UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4906
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DANIEL JERONIMO-RODAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:13-cr-00153-RBH-2)
Submitted: June 16, 2014 Decided: June 25, 2014
Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stuart M. Axelrod, AXELROD & ASSOCIATES, P.A., Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Robert F. Daley, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Jeronimo-Rodas appeals from his conviction for
possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. On appeal, he
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress, where he asserted that police officers’ continued
questioning of him at his residence after he denied the officers
entry was unconstitutional. We affirm.
Victor Gomez, an agent with the Department of Homeland
Security, along with two members of the Myrtle Beach Police
Department’s Gang Unit, knocked on Daniel Jeronimo-Rodas’s
trailer’s front door at approximately 6:30 pm on February 15,
2013, in order to investigate a tip that illegal aliens in
possession of firearms were on the premises. Jeronimo-Rodas
opened the door. Gomez identified himself and informed
Jeronimo-Rodas that the officers were conducting an
investigation. Gomez asked if he could enter the residence, and
Jeronimo-Rodas denied Gomez’s request. Gomez then continued to
question Jeronimo-Rodas concerning both his immigration status
and his ownership of a vehicle parked near the residence.
Eventually, Jeronimo-Rodas retrieved documentation
concerning the vehicle, along with a Mexican passport. After
indicating to Gomez that he was a Mexican citizen,
Jeronimo-Rodas stated that he was in the United States
illegally. Gomez then placed Jeronimo-Rodas under arrest.
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Subsequent to his arrest, Jeronimo-Rodas admitted that he had a
firearm in the trailer, and he consented when Gomez asked to
enter the premises to retrieve the firearm.
In reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion
to suppress, we review de novo the ultimate conclusion that the
police did or did not have the requisite probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, but all findings of historical fact and
credibility determinations are reviewed deferentially, under the
clear error standard. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996). “A voluntary response to an officer’s knock at
the front door of a dwelling does not generally implicate the
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 493
(4th Cir. 2001). However, the Fourth Amendment is implicated
“when officers gain visual or physical access to a room after an
occupant opens the door not voluntarily, but in response to a
demand under color of authority.” United States v. Mowatt, 513
F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Kentucky v.
King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); see Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
Jeronimo-Rodas particularly relies on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Johnson, where officers investigating a
report of opium use in a hotel traced the opium to a particular
room. 333 U.S. at 12. Officers in Johnson knocked on the door
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to the room and identified themselves as police, and after a
slight delay, the defendant opened the door. Id. After one
officer informed the defendant that he wanted to speak with her
about the opium smell, the defendant stepped back and let the
officers into the room, apparently without objection. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the officers had obtained entry
“demanded under color of office” and that the defendant had
permitted entry into the room “in submission to authority rather
than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a
constitutional right.” Id. at 13. According to Jeronimo-Rodas,
Johnson created a bright-line rule that forbids further
investigation or questioning once a suspect denies officers
entry to his home. This bright-line rule would vitiate any
consent given by Jeronimo-Rodas after the continued questioning.
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that consent is
to be determined under the totality of the circumstances.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). In
determining whether consent was voluntary, courts examine the
officer’s conduct, the number of officers present, the time of
the encounter, and the characteristics of the individual who was
searched. See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th
Cir. 1996). Additionally, whether the individual searched was
informed of his right to decline the search is “highly
relevant.” United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir.
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1990). The voluntariness of consent is a factual finding
reviewed for clear error. Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 651.
Here, the district court explicitly found Gomez to be
a credible witness and carefully considered the totality of the
circumstances: (1) the entire encounter took a matter of minutes
and occurred on Jeronimo-Rodas’s own property; (2) Gomez had
reasonable suspicion to interview Jeronimo-Rodas, based upon a
reliable confidential informant; and (3) once Jeronimo-Rodas
admitted he was an illegal alien, Gomez read him his rights
prior to his admissions regarding the gun and prior to his
consent to search. Gomez testified that Jeronimo-Rodas was
cooperative and that he even walked officers to his bedroom and
pointed out the handgun. Unlike in Johnson, the officers did
not “demand” that Jeronimo-Rodas open the door or cooperate.
Moreover, no guns were drawn; Jeronimo-Rodas was not ordered to
the ground; he was informed of his Miranda rights; and
Jeronimo-Rodas clearly understood his right to refuse consent,
as he had previously declined consent.
Thus, we reject Jeronimo-Rodas’s construction of
Johnson. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991)
(noting that Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only if “a
reasonable person would [not] feel free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter” and that seizure
which does not occur “when police ask questions of an individual
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. . . so long as the officers do not convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required”); United States v.
Collins, 699 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that it
was reasonable to believe defendant “voluntarily changed her
mind and consented to the search” after police induced her to
cooperate); United States v. Alexander, 573 F.3d 465, 477-78
(7th Cir. 2009) (defendant initially refused to consent then
later voluntarily agreed to consent). Taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government under the totality of
the circumstances, we find that the district court did not err
in determining that Jeronimo-Rodas’s consent was voluntarily
given and that the agents were not required to withdraw upon
Jeronimo-Rodas’s initial denial. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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