UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4432
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TYRONE JOHNIKEN, a/k/a Hassan Muhammed, a/k/a Roland,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00426-JKB-2)
Submitted: June 19, 2014 Decided: June 27, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jonathan A. Gladstone, LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN GLADSTONE,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Robert R. Harding, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Tyrone Johniken of conspiracy
to participate in racketeering activity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2012); conspiracy to commit murder in aid of
racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1959(a)(5) (West
2012 & Supp. 2013); and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and distribute heroin and cocaine base, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The district court sentenced
Johniken to life imprisonment and he now appeals. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal, Johniken challenges the district court’s
admission of the testimonies of two witnesses regarding
statements made (1) by one of Johniken’s coconspirators, and
(2) by the victim of the murder. “We review a trial court’s
rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion, and we will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that
is arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d
146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, “[u]nder Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, [a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” United
States v. Medford, 661 F.3d 746, 751-52 (4th Cir. 2011). An
error has a substantial and injurious effect only if it affected
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the verdict; if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming or
cumulative, any error is not harmful. Id. at 751-52.
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid.
802. However, “[a] statement is not hearsay if it is a
statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy and is offered against the
party.” United States v. Graham, 711 F.3d 445, 453 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 449 (2013) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). “A
statement by a co-conspirator is made in furtherance of a
conspiracy if it was intended to promote the conspiracy’s
objectives, whether or not it actually has that effect.”
Graham, 711 F.3d at 453 (citations omitted).
In addition, hearsay statements are admissible where
the declarant is unavailable to testify because the party
against whom the statements are offered wrongfully caused the
declarant’s unavailability and did so intending that result.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). “Such wrongful conduct includes but is
not limited to murdering a witness.” United States v. Jackson,
706 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2782
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
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order for the exception to apply, the desire to keep the witness
from testifying must be a reason for procuring the
unavailability of the declarant, but not necessarily the only
motivation. Id.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the
relevant legal authorities and conclude that “assuming, without
deciding, that the district court erred, . . . any such error
was harmless.” Medford, 661 F.3d at 751. The evidence of
Johniken’s guilt presented at trial was overwhelming and
therefore any error did not affect Johniken’s substantial
rights. See id. at 751-52.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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