. Defendant denied that he was the father of Siler’s child and noted that the
child’s skin color and hair texture were different from his own. However, Siler still told him
that he was the father.
¶ 42 On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he was previously Siler’s pimp and
boyfriend, and that McComb was Paschal’s pimp. However, defendant denied working with
McComb, and he testified that he did not carry a gun. Defendant further denied that he was
Siler’s pimp and boyfriend in August 1994, and he stated that she no longer lived with him at
that time. Defendant admitted that he was addicted to heroin in August 1994. Defendant
testified that he had lied to the police and provided false names on several occasions. On
September 5, 1994, two police officers arrived at defendant’s hotel room looking for Siler’s
children, and defendant voluntarily returned to the Area 5 police station with them. At the
police station, defendant spoke with Detectives Johnston and Gawrys concerning the shooting,
but defendant denied telling them that he had spent every night with Siler except the night of
the shooting.
¶ 43 In rebuttal, the State called Detective Stephen Gawrys, who testified that when he asked
defendant where he was on the night of the shooting, defendant stated that he was with Siler
every other night except that one.

¶ 44 G. Closing, Conviction, and Sentence
¶ 45 At closing argument, the defense argued that Siler was not credible and that defendant was
not present when Kosinski was shot and killed. The jury convicted defendant of murder and
armed robbery. Codefendant Birandi Paschal was also found guilty of murder and armed
robbery by a separate jury, but codefendant Alanda McComb was acquitted following a bench
trial. After considering factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced

-9-
 defendant to 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for murder, to be served
concurrently with a 20-year sentence for armed robbery.

¶ 46 II. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 47 On direct appeal, defendant claimed that his convictions should be reversed because: (1)
the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) certain evidence was improperly admitted; (3)
the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (4) his counsel provided ineffective assistance
by not objecting to the inadmissible evidence. On March 1, 1999, we reversed defendant’s
armed robbery conviction, but rejected defendant’s other claims. People v. Morrow, 303 Ill.
App. 3d 671 (1999). Defendant was denied leave to appeal on June 2, 1999. People v. Morrow,
184 Ill. 2d 567 (1999) (table).
¶ 48 While defendant’s petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was still
pending, defendant’s counsel filed his first postconviction petition on April 23, 1999. In his
petition, defendant claimed: (1) that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to interview Siler before trial, investigate alibi witnesses, and object to improper evidence and
arguments; (2) that he was forced to be tried by a jury and to testify in his own defense; and (3)
that his sentence was excessive and improperly entered without a presentence investigation.
The trial court later granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition, and we affirmed the
dismissal on appeal. People v. Morrow, No. 1-00-3878 (2002) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 49 On February 11, 2010, defendant filed a pro se habeas corpus petition, which was later
dismissed by the trial court, and we affirmed the dismissal on appeal. Morrow v. Ryker, No.
1-10-1243 (2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In February 2011,
defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2006). The trial court later dismissed the section
2-1401 petition, and defendant appealed; however, the appellate record in this case does not
reveal the outcome of defendant’s prior appeal.
¶ 50 While defendant’s appeal of the dismissal of his pro se habeas petition was still pending,
defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive pro se postconviction petition on
December 5, 2011. In his successive petition, defendant argued that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for not arguing on direct appeal that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request second-degree murder instructions. Defendant explained that he filed his
original postconviction petition on April 23, 1999, while his petition for leave to appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court was still pending, in order to comply with the statute of limitations
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2006)), which
required petitions to be filed within the sooner of three years from conviction or six months
after direct appeal. As a result, defendant argued that he had cause to file a successive
postconviction petition since he had to file his first petition to comply with the Act and he did
not discover his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness until his petition for leave to appeal was
denied later on June 2, 1999. The trial court denied defendant leave to file a successive petition,
finding that, although defendant established cause to file his successive petition, he did not
show prejudice since the evidence did not support a finding of second-degree murder.
- 10 -
¶ 51 Defendant now appeals the denial of his leave to file a successive pro se postconviction
petition.

¶ 52 ANALYSIS
¶ 53 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied him leave to file a
successive pro se postconviction petition since he established both cause and prejudice.
Specifically, defendant argues that he demonstrated prejudice in his claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to request a second-degree murder instruction, and that his appellate
counsel ineffectively failed to raise this claim on direct appeal. In response, the State argues
that defendant did not establish prejudice since the evidence did not support a finding of
second-degree murder. However, we find that counsel’s decision not to request a
second-degree murder instruction was appropriate as a matter of trial strategy, and we affirm
defendant’s conviction and sentence as a result.
¶ 54 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides that “[o]nly one petition may be filed by a
petitioner under this Article without leave of the court.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2006). A
petitioner may be granted leave to file another postconviction petition “only if a petitioner
demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction
proceedings and prejudice results from that failure.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2006). “To
establish ‘cause,’ the defendant must show some objective factor external to the defense
impeded his ability to raise the claim in the initial postconviction proceeding.” People v.
Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 82 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 460 (2002)).
“To establish ‘prejudice,’ the defendant must show the claimed constitutional error so infected
his trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 82
(citing Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464). Our review of the trial court’s dismissal of
defendant’s postconviction petition is de novo. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 247 (2001).
De novo consideration means we perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform.
Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011).
¶ 55 As an initial matter, we address defendant’s argument that our review is subject to a more
lenient consideration of cause and prejudice as set forth in People v. LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d
914, 924 (2006). In that case, the Second District held that a section 122-1(f) motion “need
state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice.” LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d at
924. Although defendant points to Justice Burke’s dissent in People v. Evans, 2013 IL 113471,
¶¶ 23-24, in support of his argument that there is a “split of authority in the appellate court”
concerning the applicable standard for a successive pro se postconviction petition, defendant
has not cited another decision that has accepted LaPointe’s “gist” standard. Moreover, Justice
Burke noted in Evans that LaPointe has been rejected in People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st)
091651, ¶¶ 21-22. Also, our supreme court recently rejected the argument that successive
petitions should be considered under the same first-stage “gist” standard as an initial
postconviction petition. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 25. As such, we decline to
follow the more lenient standard set forth in LaPointe.
¶ 56 Next, we consider defendant’s claim that he established prejudice sufficient to file a
successive petition because his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a second-degree
- 11 -
 murder instruction at trial, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this
claim on direct appeal. “ ‘The sixth and fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantee the fundamental right of a defendant in a criminal case to be effectively
assisted by counsel.’ ” People v. Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d 909, 927 (2004) (quoting People v.
Spann, 332 Ill. App. 3d 425, 429 (2002), citing U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV). A claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is judged according to the two-prong, performance-prejudice
test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.
2d 504, 525 (1984); People v. Boyd, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1034 (2006). “To obtain relief
under Strickland, a defendant must prove [1] that defense counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and [2] that this substandard performance caused
prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the trial result
would have been different.” Boyd, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1034 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-88). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 283 (1992).
¶ 57 A person commits the offense of second-degree murder when he or she commits the
offense of first-degree murder, and he or she unreasonably believes at the time of the killing
that the circumstances are such that, if they existed, they would justify or exonerate the killing.
720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 2010). The statute “takes into account that human beings, in a
heated atmosphere, might reach conclusions which seem to them under the circumstances
reasonable, but which in the cold light of rational analysis are obviously unreasonable. It is the
genius of our law that, while not condoning unreasonable behavior, it nevertheless recognizes
and takes into account that human beings may reach unreasonable beliefs, given the
circumstances of the moment and the conditions under which beliefs are formulated and
drawn.” People v. Vaughn, 26 Ill. App. 3d 247, 255 (1975). Where there is even slight
evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime to a lesser-included
offense, an instruction defining the lesser offense should be given. People v. Upton, 230 Ill.
App. 3d 365, 374 (1992) (citing People v. Perry, 19 Ill. App. 3d 254, 257-58 (1974), People v.
Stevenson, 196 Ill. App. 3d 225, 230 (1990), and People v. Willis, 170 Ill. App. 3d 638, 641
(1988)).
¶ 58 Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective since the evidence at trial was sufficient
for a finding of second-degree murder. Siler testified at trial that, at the time of the shooting,
defendant was her pimp and “protector”; defendant was her boyfriend of four years and she
lived with him for two years; she was five months pregnant with defendant’s child; and she
“loved” defendant and his nickname was tattooed on her wrist. On August 28, 1994, Kosinski
fought with Siler and she called to defendant for help, and in response defendant ran to her
defense and shot Kosinski to protect the life of his girlfriend and unborn child. Defendant
argues that, since defendant unreasonably believed that he was justified in killing Kosinski, the
evidence supports a conviction of second-degree murder, and his trial counsel was ineffective
in failing to request an instruction.
¶ 59 However, even if we determine that there was sufficient evidence to support a
second-degree murder instruction, defense counsel may have concluded that a self-defense
theory would have been incompatible with the theory presented, since it would require
- 12 -
 defendant to admit to the shootings. “ ‘[T]he decision of whether to submit an instruction on a
lesser included offense is typically considered to be one of trial strategy that has no bearing on
the competency of counsel because counsel could have reasonably believed that the instruction
would have converted a likely acquittal into a likely conviction of the lesser crime.’ ” People v.
White, 2011 IL App (1st) 092852, ¶ 70 (quoting People v. Cathey, 406 Ill. App. 3d 503, 512
(2010), rev’d on other grounds, 2012 IL 111746). Here, defense counsel made the strategic
decision to argue that the State failed to prove its case, and although defendant’s trial counsel’s
argument was ultimately unsuccessful, that “does not mean counsel performed unreasonably
and rendered ineffective assistance.” People v. Walton, 378 Ill. App. 3d 580, 589 (2007).
¶ 60 This case would be different if the defense counsel had conceded in his or her opening that
defendant had committed the murder. “ ‘[W]here defense counsel argues a theory of defense
but then fails to offer an instruction on that theory of defense, the failure cannot be called trial
strategy and is evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” White, 2011 IL App (1st)
092852, ¶ 65 (quoting People v. Serrano, 286 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492 (1997)). When defense
counsel concedes that defendant is the murderer, then the only issues left for the jury to resolve
at trial are issues relating to affirmative defenses and second-degree murder. If counsel then
fails to follow through and fails to request the appropriate instructions, then this may be
considered ineffectiveness of counsel. People v. Lewis, 240 Ill. App. 3d 463, 469-70 (1992)
(finding that where trial counsel told the jury in closing, “ ‘You got an easy job on Nimrod. If it
was justified, you turn him loose, if it wasn’t, you convict him,’ ” trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to submit an instruction on justification or voluntary manslaughter).
¶ 61 However, that is not the case here. In the case at bar, the defense counsel contested the fact
that defendant was the murderer, from the opening remarks through cross-examination, and
right through to the closing. Defendant testified in his own defense that he did not shoot
Kosinski and that he was not even present during the commission of the offense. At that point,
the decision whether to request a second-degree instruction, and thus give the jury a
compromise point short of a full acquittal, became a part of the trial strategy.
¶ 62 Although defendant argues now that he unreasonably believed he was justified in killing
Kosinski to protect his girlfriend and unborn child, at trial defendant testified that, in August
1994, he no longer lived with Siler and she was no longer his girlfriend, and he denied that he
was the father of Siler’s child. Since defendant himself denied that he was in a relationship
with Siler at the time of the shooting, defendant’s testimony does not support his theory for
second-degree murder and instead supports the conclusion that the decision not to request a
second-degree murder instruction was a matter of trial strategy.
¶ 63 We observe that the sentencing range for first-degree murder is 20 to 60 years (730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2012)), while the sentencing range for second-degree murder is 4 to 20
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2012)). Although one’s exposure under first-degree murder is
greater, it is possible to receive the same sentence whether one is convicted of first-or
second-degree murder. The ultimate sentence is left to the trial court’s discretion, which
counsel may address at sentencing by showing mitigating factors. People v. Haley, 2011 IL
App (1st) 093585, ¶ 63. This overlap in possible sentences is part of the reason why the

- 13 -
 decision whether to ask for a second-degree murder instruction is usually considered part of
the defense’s trial strategy.
¶ 64 We conclude that defendant’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance because
the “record here establishes that defense counsel thoroughly investigated and prepared
defendant’s case and reasonably chose to argue defendant’s complete innocence in the
shooting, rather than a justification for it.” People v. Jones, 234 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1098 (1992).
In turn, defendant’s appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct
appeal since there was no merit to defendant’s claim. As a result, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition since defendant did not
establish prejudice, and we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence. Since we find that
defendant did not show prejudice, we need not consider whether he had cause to file his
successive petition.

¶ 65 CONCLUSION
¶ 66 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 67 Affirmed.

- 14 -