UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4667
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALVIN LEE EDGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:11-cr-00301-RJC-DSC-1)
Submitted: June 23, 2014 Decided: June 27, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denzil H. Forrester, THE LAW OFFICES OF DENZIL H. FORRESTER,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins,
United States Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alvin Lee Edge was convicted by a jury of possession
of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable
by more than one year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2012). The district court sentenced Edge to 120
months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
Edge appeals his conviction and a special condition of the
supervised release component of his sentence. We affirm.
Edge first argues that the district court erred in
denying him a fair opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution
witness by prohibiting inquiry into a prior larceny conviction.
The Government responds that the district court did not abuse
its discretion, and that even if the court erred, the error is
harmless in light of the evidence of Edge’s guilt. A district
court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir.
2007).
If a party seeks to attack “a witness’s character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction . . . for any
crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be
admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing
the elements of the crime required proving — or the witness’s
admitting — a dishonest act or false statement.” Fed. R. Evid.
609(a)(2). “A trial judge has no discretion to exclude evidence
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that qualifies under this rule. Because the admission of such
evidence is mandatory, however, Rule 609(a)(2) covers only a
narrow class of crimes which by their nature bear directly upon
the witness’ propensity to testify truthfully.” Kelly, 510 F.3d
at 438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
elements of larceny in North Carolina “are: (1) taking the
property of another; (2) carrying it away; (3) without the
owner’s consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of
the property permanently.” State v. Sheppard, 744 S.E.2d 149,
151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
Edge’s reliance on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974), is misplaced. In that case, the defense was barred from
revealing the fact that a witness was on probation for a
juvenile adjudication for burglary – the same type of crime for
which Davis was on trial. Id. at 319. The defense sought to
show that the witness might have a motivation to cooperate with
police or testify falsely to divert attention from himself. Id.
In this case, however, no such direct link exists between
Brandt’s prior larceny conviction and his testimony against
Edge, and Edge sought to admit the conviction merely for general
impeachment and credibility purposes. We conclude that the
prior larceny conviction did not directly impugn the witness’s
truthfulness, and the district court did not abuse its
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discretion in prohibiting cross-examination regarding the
conviction.
Edge next argues that the special condition of
supervised release prohibiting contact with his girlfriend, Ms.
Smith, without approval of the probation officer violates his
fundamental right to marry because it prohibits him from
marrying Ms. Smith. He acknowledges that the court did not
prohibit him from marrying Ms. Smith, but ordered him to have no
contact with her without approval of the probation officer.
“District courts have broad latitude to impose conditions on
supervised release, and as such, we typically review such
conditions only for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A particular restriction does not require an
‘offense-specific nexus,’ but the sentencing court must
adequately explain its decision and its reasons for imposing
it.” Id.
“[C]onditions that interfere with a defendant’s
constitutional liberties, such as raising his child or
associating with a loved one, must be adequately explained or
else their imposition undermines the fairness and integrity of
our judicial proceedings.” Id. at 408. Our review of the
record leads us to conclude that the district court’s
restriction on contact with Smith is sufficiently related to
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“the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), the need to deter future criminal conduct by Edge,
§ 3553(a)(2)(B), and the need “to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant, § 3553(a)(2)(C). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d)(1) (2012) (listing factors to be considered in
imposing special conditions on supervised release). Moreover,
the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing
the special condition, which is not an absolute prohibition, but
merely requires the authorization of the probation officer. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm Edge’s conviction and sentence.
We note, however, that the written judgment erroneously lists
the “no contact” condition in the imprisonment section of the
judgment rather than as a special condition of supervised
release. We therefore remand for correction of the judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
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