County of Grant v. Daniel A. Vogt

2014 WI 76

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2012AP1812
COMPLETE TITLE: County of Grant,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Daniel A. Vogt,
Defendant-Appellant.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
346 Wis. 2d 551,830 N.W.2d 723
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)

OPINION FILED: July 18, 2014
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: January 9, 2014

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Grant
JUDGE: Robert VanDeHey

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED: ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur.
(Opinion filed.)
DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissent. (Opinion
filed.)
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there was a brief
by Anthony J. Pozorski Sr., assistant district attorney, and
Grant County, and oral argument by Anthony J. Pozorski Sr.

For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Jeffery
J. Scott, and Block, Scott & Heenan, LLC, Platteville, and oral
argument by Jeffery J. Scott.
 2014 WI 76
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2012AP1812
(L.C. No. 2012TR459 & 2012TR460)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

County of Grant,

Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
FILED
v.
JUL 18, 2014
Daniel A. Vogt,
Diane M. Fremgen
Defendant-Appellant. Clerk of Supreme Court

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.

¶1 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of an
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing a

decision of the Grant County Circuit Court, which found the

defendant guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

¶2 The case affords this court an opportunity to develop

the law on "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. The issue

presented is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a

law enforcement officer "seized" the defendant, Daniel Vogt

1
Cnty. of Grant v. Vogt, No. 2012AP1812, unpublished slip
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013).
 No. 2012AP1812

(Vogt), when he knocked on the driver's window of Vogt's vehicle

and asked Vogt to roll down the window. When Vogt complied, the

officer immediately smelled alcohol in the vehicle and noticed

Vogt's slurred speech, leading to an investigation and Vogt's

ultimate arrest. In these circumstances, did the officer

"seize" Vogt before the officer had probable cause or reasonable

suspicion to believe that Vogt committed an offense?

¶3 Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we

conclude that a law enforcement officer's knock on a car window

does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to

give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person

is not free to leave. The objective of law enforcement is to

protect and serve the community. Accordingly, an officer's

interactions with people are not automatically adversarial. A

court's "seizure" inquiry into one of these interactions must

examine the totality of the circumstances, seeking to identify

the line between an officer's reasonable attempt to have a

consensual conversation and a more consequential attempt to
detain an individual. The facts in this case do not show a

level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to

implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Vogt rolled down his

window and exposed the grounds for a seizure. Consequently, we

reverse.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 In the early morning of December 25, 2011, Deputy

Matthew Small (Deputy Small) of the Grant County Sheriff's
Department was on patrol duty in the Village of Cassville. The
2
 No. 2012AP1812

village is located on the Mississippi River, southwest of

Lancaster, the Grant County seat. In 2010 Cassville had a

population of 947. Around 1 a.m., Deputy Small observed a

vehicle on Prime Street turn west and pull into the parking lot

next to a closed park and boat landing on the Mississippi. He

did not observe any traffic violations but thought the driver's

conduct was suspicious.

¶5 Riverside Park closed at 11 p.m., but the adjacent

parking lot remained open. Deputy Small said, however, that

because of the time of year (Christmas), and because the park

was closed and there were no boats at the landing, he thought it

was odd for someone to be there.2

¶6 His curiosity piqued, Deputy Small pulled into the

parking lot and parked his marked squad car behind Vogt's

vehicle a little off to the driver's side. The squad car's

headlights were on, but its red and blue emergency lights were

not. Vogt's car was running and had its lights on as well.

Deputy Small said at the suppression hearing that he was not

2
The circuit court opined that it was reasonable for Deputy
Small to ask Vogt what he was doing. During the hearing on
Vogt's motion to suppress, the court commented, "I mean on one
hand, what the officer did seems perfectly reasonable. You
know, 2:00 in the morning, nobody's going to be launching a boat
on Christmas Day." At trial, the court reiterated the
reasonableness of Deputy Small's conduct when it noted that
"there is really not anything unreasonable with approaching a
vehicle at bar time and finding out why they're parked
at . . . a boat landing that apparently was not closed, but the
park next to it was closed."

3
 No. 2012AP1812

blocking the car and that the driver could have left, although

Daniel Vogt later disagreed.

¶7 Deputy Small got out of his squad car and walked up to

Vogt's window. He was in full uniform and had a pistol in his

side holster. There were two people in the vehicle: Vogt in the

driver's seat and Kimberly Russell (Russell) in the passenger's

seat. Deputy Small testified at the trial that he rapped on the

window but could not recall if the knock was hard or soft.3 He

also said that he motioned for Vogt to roll down the window and

that if Vogt had ignored him and driven away, Deputy Small would

have let him go because he "had nothing to stop him for."

¶8 When Vogt rolled down the window, Deputy Small asked

him what he was doing, and Vogt said that he was trying to

figure out his radio. Deputy Small said that Vogt's speech was

slurred and that he could smell intoxicants coming from inside

the vehicle. Deputy Small asked Vogt for his driver's license

and went back to his squad car. He turned on the red and blue

emergency lights and moved the squad car back and a little to
the left so that he could videotape the interaction. Deputy

Small asked Vogt to step out of the vehicle for a field sobriety

test, during which Vogt showed signs of intoxication. Deputy

Small then placed Vogt under arrest and transported him to the

Grant County Jail in Lancaster where Vogt submitted to an

evidentiary chemical test of his breath. The test indicated

3
Previously, at a suppression hearing, Deputy Small said he
could not remember whether the window was up or down but said
that he "may have knocked on the window."

4
 No. 2012AP1812

that Vogt had a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) of .19——

more than twice the legal limit. See Wis. Stat.

§ 340.01(46m)(a) (2011-12).4

¶9 Vogt was cited for operating a motor vehicle while

under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) and PAC contrary to

Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a).5 Because this was his first violation

of § 346.63(1)(a), it was a civil violation. See Wis. Stat.

§ 346.65(2)(am). Vogt filed a plea of not guilty on January 5,

2012. On February 29, 2012, he moved to suppress all evidence

obtained during his allegedly unlawful detention and arrest on

grounds that Deputy Small did not have reasonable suspicion to

conduct a traffic stop. The Grant County Circuit Court, Robert

P. VanDeHey, Judge, held a motion hearing on March 30, 2012,

during which Deputy Small was the only witness to testify.

¶10 The circuit court denied the motion to suppress in a

written order on April 23, 2012. Judge VanDeHey relied on the

seizure analysis articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446

U.S. 544, 554 (1980), and determined that Deputy Small's conduct
did not constitute a seizure. The circuit court noted:

Deputy Small did not draw his gun. His emergency
lights were not in operation. There is no showing
that he raised his voice. There is some evidence that
he impeded the operation of the defendant's automobile

4
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.
5
Although the PAC citation lists only Wis. Stat.
§ 346.63(1)(a) as the violated statute, the statute that
specifically prohibits driving with a prohibited alcohol
concentration is Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b).

5
 No. 2012AP1812

in that he initially parked somewhat to the side and
behind the vehicle and then had to re-position his
vehicle to conduct field sobriety tests. There is no
evidence that Deputy Small "commanded" Mr. Vogt to
roll down his window by tapping on the window and
motioning that he roll down his window.
Although the circuit court believed it was a close case, the

court denied the motion to suppress.

¶11 A trial to the court took place on July 5, 2012.

Vogt's passenger, Russell, testified that Deputy Small's rap on

the window was "hard" and that he said, "Give me your driver's
license." According to Russell, Deputy Small's voice "was

forceful," and he did not say "please" or "thank you." Russell

also described the parking lot. To the right of the vehicle

were a lit pop machine and the park. As Deputy Small said, the

squad car was behind Vogt's vehicle, a little closer to the

driver's side. The Mississippi River was in front of Vogt's

vehicle. Wisconsin Power & Light Company was on the left,6 and

Deputy Small was standing on the left side of Vogt's vehicle.

Russell thought that Vogt could not have ignored Deputy Small

and could not have left because there was nowhere for him to go.

¶12 Vogt testified that Deputy Small "rapped on the window

very loud" with his knuckles and told Vogt to open the window

without saying "please" or "would you." Vogt said that Deputy

Small's voice was commanding and that he did not think he had

any alternative to rolling down the window. Vogt said that he

6
Vogt admitted on cross-examination that Wisconsin Power &
Light Company was far enough away that it would not have
prevented him from turning left.

6
 No. 2012AP1812

could not have pulled forward and turned around, could not have

turned left without hitting Deputy Small, could not have turned

right without hitting the pop machine, and could not have backed

up because of the squad car. On cross-examination, Vogt

admitted that the boat landing was roughly 40 yards wide and

that the Mississippi River could have been 50 feet in front of

him. In the past, ice had washed up onto the parking lot, but

Vogt did not know how far it had washed up on December 25, 2011,

if at all. Vogt agreed that he had had too much to drink and

should not have been driving.

¶13 At the end of the trial, Vogt renewed his motion to

suppress. In making its decision, the circuit court noted that

there was a question as to whether Deputy Small verbally

commanded Vogt to roll down the window. The court said:

There is additional evidence today that was not
brought forth at the motion hearing, particularly that
the officer rapped loudly on the window and supposedly
commanded Mr. Vogt to roll down the window. That's
different than the officer's testimony who indicated
that he just wanted to see what was going on. He was
suspicious. Had Mr. Vogt decided to drive away, he
would have let him.

The officer also testified that he did not block
the vehicle in, that the vehicle could have gotten
around him. So there are a few factual distinctions
as far as the testimony. It's not a very bright line,
and I don't know how a driver knows the difference
between a command and a suggestion, particularly when
we're talking about a physical movement, the knocking
on the window.

To the extent that Mr. Vogt and Ms. Russell's
testimony differs from the officer's, the resolution
probably is somewhere in between, that the officer
wasn't as aggressive as the occupants of the vehicle

7
 No. 2012AP1812

thought, and maybe he wasn't quite as subtle as he
thought he was being. But the basic facts are that
there was [a] vehicle running at night at bar time.
The officer knocked on the window, rapped on the
window. There is a dispute as to whether there was
actually a verbal command after that. I don't know
that that's the case. Given that the vehicle was
running and the time of night and the officer's
initial testimony that he probably just knocked on the
window, that that seems to be the——well, at least the
consistent testimony.
Vogt's attorney interrupted to remind the court that at the

motion hearing, Deputy Small could not remember how he

approached Vogt. The court responded:

Yeah, and it was quoted in the decision, but I——his
testimony today was that it——if Mr. Vogt drove away,
he wasn't going to stop him. He had no reason to do
it, which would indicate that he wasn't commanding him
to do anything, is that he was simply trying to make
contact.
¶14 The circuit court found Vogt guilty of the OWI

violation and dismissed the PAC count. The court ordered a

forfeiture of $899, revoked Vogt's license for seven months,

ordered alcohol assessment and a driver safety plan, and entered

an order for a mandatory ignition interlock for one year. All

penalties were stayed pending appeal. The judgment of

conviction was filed on August 3, 2012, and Vogt filed a notice

of appeal on August 13, 2012.

¶15 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals

reversed the circuit court. Cnty. of Grant v. Vogt, No.

2012AP1812, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013).

The court of appeals determined that "when a uniformed officer
approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to roll

8
 No. 2012AP1812

down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel free

to ignore the officer." Id., ¶13. The court of appeals assumed

that Deputy Small "directed Vogt to roll down his window, rather

than asking him if he would do so." Id. Based on this

assumption, the court of appeals concluded that a reasonable

driver would not have felt free to leave, and therefore, Deputy

Small seized Vogt without reasonable suspicion. Id., ¶¶13-14.

¶16 The County of Grant petitioned this court for review,

which we granted on October 15, 2013.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17 Whether someone has been seized presents a two-part

standard of review. State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶17, 255

Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834. This court will uphold the circuit

court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but

the application of constitutional principles to those facts

presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Id. The

same standard of review applies to a motion to suppress. See

State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶19, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568.
III. DISCUSSION

¶18 Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, "The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S.

Const. amend. IV.7 The Wisconsin Constitution contains the same

7
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads in full:

9
 No. 2012AP1812

language,8 and "[w]e have historically interpreted the Wisconsin

Constitution's protections in this area identically to the

protections under the Fourth Amendment as defined by the United

States Supreme Court."9 State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶14, 327

Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97 (footnote omitted) (citation

omitted).

¶19 The law on searches and the law on seizures present

separate lines of analysis. With respect to the latter, the

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.
8
The Wisconsin Constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

Wis. Const. art. I, § 11.
9
While this court generally interprets the Wisconsin
Constitution to give the same protections as the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, we have determined
that the Wisconsin Constitution offers more protection than the
Fourth Amendment under the good faith exception, which does not
apply in this case. See State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶60, 245
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. Because we interpret the Wisconsin
Constitution to be coterminous with the United States
Constitution in this area, the analysis in this opinion applies
to both constitutions.

10
 No. 2012AP1812

Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin

Constitution are not implicated until a government agent

"seizes" a person. State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶23, 294

Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729. The reason is that not all personal

interactions between law enforcement officers and people

constitute a seizure. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552; Young, 294

Wis. 2d 1, ¶18 ("[N]ot all police-citizen contacts constitute a

seizure . . . .").

¶20 A seizure occurs "[o]nly when the officer, by means of

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained

the liberty of a citizen." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 (quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). As Justice Stewart

stated in Mendenhall, "a person has been 'seized' within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person

would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554

(footnote omitted).

¶21 When Mendenhall was written, Justice Stewart's lead
opinion was joined by only Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell

authored a concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Burger and

Justice Blackmun, in which he observed that "I do not

necessarily disagree with" Justice Stewart's standard, but "the

question whether the respondent . . . reasonably could have

thought she was free to 'walk away' when asked by two Government

agents for her driver's license and ticket is extremely close."

Id. at 560 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).

11
 No. 2012AP1812

¶22 The Court's tentative acceptance of Justice Stewart's

standard has since been bolstered and confirmed. INS v.

Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215-17 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.

491, 497, 502-04 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Kaupp v.

Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629-30 (2003); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.

429, 434-35 (1991); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-

28 (1991); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988);

Delgado, 466 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., concurring in part,

dissenting in part) (citations omitted) ("A majority of the

Court has since adopted [the Mendenhall] formula as the

appropriate standard for determining when inquiries made by the

police cross the boundary separating merely consensual

encounters from forcible stops to investigate a suspected

crime.").

¶23 After articulating the test for determining when a

seizure takes place, Justice Stewart went on to list some

examples of circumstances that might suggest a seizure: "the

threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of

the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating

that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citations omitted); see Kaupp, 538

U.S. at 630. Justice Stewart stated that without similar

evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he

or she was not free to leave, an interaction with law

enforcement is not a seizure as a matter of law. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 555 (stating that "inoffensive contact between a
12
 No. 2012AP1812

member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law,

amount to a seizure of that person").

¶24 The Supreme Court provided further guidance in

Delgado, when it stated that "police questioning, by itself, is

unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation. While most

citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people

do so, and do so without being told they are free not to

respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the

response." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (citing Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-34 (1973)). The Court then

adopted the Mendenhall standard and stated that there is no

seizure "[u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so

intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would

have believed he was not free to leave." Id.

¶25 The rule that a seizure occurs only when law

enforcement restrains a person's liberty by show of authority

advances the goals of the Fourth Amendment:

The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to
eliminate all contact between the police and the
citizenry, but "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals." United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 [(1976)]. As
long as the person to whom questions are put remains
free to disregard the questions and walk away, there
has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or
privacy as would under the Constitution require some
particularized and objective justification.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54. To facilitate these goals, the

test is objective and "calls for consistent application from one
police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular

13
 No. 2012AP1812

individual's response to the actions of the police."

Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.

¶26 To sum up, there are countless interactions or

encounters among police and members of the community. Not all

encounters are seizures, and these non-seizure encounters are

not governed by the Fourth Amendment. Other interactions or

encounters are seizures and are subject to Fourth Amendment

criteria. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on the line

between seizures and mere encounters as well as the

reasonableness of the police/citizen interactions that do

constitute seizures.

¶27 There are two kinds of permissible seizures. Young,

294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20. A Terry stop is an investigatory stop for

which a law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion

"in light of his experience that criminal activity may be

afoot."10 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20;

State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 57, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). An

10
The standards for a Terry stop are codified in the
Wisconsin Statutes:

After having identified himself or herself as a
law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may
stop a person in a public place for a reasonable
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects
that such person is committing, is about to commit or
has committed a crime, and may demand the name and
address of the person and an explanation of the
person’s conduct. Such detention and temporary
questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where
the person was stopped.

Wis. Stat. § 968.24.

14
 No. 2012AP1812

officer has reasonable suspicion when he "possesses specific and

articulable facts which would warrant a reasonable belief that

criminal activity was afoot." Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55

(citing State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377

(1972)).

¶28 The second kind of permissible seizure is an arrest,

which normally involves "a trip to the station house and

prosecution for crime." Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22 (quoting

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16). To make an arrest, a law enforcement

officer must have probable cause to believe that the person

arrested has committed a crime. Id. That is, the officer must

"have sufficient knowledge at the time of the arrest to 'lead a

reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably

committed or was committing a crime.'" Id. (quoting State v.

Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999)).

¶29 In the present case, neither type of permissible

seizure came into play until Vogt opened the window and Deputy

Small detected signs of intoxication. Deputy Small may have had
a savvy hunch that the driver of the Vogt vehicle had been

drinking. But a savvy hunch is not equivalent to the reasonable

suspicion that would have justified a Terry-type temporary

detention. Because Deputy Small did not have reasonable

suspicion to believe Vogt was operating while intoxicated until

after Vogt opened his window, we must determine whether Vogt was

seized before his window was rolled down.

A. Wisconsin Seizure Law

15
 No. 2012AP1812

¶30 This court has adopted the Mendenhall test for

determining whether a seizure took place, and it is the proper

test for this case. Id., ¶37 ("Mendenhall is the appropriate

test for situations where the question is whether a person

submitted to a police show of authority because, under all the

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person

would not have felt free to leave."). The test is objective and

considers whether an innocent reasonable person, rather than the

specific defendant, would feel free to leave under the

circumstances. See Williams, 255 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23.

¶31 The seizure test is necessarily objective,11 but it is

complicated by the tendency of people to defer to a symbol of

authority no matter how it is manifested. A badge might imbue

an officer's request with intimidation in the mind of some

persons, but the law must be more discerning. In most cases it

is important for courts conducting a Fourth Amendment seizure

analysis to distinguish between a person's individual

predisposition, which might lead the person to consent to an

11
The test must be objective because "any test intended to
determine what street encounters are not seizures must be
expressed in terms that can be understood and applied by the
officer. Asking him to determine whether the suspect feels free
to leave, however 'would require a prescience neither the police
nor anyone else possesses.'" 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.4(a), at 568 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting United States
v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969)).

16
 No. 2012AP1812

officer's inquiry, and an officer's objective conduct.12 To

their credit, citizens and others may feel tethered by social

norms to an officer's request and may consent in order to avoid

the taboo of disrespecting an officer of the law. However, a

person's consent is no less valid simply because an individual

is particularly susceptible to social or ethical pressures.13

Were it otherwise, officers would be hesitant to approach anyone

for fear that the individual would feel "seized" and that any

question asked, however innocuous, would lead to a violation of

the Fourth Amendment. Thus, when determining whether an

individual was seized, we must replace the individual with the

12
See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 228 (1984) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the
seizure analysis "properly looks not to the subjective
impressions of the person questioned but rather to the objective
characteristics of the encounter which may suggest whether or
not a reasonable person would believe that he remained free
during the course of the questioning to disregard the questions
and walk away") (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2,
at 52 (1978)).
13
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a), at 581
(5th ed. 2012) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that law
enforcement "should be allowed 'to seek cooperation, even where
this may involve inconvenience or embarrassment for the citizen,
and even though many citizens will defer to this authority of
the police because they believe——in some vague way——that they
should.'") (quoting Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 258
(1975)).

17
 No. 2012AP1812

paradigmatic reasonable person and focus on the officer's

conduct under the totality of the circumstances.14

¶32 Although we have established the proper standards for

seizure cases, this court has not yet considered whether a

person is necessarily seized within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment when a law enforcement officer knocks on the window of

the person's vehicle. However, we have expressed reluctance to

determine that pulling up behind a car and "present[ing] indicia

of police authority" automatically constitutes a seizure.

Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶65, 69 ("[N]ot every display of police

authority rises to a 'show of authority' that constitutes a

seizure."). In Young, the officer stopped his squad car in the

middle of the street behind the defendant's car, which was

parked on the side of the street. Id., ¶10. The officer shined

his spotlight on the defendant's vehicle and turned on his

emergency flashers, but he did not activate his red and blue

emergency lights. Id. This court was reluctant to label the

officer's conduct a "seizure," in part because he did not stop

14
To some extent, the "reasonable person" here is a legal
fiction. That defendants often consent to searches of areas
that reveal incriminating evidence demonstrates that people
often do not feel free to decline an officer's request, even
absent a manifest show of authority. However, the reasonable
person standard is necessary if the inquiry is to remain
objective. The value of objective standards in this area cannot
be gainsaid because the alternative is to equate the innocuous
to the arbitrary and substantially limit the role of law
enforcement in the community.

18
 No. 2012AP1812

the defendant's car (it was parked already),15 and the officer

did not use his red and blue emergency lights. Id., ¶¶66, 68-

69. We did not have to decide in Young whether the officer's

conduct was a seizure, but the case demonstrates that not all

manifestations of authority will result in a seizure.

B. Decisions from Other Jurisdictions

¶33 Several jurisdictions outside Wisconsin have

determined that knocking on a vehicle's window does not

necessarily constitute a seizure.16 We discuss some of these

factually similar cases below.

15
In contrast, we determined that an impermissible seizure
occurred when officers stopped a moving vehicle without
reasonable suspicion by blocking its path with an unmarked squad
car. State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 247, 258-59, 263, 557
N.W.2d 245 (1996).
16
See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d 1070 (8th
Cir. 2005) (no seizure when officer got out of his squad car,
shined a flashlight on his uniform and kept a hand on his gun as
he approached the defendant and knocked on the defendant's
vehicle window three separate times until defendant opened the
window); Ex parte Betterton, 527 So. 2d 747, 748-50 (Ala. 1988)
(determining that it was not a seizure when an officer
approached a parked car and knocked on the driver's window);
State v. Cerrillo, 93 P.3d 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (officer
knocking on vehicle window to wake up sleeping occupants and
requesting driver's license was not a seizure); Custer v. State,
135 P.3d 620, 625-26 (Wyo. 2006) (no seizure when officer
knocked on vehicle window twice to get defendant's attention).
But see State v. Patterson, 868 A.2d 188, 192-93 (Me. 2005)
(concluding that officer's knock on a car window and an order to
roll down the window constituted a seizure, although a mere
request might have led to a different result); Williams v. State
Dep't of Safety, 854 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(determining that an officer's knock on a car window violated
the Fourth Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion).

19
 No. 2012AP1812

¶34 In State v. Randle, 276 P.3d 732 (Idaho Ct. App.

2012), an officer saw the defendant's "vehicle alone in a

parking lot with its front-end abutting a grassy knoll." Id. at

733. The officer parked about two car lengths behind the

defendant, left the headlights of his squad car on, and knocked

on the defendant's window. Id. The defendant opened the door,

and the officer noticed two open beer cans in the cup holder.

Id. The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath and

decided to conduct a field sobriety test, which the defendant

failed. Id. at 734. In considering the defendant's motion to

suppress the evidence of intoxication, the circuit court

determined that even though he could not pull forward, the

defendant could have backed up and driven away and was not

seized. Id. at 737. The court of appeals agreed, stating:

After this review of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the encounter between Randle
and the officer, we conclude that, when the officer
parked behind Randle's vehicle, left the patrol car's
headlights on, approached Randle's vehicle and knocked
on the window, such conduct would not have
communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was
not at liberty to ignore the officer's presence and go
about his or her business.

Both cited cases that have determined that the
circumstances surrounding an officer's knock on a vehicle window
constituted a seizure are readily distinguishable. In
Patterson, the court determined that the officer commanded the
driver to roll down the window instead of merely making a
request. Patterson, 868 A.2d at 192-93. The court in Williams
did not conduct a seizure analysis and instead ended the inquiry
when it determined that the officers did not have a reasonable
suspicion to knock on the vehicle window. Williams, 854 S.W.2d
at 105-07. Therefore, neither case provides persuasive guidance
for this court.

20
 No. 2012AP1812

Id. at 738.

¶35 In State v. Steffes, 791 N.W.2d 633 (N.D. 2010), an

officer responded to a tip that a man who appeared intoxicated

was entering a vehicle in the parking lot of a bar. Id. at 634.

The officer arrived and parked far enough from Steffes' vehicle

so that Steffes could leave the parking spot if he wanted. Id.

Steffes was sitting in the driver's seat holding a cell phone,

and the radio was playing loudly. Id. at 635. The officer

"tapped on the driver's side window and with his finger motioned

downward indicating he wanted Steffes to lower the window." Id.

Steffes looked at the officer but did not respond, so the

officer knocked again. Id. At that point, Steffes opened the

door slightly and began to talk with the officer. Id.

¶36 While the two were talking, another officer arrived.

Id. When the first officer asked Steffes for his driver's

license, Steffes said that he did not have it with him and gave

a fake name and birthdate. Id. Steffes was charged with

providing false information to a law enforcement officer and
moved to suppress on grounds that he was unlawfully seized. Id.

The district court denied the motion and entered judgment on

Steffes' conditional guilty plea. Id. On appeal, Steffes

argued that the officer's second knock, oral request, and hand

gesture constituted a seizure. Id. at 636. The Supreme Court

of North Dakota noted that the officer did not turn on the red

and blue emergency lights, did not block Steffes' car, and did

not display authority. Id. Therefore, Steffes was not seized.
Id. at 637.
21
 No. 2012AP1812

¶37 In State v. Bryant, 161 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App. 2005),

around 2:00 a.m., an officer noticed the defendant's car turn

into a shopping center in which the businesses were closed. Id.

at 760, 762. The officer pulled into the parking lot, got out

of his patrol car, and knocked on the defendant's window. Id.

When the defendant opened his car door, the officer smelled

alcohol and arrested the defendant for driving while

intoxicated. Id. The circuit court suppressed the evidence of

intoxication because the defendant did not violate any traffic

laws, and the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to

approach the defendant's car and knock on the window. Id. at

761. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the

officer "was not required to have reasonable suspicion that [the

defendant] was engaged in criminal activity to approach [the

defendant's] car and knock on his window." Id. at 762. Thus,

the interaction "did not become an investigative detention until

after [the defendant] opened his car door." Id.

¶38 These cases demonstrate that when an officer parks
near a person's vehicle, gets out, and knocks on the person's

window, the officer has not necessarily displayed sufficient

authority to cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she

22
 No. 2012AP1812

was not free to leave.17 While a person is not automatically

seized by a knock on the window, or even a supplementary

request, the seizure inquiry looks at the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the officer has effected a

detention. Thus, we turn to the facts of the case before us to

determine whether Vogt was unlawfully seized.

C. The Interaction Between Vogt and Deputy Small

¶39 Vogt's argument focuses mainly on Deputy Small's

conduct before Vogt opened the window. Once the window was open

and Deputy Small smelled intoxicants and detected Vogt's slurred

speech, Deputy Small had reasonable suspicion that Vogt was

operating his vehicle while intoxicated. Before that point, the

parties agree that Deputy Small did not have reasonable

suspicion to stop Vogt. Thus, the question for this court is

whether Deputy Small seized Vogt at any time before Vogt rolled

down his window. We conclude that he did not.

¶40 Vogt suggests that the seizure occurred when Deputy

Small knocked on the window and "commanded" Vogt to roll down
the window. Vogt admits that Deputy Small did not seize him by

17
See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a), at
574-77 (5th ed. 2012) (footnotes omitted) ("[I]f an officer
merely walks up to a person standing or sitting in a public
place (or, indeed, who is seated in a vehicle located in a
public place) and puts a question to him, this alone does not
constitute a seizure."). In addition, "The officer may tap on
the window and perhaps even open the door if the occupant is
asleep. A request that the suspect open the door or roll down
the window would seem equally permissible, but the same would
not be true of an order that he do so." Id., § 9.4(a), at 594-
95 (footnotes omitted).

23
 No. 2012AP1812

following him into the parking lot. He admits that Deputy Small

did not seize him by getting out of his squad car and would not

have seized him by walking around Vogt's car and looking through

the windows. However, Vogt takes issue with the location of

Deputy Small's car and his conduct at Vogt's window. In

claiming that a seizure took place, Vogt highlights several

alleged facts: (1) Deputy Small parked right behind Vogt's

vehicle; (2) "the location of Mr. Vogt's vehicle in the parking

lot was not conducive to simply driving away"; (3) Deputy Small

commanded Vogt to roll down the window; and (4) Deputy Small

rapped loudly on the window.

¶41 Even taken together, these facts do not demonstrate

that Vogt was seized. Although Deputy Small parked directly

behind Vogt and allegedly there were obstacles on three sides of

Vogt's vehicle, these facts do not demonstrate that Vogt was

seized because he still could have driven away. The circuit

court did not explicitly find that Vogt had room to leave the

parking lot, but "if a circuit court fails to make a finding
that exists in the record, an appellate court can assume that

the circuit court determined the fact in a manner that supports

the circuit court's ultimate decision." State v. Martwick, 2000

WI 5, ¶31, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (citing Sohns v.

Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960)). The

appellate court is entrusted to make that assumption "only when

evidence exists in the record to support the 'assumed fact.'"

Id., ¶74 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). The record supports
the assumption that Vogt had room to leave.
24
 No. 2012AP1812

¶42 Although Deputy Small pulled up behind Vogt's vehicle,

there was testimony at trial that Vogt might have had 50 feet in

front of him in which he could have pulled forward and turned

around. In addition, the video from the camera in Deputy

Small's squad car shows ample room for the car to move forward.

There was some discussion about ice washing up onto the lot in

the past; however, there is no ice visible on the video and no

evidence that there actually was ice on December 25, 2011.

Thus, we assume that because the circuit court determined that a

reasonable person in Vogt's circumstances would have felt free

to leave, there was an avenue by which Vogt could have actually

left. Like the defendant in Randle who was not seized simply

because the grassy knoll limited his exit options, Randle, 276

P.3d at 733, 738, Vogt was not seized simply because there was

only one way out of the parking lot.

¶43 Vogt's assertion that he was seized because of Deputy

Small's "command" to roll down the window also is unpersuasive.

The circuit court found in its decision on the motion to
suppress that "[t]here is no evidence that Deputy Small

'commanded' Mr. Vogt to roll down his window by tapping on the

window and motioning that he roll down his window." At trial,

the court found that Deputy Small's testimony "would indicate

that he wasn't commanding [Vogt] to do anything, . . . that he

was simply trying to make contact." Even though the circuit

court noted that Deputy Small maybe "wasn't quite as subtle as

he thought he was being," the court still determined that Deputy
Small's conduct was not so intimidating as to constitute a
25
 No. 2012AP1812

seizure. Thus, Vogt's arguments that he was seized due to a

"command" from Deputy Small are unavailing.18

¶44 Vogt also emphasizes the loudness of the knock in

arguing that he was seized. Although the seizure analysis

considers the totality of the circumstances, the volume of the

knock generally will not play a significant roll in the

analysis. We live in a time of distraction where earbuds

connected to smartphones or other music devices are commonplace.

Vehicles may be outfitted with sophisticated stereo systems. It

might be necessary for an officer to motion or to knock in order

to attract the attention of a person with whom he would like to

speak if the person is willing. To prescribe the types of

permissible attention-getting gestures or the allowable volume

of a knock would be an unrealistic venture. A knock might sound

loud to an unsuspecting vehicle occupant, but that alone does

not mean the occupant has been seized.

¶45 Vogt also implies that the fact that he was in a

vehicle affects the analysis because if he had left, he might
have been charged with obstruction. Vogt's argument implicitly

18
The court of appeals decided to assume that Deputy Small
"commanded" Vogt to roll down the window. Cnty. of Grant v.
Vogt, No. 2012AP1812, unpublished slip op., ¶13 (Wis. Ct. App.
Mar. 14, 2013). After noting that there was a discrepancy
between Deputy Small's and Vogt's testimony, the court of
appeals said that "those distinctions are not determinative in
this case because without clarification, we must assume that the
officer directed Vogt to roll down his window, rather than
asking him if he would do so." Id. Because the circuit court
made findings that Deputy Small did not command Vogt and
determined Vogt was not seized, the court of appeals' assumption
was not correct.

26
 No. 2012AP1812

suggests that Wis. Stat. § 346.04,19 which prohibits a driver

from ignoring a signal from a traffic officer, limited Vogt's

ability to drive away. At oral argument, the County of Grant

pointed out that Wis. Stat. § 346.04 is inapplicable because it

applies only to highways. We agree.

¶46 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.02(1) is clear: "This chapter

applies exclusively upon highways except as otherwise expressly

provided in this chapter." The term, "highways," does not

include public parking lots. 65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1976)

(OAG 45-47). A 1957 legislative committee note to Wis. Stat.

19
Wisconsin Stat. § 346.04 provides:

(1) No person shall fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order, signal or direction of a
traffic officer.

(2) No operator of a vehicle shall disobey the
instructions of any official traffic sign or signal
unless otherwise directed by a traffic officer.

(2t) No operator of a vehicle, after having
received a visible or audible signal to stop his or
her vehicle from a traffic officer or marked police
vehicle, shall knowingly resist the traffic officer by
failing to stop his or her vehicle as promptly as
safety reasonably permits.

(3) No operator of a vehicle, after having
received a visual or audible signal from a traffic
officer, or marked police vehicle, shall knowingly
flee or attempt to elude any traffic officer by
willful or wanton disregard of such signal so as to
interfere with or endanger the operation of the police
vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or
pedestrians, nor shall the operator increase the speed
of the operator's vehicle or extinguish the lights of
the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee.

27
 No. 2012AP1812

§ 346.61 is "highly persuasive evidence of legislative intent

that public parking lots are not highways for the purpose of

enforcement of ch. 346, Stats., generally." Id. at 46.

¶47 The exceptions alluded to in the phrase "except as

otherwise expressly provided in this chapter" are the exceptions

found in Wis. Stat. § 346.61, namely, §§ 346.62 to 346.64

(reckless driving and drunken driving). These exceptions apply

beyond the limitation of "highways" and thus may be applied in

public parking lots. However, these exceptions do not include

Wis. Stat. § 346.04, which applies "exclusively upon highways."

Thus, Vogt could have driven out of the parking lot without

violating § 346.04.

¶48 If Deputy Small had pursued Vogt and ordered him to

stop once he left the parking lot, Vogt could have pulled over

to comply. But stopping a moving vehicle is indisputably a

seizure, State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245

(1996), and requires Fourth Amendment analysis.

¶49 In any event, Vogt cannot speculate about what might
have happened if he had tried to leave. See Delgado, 466 U.S.

at 220-21 (stating that defendants "may only litigate what

happened to them"). In short, § 346.04 does not support Vogt's

argument. We need not decide whether § 346.04 would affect the

seizure analysis if Deputy Small had encountered Vogt on a

highway. However, § 346.04 does not apply to the facts as we

know them.

¶50 To support his arguments, Vogt cites an unpublished
court of appeals decision involving an interaction between a
28
 No. 2012AP1812

person in a vehicle and two police officers. See City of

Kenosha v. Tower, No. 2009AP1957, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct.

App. Oct. 6, 2010). In Tower, two bike patrol officers

approached the defendant's van, which was stopped with the

engine running on the side of the street where there was a "no

parking" sign. Id., ¶2. Immediately after making contact with

the defendant, the officers ordered her to "put the vehicle in

'park.'" Id. The officers noticed signs of intoxication, and

eventually, because the defendant refused to provide a breath

sample, her license was revoked. Id., ¶¶2-4. On appeal, the

city appeared to acknowledge that a seizure occurred and focused

on whether there was reasonable suspicion. Id., ¶¶7, 11

("Because the City argues this was a valid Terry stop, on appeal

we need only address whether the facts known to the officers,

considered together as a totality of the circumstances, provided

them the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify stopping

Tower."). Thus, Tower does not support Vogt's argument because

the question in that case was whether there was reasonable
suspicion, not whether the defendant was seized.

¶51 Ultimately, what Deputy Small did in this case is what

any traffic officer might have done: investigate an unusual

situation. As the circuit court noted, "what the officer did

seems perfectly reasonable." Deputy Small was acting as a

conscientious officer. He saw what he thought was suspicious

behavior and decided to take a closer look. Even though Vogt's

conduct may not have been sufficiently suspect to raise
reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot, it was reasonable
29
 No. 2012AP1812

for Deputy Small to try to learn more about the situation by

engaging Vogt in a consensual conversation.20

¶52 The Fourth Amendment's prerequisites for a seizure are

intended to safeguard the privacy of all persons; thus, a mere

hunch is not enough to condone a seizure. See Terry, 392 U.S.

at 27. Yet, while the law applicable to the facts of this case

does not condone a seizure, it does not forestall an officer's

reasonable attempt at further inquiry. In similar

circumstances, a person has the choice to refuse an officer's

attempt to converse and thereby retain his privacy, or respond

by talking to the officer and aiding the officer in his duty to

protect the public. A dutiful officer does not make a mistake

by presenting a person with that choice. Only when the officer

forecloses the choice by the way in which he exercises his

authority——absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause——does

he violate the Fourth Amendment.

¶53 Although it may have been Vogt's social instinct to

open his window in response to Deputy Small's knock, a
reasonable person in Vogt's situation would have felt free to

leave. As several jurisdictions have recognized, a law

enforcement officer's knock on a vehicle window does not

automatically constitute a seizure. The circumstances attendant

to the knock in the present case are not so intimidating as to

20
See Barry, 394 F.3d at 1075 (citation omitted) (stating
that the officer "probably would have been remiss had he ignored
the vehicle parked in an alley behind closed stores at 11:18
p.m.").

30
 No. 2012AP1812

transform the knock into a seizure. None of the examples

outlined by Justice Stewart as demonstrating a seizure are

present in this case. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55. Vogt

was not subject to the threatening presence of multiple

officers. Deputy Small did not brandish any weapon. There is

no evidence that Deputy Small touched Vogt, and as discussed

above, Deputy Small did not speak in a way that would suggest

Vogt was compelled to roll down the window. While the facts of

Justice Stewart's examples need not be present for there to be a

seizure, the facts in this case are not sufficient to

demonstrate that a reasonable person would not feel free to

leave. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, Vogt

was not seized.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶54 Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we

conclude that a law enforcement officer's knock on a car window

does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to

give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person
is not free to leave. The objective of law enforcement is to

protect and serve the community. Accordingly, an officer's

interactions with people are not automatically adversarial. A

court's "seizure" inquiry into one of these interactions must

examine the totality of the circumstances, seeking to identify

the line between an officer's reasonable attempt to have a

consensual conversation and a more consequential attempt to

detain an individual. The facts in this case do not show a
level of intimidation or exercise of authority sufficient to
31
 No. 2012AP1812

implicate the Fourth Amendment until after Vogt rolled down his

window and exposed the grounds for a seizure. Consequently, we

reverse.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed.

32
 No. 2012AP1812.akz

¶55 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (concurring). I join

the majority opinion, but concur and go further to conclude that

even if a seizure were to have occurred, the officer was acting

as a community caretaker at the time of the seizure.

¶56 "Officers may exercise two types of functions: law

enforcement functions and community caretaker functions." State

v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶18, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592

(citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). Officers

acting in their community caretaker capacity "may be

constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches and

seizures." Id., ¶14 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 448; State v.

Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, ¶14, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707

N.W.2d 565). The exception exists, in part, because "'[a]n

officer less willing to discharge community caretaking functions

implicates seriously undesirable consequences for society at

large.'" Id., ¶33 (quoting State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177,

¶18, 238 Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508).
¶57 An officer is engaged in a "bona fide community

caretaker function" only if that officer has "an objectively

reasonable basis" to conclude "that a motorist may have been in

need of assistance" at the time of the stop. State v. Kramer,

2009 WI 14, ¶¶36-37, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. Further,

the exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied only if

"the officer's exercise of a bona fide community caretaker

function was reasonable." Id., ¶40 (citing State v. Kelsey
C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶35, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777). This

1
 No. 2012AP1812.akz

requires courts to "balanc[e] a public interest or need that is

furthered by the officer's conduct against the degree of and

nature of the restriction upon the liberty interest of the

citizen." Id. In balancing these interests, courts consider

the following factors:

(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3)
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the
availability, feasibility and effectiveness of
alternatives to the type of intrusion actually
accomplished.
Id., ¶41.

¶58 With respect to the first factor, "the public has a

substantial interest in ensuring that police assist motorists

who may be stranded . . . ." Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶42.

Police assistance to motorists is "'not only authorized, but

constitute[s] an important duty of law enforcement officers.'"

Id. (quoting State v. Goebel, 103 Wis. 2d 203, 208, 307

N.W.2d 915 (1981)). Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of

the reasonableness of Officer Small's exercise of the community

caretaker function.

¶59 With respect to the second factor, Officer Small was

checking on the occupants of a vehicle parked at the top of a

boat ramp in a closed park at approximately 1:00 on Christmas

2
 No. 2012AP1812.akz

morning.1 The presence of the vehicle in a closed park, at that

hour, and at that time of the year, was unusual at a minimum.

Under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively

reasonable for Officer Small to conclude that the occupants of

the vehicle might be in need of assistance.2 Further, as the

majority opinion properly notes, Officer Small used a minimum of

overt authority and force in contacting the driver of the

vehicle. Majority op., ¶¶40-44. The second factor thus weighs

in favor of the reasonableness of Officer Small's conduct.

¶60 The third factor also militates in favor of finding

that Officer Small acted reasonably, as the case at issue

involves an automobile. See Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶44. As

this court has stated, "a citizen has a lesser expectation of

privacy in an automobile," and so the privacy interest at issue

weighs less heavily against the officer. Ziedonis, 287

Wis. 2d 831, ¶31.

¶61 Finally, in considering the fourth factor, Officer

Small had no other reasonable alternatives for discharging his

1
As a practical matter, Vogt's presence in the parking lot
after the park had closed was quite possibly illegal. Vogt
concedes that the park was closed, and that a posted sign
indicated that it was illegal to enter the park after closing.
Grant County Ordinances § 200-2 gives a broad definition of
"park" that would seem to encompass the parking lot.
2
While Officer Small testified that he thought the vehicle
was "suspicious," we have held that when "'an objectively
reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown,
that determination is not negated by the officer's subjective
law enforcement concerns.'" State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶31
n.11, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (quoting State v. Kramer,
2009 WI 14, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598).

3
 No. 2012AP1812.akz

community caretaker function. See Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶45.

Officer Small had to contact the driver of the vehicle in order

to determine whether he was in need of assistance. As

discussed, the manner of that contact was reasonable. The

fourth factor thus weighs in Officer Small's favor as well.

Thus, I conclude that Officer Small's conduct in the case at

issue was a reasonable exercise of his community caretaker

function.

¶62 Indeed, not only was Officer Small's checking on the

occupants of the vehicle objectively reasonable, we also expect

our officers to react to such situations in this way and not sit

idly by with the hope that the occupants will be safe.

¶63 The facts in the case at issue are essentially

identical to those in Kramer. Officer Small did not act in an

overbearing or excessively intrusive manner. His behavior was

constitutionally permissible. Officer Small simply walked up to

the driver's side window of the vehicle to initiate contact with

the driver. Under the circumstances presented, his action was
"the only reasonable approach that [the officer] could take in

performing this community caretaker function." Kramer, 315

Wis. 2d 414, ¶44. As a result, I conclude that Officer Small's

conduct was justified under the community caretaker exception.

¶64 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.

¶65 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE

ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence.

4
 No. 2012AP1812.ssa

¶66 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting). I would

affirm the decision of the court of appeals holding that the

officer's conduct in the instant case constituted a seizure of

the defendant within the meaning of the federal and state

constitutions.

¶67 No one disputes that the legal standard to be applied

to determine whether a seizure occurred in the instant case is

as follows: "[A] seizure occurs if 'in view of all of the

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person

would have believed that he was not free to leave.'"1

¶68 The dispute is about the application of the legal

standard to the totality of the circumstances of the instant

case.2

1
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (quoting
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).

See also majority op., ¶30; State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94,
¶23, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834.
2
The totality of the circumstances is important. A small
variation in the circumstances often determines the outcome.
See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 9.4(a), at 594-95 (5th ed. 2013):

[T]he mere approach and questioning of [persons seated
in parked vehicles] does not constitute a seizure.
The result is not otherwise when the officer utilizes
some generally accepted means of gaining the attention
of the vehicle occupant or encouraging him to
eliminate any barrier to conversation. The officer
may tap on the window and perhaps even open the door
if the occupant is asleep. A request that the suspect
open the door or roll down the window would seem
equally permissible, but the same would not be true of
1
 No. 2012AP1812.ssa

¶69 Here are the circumstances: It was late at night; the

parking lot was empty; Deputy Small was in full uniform with his

pistol fully visible; the deputy parked his squad car with

headlights on right behind the defendant's vehicle; the location

of the defendant's vehicle in the parking lot was not conducive

to simply driving away; Deputy Small rapped loudly on the

window; Deputy Small signaled the defendant to roll down the

window.

¶70 Courts across the country have divided when confronted

with facts substantially similar to the ones in the instant

case.3 Why? Because courts engage in a fiction in determining

whether the mythical reasonable person in the position of the

defendant would have believed that he or she was not free to

leave.4

¶71 Studies demonstrate that the reasonable person "free

to leave" standard applied in judicial decisions does not

generally reflect what real, everyday people think and how they

an order that he do so (footnotes omitted, emphasis
added).
3
See several cases described in majority op., ¶¶33-38.
4
See majority op., ¶31 n.14.

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 No. 2012AP1812.ssa

act when approached by law enforcement officers.5 In short, the

world of legal decisions does not reflect the real world. As

Professor LaFave has written, the United States Supreme Court

finds "a perceived freedom [to leave] in circumstances when only

the most thick-skinned of suspects would think such a choice was

open to them."6

¶72 When I look to the totality of the circumstances in

the instant case, I conclude that, under the circumstances, a

reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. A

reasonable person would have had three options: (1) to drive

away; (2) to stay put with the window closed; or (3) to comply

with the officer's directions.

¶73 No reasonable person I can imagine would feel free to

drive away under the circumstances of the present case when the

5
See, e.g., David K. Kessler, Free To Leave: An Empirical
Look at the Fourth Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 51 (2009) (concluding that the average person does
not feel free to leave simple interactions with police officers,
based on empirical evidence from studying two scenarios in which
the United States Supreme Court has held that a reasonable
person would feel free to leave, on public sidewalks and on
busses); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for
Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 437, 439-42 (1988) (describing the
"free to leave" test as artificial, resulting in outcomes "which
bear little relationship to the individual's actual freedom to
walk away"); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and
the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153 (2002)
(criticizing broadly the Court's post-Mendenhall jurisprudence
as ignorant of human behavior with respect to authority figures,
creating a set of non-seizures that nonetheless relied upon the
coercive force of law enforcement).
6
Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous
Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev.
729, 739-40.

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officer knocked on the car window and instructed the person to

roll down the car window. A reasonable person would be

concerned that driving away could be viewed as violating some

law that governs obstructing an officer, disobeying an officer,

or fleeing.

¶74 No reasonable person I can imagine would feel free to

simply stay put with the car window closed for substantially the

same reasons that no reasonable person would have just driven

off.

¶75 As the court of appeals wrote, "when a uniformed

officer approaches a vehicle at night and directs the driver to

roll down his or her window, a reasonable driver would not feel

free to ignore the officer." County of Grant v. Vogt, No.

2012AP1812, unpublished slip op. ¶13 (Wis. Ct. App. March 14,

2013).

¶76 Before I conclude, I address the community caretaker

function that the concurrence addresses.

¶77 Exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be
carefully delineated. "The State bears the burden of proving

that the officer's conduct fell within the scope of a reasonable

community caretaker function." State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14,

¶17, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (citation omitted). The

State in the instant case never met or attempted to meet this

burden.

¶78 The concurring opinion concludes, "Under the totality

of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for Officer
Small to conclude that the occupants of the vehicle might be in

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need of assistance." Concurrence, ¶59. But neither the

officer's testimony nor the State's arguments demonstrate that

the officer ever came to that conclusion or that that conclusion

is objectively reasonable on the basis of this record. Overall,

the concurring opinion relies on a wholly speculative premise.

¶79 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

¶80 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH

BRADLEY joins this dissent.

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