UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RAYMOND L. HALL, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-0931 (CRC)
)
)
WARDEN RAYMOND BYRD, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed this action for a writ of habeas corpus
from the District of Columbia’s Correctional Treatment Facilit y (“CTF”). He
presents two distinct claims. First, petitioner challenges the consecutive
sentences and assessed fine imposed by the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia on September 24, 2013. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. # 1]
at 2, 4-5. Second, petitioner challenges the Department of Corrections’
calculation of his sentence and its alleged arbitrary refusal to place him in “a
halfway house or home confinement like other D.C. Code offenders housed in
[Bureau of Prison’s] custod y . . . .” Id. at 4. Petitioner seeks his release from
CTF and the modification of his sentences from consecutive to concurrent. See
id. at 4, 6.
“A court . . . entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall
forthwith award the writ . . ., unless it appears from the application that the
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applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the
following reasons, the Court will deny the petition and dismiss the case.
1. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Petitioner’s Sentencing Claim
Unlike federal and state prisoners, “a District of Columbia prisoner has no
recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is ‘inadequate or
ineffective to test the legalit y of his detention’ ” Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F.3d
34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted); Garris v. Lindsay, 794
F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986). D.C. Code § 23–
110 authorizes a District of Columbia prisoner to file a motion in Superior Court
“to vacate, set aside, or correct [a] sentence on any of four grounds” challenging
its constitutionalit y. Alston v. United States, 590 A.2d 511, 513 (D.C. 1991).
This local remed y “has been found to be adequate and effective because it is
coextensive with habeas corpus.” Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C.
1992) (citing Garris, 794 F.2d at 725; Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 377-82
(1977)).
The statute provides in particular:
[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to appl y for relief by motion
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any
Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the Superior Court has
denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legalit y of his
detention.
D.C. Code § 23-110(g). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has interpreted the “plain language” of this provision as
“divest[ing] federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners
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who could have raised viable claims pursuant to section 23-110(a).” Williams v.
Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Because petitioner may
challenge the Superior Court’s sentence under § 23-110 and has not alleged, let
alone shown, the ineffectiveness of that remedy, this Court lacks authorit y to
entertain petitioner’s claim arising from his sentence.
2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Issuance of the Writ to His Warden
In habeas proceedings, “[t]he writ or order to show cause [is] directed to
the person having custod y of the person detained,” 28 U.S.C. § 2243, which, in
this case, is the warden of CTF. A District of Columbia prisoner is entitled to
habeas relief when he shows that his "custody is in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C § 2241(c)(3). As discussed
next, petitioner has not made the requisite showing.
Petitioner contends that “prison officials had miscalculated [his] sentence
and ran it ‘consecutivel y’ in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” Pet. at 4.
However, petitioner admits, and the Superior Court’s commitment order is clear,
that the underl ying “count(s) run consecutive to each other and consecutive to
an y other sentence.” Hall v. District of Columbia, 2013 DVM 000172 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2013). The warden’s execution of that order does not
implicate the double jeopard y clause’s proscription against “multiple
punishments for the same offense.” Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (“The purpose [of the
double jeopard y clause] is to ensure that sentencing courts do not exceed, b y the
device of multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the legislative branch
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of government, in which lies the substantive power to define crimes and
prescribe punishments.”) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 713 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting parolee’s double
jeopardy claim against the U.S. Parole Commission because “the USPC has no
authorit y to impose a prison sentence upon conviction of a crime; this authorit y
rests with the Superior Court of the District of Columbia”) (citation omitted).
Hence, the Court finds petitioner’s ground for relief based on the double
jeopard y clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be
meritless.
Petitioner also invokes the equal protection clause by alleging that he was
“discriminated against” when he was “denied the . . . opportunit y to be sent to a
halfway house or home confinement,” but he compares himself with D.C. Code
offenders housed in the U.S. Bureau of Prisons. 1 Pet. at 4. An equal protection
violation occurs when the government treats “similarl y situated” individuals
differentl y without a rational basis. Women Prisoners of the District of
Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C.
Cir. 1996). Prisoners, such as petitioner, who are housed in District of
Columbia facilities are “not similarl y situated to those prisoners [housed in BOP
facilities], because [they] [are] in the custody of a different agency of
government.” Noble v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 194 F.3d 152, 154-55 (D.C. Cir.
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“ TheDistrict of Columbia is subject to the [Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause] b y virtue of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process
of law.” Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v.
District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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1999). Hence, the Courts finds petitioner’s equal protection claim to be
meritless as well.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes (1) that it lacks
jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim challenging his Superior Court sentence
and (2) that the petition fails to provide a basis for issuing either the writ of
habeas corpus or a show cause order to petitioner’s warden. Hence, the petition
will be denied and this case will be dismissed. A separate order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
____________s/_______________
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
DATE: June 23, 2014 United States District Judge
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