FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 03 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 13-30050
13-30292
Plaintiff - Appellee,
D.C. No. 4:12-cr-00032-DLC
v.
MATTHEW BLACK EAGLE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
In these companion cases, Matthew Black Eagle appeals from the district
court’s judgment revoking probation and its subsequent judgment revoking
supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
In Appeal No. 13-30050, Black Eagle contends that the two-year term of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
supervised release imposed on February 20, 2013, was substantively unreasonable.
In Appeal No. 13-30292, Black Eagle contends that the 18-month term of
supervised release imposed on October 9, 2013, was substantively unreasonable.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). The terms of supervised release were substantively reasonable in
light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the
circumstances, including Black Eagle’s history of drug and alcohol abuse. See
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.3(C); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In both appeals, Black Eagle contends that the district court erred by
imposing certain conditions of supervised release, including the standard condition
that he report to a probation officer and five special conditions related to drug and
alcohol use, because those conditions are not reasonably related to his offense of
conviction. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the
challenged conditions. See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir.
2003) (“[A] condition of supervised release need not relate to the offense as long as
the condition satisfies the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or
rehabilitation.”).
AFFIRMED.
2 13-30050 & 13-30292