FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 03 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KIMBERLY A. O’CONNOR, No. 12-16511
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02264-JAT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SCOTTSDALE HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Kimberly A. O’Connor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing for lack of standing her action alleging a violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and various state law claims. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly
Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2007) (interpretation of the ADA);
Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal for lack of
standing). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed O’Connor’s ADA claim because
O’Connor failed to allege a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact traceable to
defendants’ conduct in delaying O’Connor’s access to a hospital’s premises with
her service dog. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of standing to allege a claim under Title III of the
ADA); Skaff, 506 F.3d at 835-36 (wheelchair-bound paraplegic lacked standing as
to his ADA claim arising from a one-hour delay in getting a hotel room with a roll-
in shower and portable shower chair). Moreover, O’Connor failed to establish a
“‘real and immediate threat of repeated injury’ in the future” to pursue injunctive
relief under the ADA. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946 (citation omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying O’Connor leave to
amend because amendment would be futile. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF
Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review
and noting that district court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave to
amend where amendment would be futile).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration
because O’Connor failed to establish grounds for such relief. See D. Ariz. Loc. R.
7.2(g)(1) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration); Hilton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d
391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing application of local rules for an abuse of
discretion); see also Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and factors for
reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).
Defendants’ contention that O’Connor’s motion for reconsideration did not
constitute a tolling motion for purposes of filing her notice of appeal is
unpersuasive. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(4)(A)(iv) & (vi).
AFFIRMED.
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