IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0024
Filed February 14, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR STORY COUNTY,
Defendant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Story County, Timothy J.
Finn, Judge.
The district court determined a sex offender was eligible for
modification of his offender registration obligation. The State filed a
petition for writ of certiorari. WRIT ANNULLED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John R. Lundquist,
Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
Andrew J. Boettger of Hastings, Gartin & Boettger, LLP, Ames, for
defendant.
2
HECHT, Justice.
An individual convicted of a sex offense sought modification of his
sex offender registration obligation. After determining the individual met
the requirements of the statutory registration modification provision, the
district court granted modification and ordered the individual removed
from the offender registry. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
contending the district court erred in determining the individual was
eligible for modification under the provision. We granted the petition and
transferred the case to the court of appeals. On further review of the
decision of the court of appeals, we annul the writ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
David Buchwald was eighteen years old when he pleaded guilty to
a single count of lascivious acts with a child in February 2002.
Buchwald was sentenced and incarcerated as an adult. Upon his release
from prison in April 2004, Buchwald was required to register as a sex
offender for ten years under the then-existing version of Iowa’s sex
offender registry statute. He registered and remained on the registry
without incident until he petitioned for modification of his requirement in
February 2011.
Iowa’s legislature amended the registry statute significantly in
2009 and added a provision under which persons subject to registration
requirements may petition the district court for modification. See Iowa
Code § 692A.128 (Supp. 2009). The provision grants the district court
authority to modify registration obligations if certain conditions are met.
Id. The relevant subsections provide:
1. A sex offender who is on probation, parole, work
release, special sentence, or any other type of conditional
release may file an application in district court seeking to
modify the registration requirements under this chapter.
3
2. An application shall not be granted unless all of the
following apply:
a. The date of the commencement of the requirement
to register occurred at least two years prior to the filing of
the application for a tier I offender and five years prior to the
filing of the application for a tier II or III offender.
b. The sex offender has successfully completed all sex
offender treatment programs that have been required.
c. A risk assessment has been completed and the sex
offender was classified as a low risk to reoffend. The risk
assessment used to assess an offender as a low risk to
reoffend shall be a validated risk assessment approved by
the department of corrections.
d. The sex offender is not incarcerated when the
application is filed.
e. The director of the judicial district department of
correctional services supervising the sex offender, or the
director’s designee, stipulates to the modification, and a
certified copy of the stipulation is attached to the
application.
....
5. The court may, but is not required to, conduct a
hearing on the application to hear any evidence deemed
appropriate by the court. The court may modify the
registration requirements under this chapter.
6. A sex offender may be granted a modification if the
offender is required to be on the sex offender registry as a
result of an adjudication for a sex offense, the offender is not
under the supervision of the juvenile court or a judicial
district judicial department of correctional services, and the
department of corrections agrees to perform a risk
assessment on the sex offender. However, all other
provisions of this section not in conflict with this subsection
shall apply to the application prior to an application being
granted except that the sex offender is not required to obtain
a stipulation from the director of a judicial district
department of correctional services, or the director’s
designee.
....
Id.
4
Before the 2009 amendments, the registry statute had no similar
modification provision—instead, persons on the registry could seek only
determinations of “whether the offense for which the person ha[d] been
convicted require[d] the person to register,” and “whether the period of
time during which the person [was] obligated to register . . . [had]
expired.” See id. § 692A.8 (2009).
In his 2011 petition, Buchwald invoked the new modification
provision and alleged he met or could meet each of the provision’s
prerequisites for adjustment of his obligation. More specifically, he noted
he was not incarcerated or under any other probationary oversight at the
time, he had been classified as a tier II offender and had been on the
registry for more than five years, and he had not been ordered to undergo
any sex offender treatment program. Because the provision also requires
a risk assessment classifying an offender as low risk to reoffend as a
prerequisite for modification, Buchwald requested an assessment, which
the district court ordered.
Initially, Buchwald relied on subsection 6 of section 692A.128 as
the basis for his eligibility for modification. See id. § 692A.128(6) (2011)
(“A sex offender may be granted a modification if the offender is required
to be on the sex offender registry as a result of an adjudication for a sex
offense . . . .”). When the district court ordered the risk assessment
based on Buchwald’s petition, the State urged reconsideration of the
order on behalf of the department of correctional services (the
department), contending the legislature’s use of the word “adjudication”
in subsection 6 indicates the subsection applies only to individuals
subject to the registry as a result of juvenile adjudications. Under that
reading, the State maintained, Buchwald’s conviction as an adult
rendered him ineligible for modification under subsection 6. The district
5
court held a hearing on the State’s motion, at which time Buchwald
moved to amend his petition to “include consideration of Iowa Code
section 692A.128 in its entirety” as the basis of his argument for
eligibility.1 After granting Buchwald’s motion to amend, the district court
denied the State’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the risk
assessment, agreeing subsection 6 “clearly applie[d] only to juveniles”
but concluding subsections 2 and 5 granted the court discretion to
modify registration requirements provided various statutory criteria were
met. See id. § 692A.128(5) (“The court may modify the registration
requirements under this chapter.”); see also id. § 692A.128(2) (providing
“[a]n application shall not be granted unless all of the following apply”
and enumerating several conditions).
The State petitioned our court for a writ of certiorari and moved to
stay the district court order, but we denied the petition and motion. The
department then performed the risk assessment and determined
Buchwald presented a low risk to reoffend. With the risk assessment
completed, the district court held a new hearing on Buchwald’s eligibility
for modification, at which the parties reiterated their arguments. The
district court, having previously addressed the arguments, concluded the
assessment rendered Buchwald eligible for modification under
subsection 1 and therefore reduced the duration of Buchwald’s
registration obligation to five years. Because five years had elapsed
before Buchwald petitioned for modification, the district court ordered
him removed from the registry.
1Buchwald also argued at the hearing any interpretation of the modification
provision rendering him ineligible would violate his rights to due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
under article I, section 6 (equal protection) and section 9 (due process) of the Iowa
Constitution.
6
The State filed a new petition for writ of certiorari challenging the
legality of the district court’s modification and removal order, insisting
Buchwald was ineligible for modification under subsection 6 and
contending he was also ineligible under subsection 1 because he was no
longer subject to any of the forms of corrections supervision set forth in
subsection 1. See id. 692A.128(1) (“A sex offender who is on probation,
parole, work release, special sentence, or any other type of conditional
release may file an application in district court seeking to modify the
registration requirements under this chapter.”). We granted the petition
and transferred the case to the court of appeals.
As he had in the district court, Buchwald asserted at the court of
appeals that an appropriate interpretation of the text of section 692A.128
allows for modification of his obligation, and that any contrary
interpretation would violate his constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection. The State argued Buchwald’s eligibility for modification
is explicitly foreclosed by the text of subsections 1 and 6 and added that
his constitutional arguments are foreclosed by Iowa Supreme Court
precedent. The court of appeals sustained the State’s challenge,
concluding Buchwald was not entitled to modification because
subsection 1 of the statute, by its express terms, requires an offender be
under one of the forms of corrections supervision listed. Further, the
court of appeals explained, Buchwald’s constitutional challenges were
unpersuasive given our prior caselaw regarding the registry. Finally, the
court of appeals declined to address the applicability of subsection 6,
believing Buchwald had not raised on appeal his ineligibility under
subsection 6. We granted Buchwald’s application for further review of
the court of appeals decision.
7
II. Scope of Review.
In certiorari cases we review for errors at law. State v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 812 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 2012). We examine the jurisdiction of the
district court and the legality of its actions, and we have said illegality
exists when the court has improperly applied the law. Id. In certiorari
cases alleging violation of a constitutional right, we review de novo the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged ruling on the
constitutional right. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 801 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa
2011).
III. Discussion.
The State relies on specific statutory language in subsections 1
and 6 to argue Buchwald was ineligible for modification. Buchwald was
ineligible for modification under subsection 1, the State contends,
because the legislature’s use of the present-tense phrase “is on” limits
subsection 1’s application to individuals currently subject to some form
of corrections supervision, and Buchwald is no longer subject to any of
the specified forms of supervision. See Iowa Code § 692A.128(1) (“A sex
offender who is on probation, parole, work release, special sentence, or
any other type of conditional release may file an application [for
modification] . . . .” (Emphasis added.)). The State suggests section
692A.128(2) adds further support for this interpretation by requiring that
“[t]he director of the judicial district department of correctional services
supervising the sex offender . . . stipulates to the modification . . . .” Id.
§ 692A.128(2)(e) (emphasis added). This reading is consistent with the
purpose of the statute, the State maintains, because the forms of ongoing
corrections supervision listed can ensure a level of public protection
comparable to the protection provided by the registry.
8
An interpretation of subsection 1 encompassing individuals not
currently subject to some kind of supervision, the State adds, would
render superfluous subsection 6, which allows individuals “not under the
supervision of the juvenile court or a judicial district judicial department
of correctional services,” to petition for modification. Id. § 692A.128(6).
As noted, the State insists the use of the word “adjudication” in
subsection 6 indicates the subsection applies only to individuals subject
to the registry as a result of juvenile adjudications. Id. (“A sex offender
may be granted a modification if the offender is required to be on the sex
offender registry as a result of an adjudication for a sex offense . . . .”).
The State suggests its reading of subsection 6 necessarily constrains our
interpretation of subsection 1. There would be no need for subsection 6,
the State maintains, if subsection 1 were applicable to individuals not
currently subject to correctional supervision, because that population
would include the population of former juvenile offenders meeting the
conditions of subsection 6.
Buchwald’s argument on appeal highlights the ambiguity in the
language of the modification provision as a whole. He emphasizes the
permissive phrasing of subsection 1, which establishes an offender under
corrections supervision “may file an application” for modification. Id.
§ 692A.128(1). That language, he suggests, says nothing to preclude
individuals who have completed required periods of corrections
supervision from petitioning, and the language should be read to grant
these individuals an opportunity for modification. Buchwald also
contests the State’s claim that subsection 6 renders eligible only those
juvenile offenders no longer subject to corrections supervision.
Examined in its entirety, Buchwald contends, the modification provision
grants him an opportunity to petition for modification. His interpretation
9
is consistent with the statute’s public safety purpose, he insists, because
individuals in his position, having completed their corrections obligations
and satisfied the risk assessment and other statutory prerequisites, fall
squarely within the class the statute is designed to make eligible. Any
contrary interpretation, he argues, would violate his rights to equal
protection and procedural and substantive due process.
We have not yet had occasion to interpret the modification
provision. We have often explained we avoid assessing isolated words
and phrases when construing statutory provisions. See, e.g., In re Estate
of Melby, 841 N.W.2d 867, 879 (Iowa 2014). In interpreting provisions of
the prior version of the registration enactment lacking relevant statutory
definitions, we have examined the statutory structure and considered the
contexts in which words are used in construing provisions in a manner
best achieving the statutory purpose. See, e.g., In re S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d
405, 407–08 (Iowa 1997). We have explained the purpose of the registry
is protection of the health and safety of individuals, and particularly
children, from individuals who, by virtue of probation, parole, or other
release, have been given access to members of the public. See State v.
Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 667 (Iowa 2005); S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d at 408.
Because we conclude an appropriate interpretation of subsection 6
resolves the parties’ dispute here, we address only the parties’ arguments
confronting that provision. The State’s argument regarding the use of
“adjudication” instead of “conviction” in subsection 6 is superficially
sound. The legislature has employed the concept of adjudication in
select provisions in the amended registry statute to refer very clearly to
individuals having committed crimes as juveniles. See, e.g., Iowa Code
§ 692A.101(7) (defining “convicted” broadly to include adult and juvenile
offenders and referring to juveniles as having been “adjudicated
10
delinquent”); id. § 692A.103(3) (setting forth registration requirements for
individuals “adjudicated delinquent”); cf. id. § 692A.125(4) (addressing
statute’s retroactivity and employing both “conviction” and “adjudication”
without making reference to juvenile or adult status). A closer reading of
the language of subsection 6, however, coupled with a closer examination
of the modification provision and the registration statute, compels us to
conclude subsection 6 renders Buchwald eligible for modification.2
Subsection 6 grants any “sex offender” required to be on the
registry “as a result of an adjudication for a sex offense” an opportunity
for modification, provided the individual is no longer under juvenile court
or correctional supervision and the department of corrections agrees to
perform a risk assessment. Id. § 692A.128(6). The statute defines sex
offender broadly to include any “person who is required to be registered
under [the statute].” Id. § 692A.101(26). Similarly, the statute defines
sex offense broadly, to include any “indictable offense for which a
conviction has been entered that is enumerated in section 692A.102, . . .
[or] any comparable offense . . . under prior law, or any comparable
offense . . . in [another jurisdiction].” Id. § 692A.101(27). Those
definitions appear to do little to limit the applicability of subsection 6.
Against the backdrop of those definitions, however, the provision in
subsection 6 limiting modification relief to only those offenders no longer
2We note the legislature’s inclusion of a separate juvenile modification provision
in section 692A.103. See Iowa Code § 692A.103(5) (2011). That section provides a
“juvenile court may, upon motion of the juvenile, and after reasonable notice to the
parties and hearing, modify or suspend the registration requirements if good cause is
shown.” Id. The provision requires, however, the motion “be made and the hearing
shall occur prior to the discharge of the juvenile from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.” Id. § 692A.103(5)(a). The provision’s requirement that an offender is currently
subject to juvenile court supervision therefore clearly contrasts with the requirement in
subsection 6 that an offender is not subject to juvenile court supervision. The provision
does not, however, resolve the question of the effect of the additional requirement in
subsection 6 that an offender is not subject to correctional services supervision.
11
under correctional or juvenile court supervision is a natural complement
to subsection 1. Subsection 1 applies broadly to those offenders
currently subject to corrections supervision, while subsection 6 applies
broadly to those offenders no longer subject to supervision. See 4
Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice Series: Criminal Law § 6:95, at 298 (2013)
(noting individuals not under supervision but still subject to the registry
are eligible for modification under subsection 6).
A reading of subsections 1 and 6 in tandem is bolstered by
additional interpretive evidence. We find the use of “adjudication” in
subsection 6 as distinct from “adjudicated delinquent” or “adjudication of
delinquency” particularly instructive in this context. Our legislature has
employed some form of the word “adjudicated” in numerous provisions in
our registration statute. In the vast majority of those instances, the use
is linked very clearly with juvenile status by one or more of the words
“delinquent,” “delinquency,” or “juvenile.” See Iowa Code § 692A.101(7)
(“ ‘Convicted’ means . . . adjudicated delinquent for an act which is an
indictable offense in this state . . . including but not limited to a juvenile
who has been adjudicated delinquent . . . .” (Emphasis added.)); id.
§ 692A.103(1)(d) (noting offender must register “from the date an
adjudicated delinquent is released from placement in a juvenile facility”
(emphasis added)); id. § 692A.103(1)(e) (noting offender must register
“from the date an adjudicated delinquent commences attendance as a
student” (emphasis added)); id. § 692A.103(3) (“A juvenile adjudicated
delinquent . . . shall be required to register . . . unless the juvenile court
waives the requirement . . . .” (Emphasis added.)); id. § 692A.103(4) (“[A]
juvenile [fourteen or older at the time of offense] shall be required to
register if the adjudication was for [certain offenses] . . . . At the time of
adjudication the judge shall make a determination . . . .” (Emphasis
12
added.)); id. § 692A.103(5)(e) (“This subsection does not apply to a
juvenile fourteen years of age or older at the time the offense was
committed if the adjudication was for [certain offenses].” (Emphasis
added.)).
In two of the remaining instances, our legislature has not explicitly
linked the concept of adjudication with juvenile status, but has, in the
very same clause, juxtaposed “adjudication” with a use of “conviction.”
See id. § 692A.125(4) (“[E]ach conviction or adjudication for a sex offense
requiring registration, regardless of [when] such conviction or
adjudication occurred . . . , shall be included in determining the tier
requirements pursuant to this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)). But cf. id.
§ 692A.116(2) (“Application . . . shall be made on forms . . . and
accompanied by copies of sentencing or adjudicatory orders with respect
to each offense . . . .” (Emphasis added.)).
In the only other instances we have found in which a form of
“adjudication” appears in the statute, our legislature has notably
employed it more broadly to mean something other than “adjudicated
delinquent.” The statute’s definition of criminal or juvenile justice
agency, for example, refers to “an agency or department . . . which
performs as its principal function the apprehension, prosecution,
adjudication, incarceration, or rehabilitation of criminal or juvenile
offenders.” Id. § 692A.101(8) (emphasis added). This definition very
clearly sets forth five distinct functions—one of which is adjudication—
entities perform in our justice system, and is structured to indicate (1)
both criminal and juvenile agencies may perform any of the five functions
and (2) both criminal and juvenile offenders may be subject to any of the
five functions.
13
In much the same way, the statute employs “adjudication” to refer
to individuals of both adult and juvenile status in providing “convicted,”
for purposes of the statute, does not include “a plea, sentence,
adjudication, deferred sentence, or deferred judgment which has been
reversed or otherwise set aside.” Id. § 692A.101(7) (emphasis added).
We think it unlikely the definition’s use of “adjudication” for purposes of
exemption distinguishes adults having had convictions or adjudications
set aside from juveniles having had adjudications set aside. Instead, it
constitutes another clear use of “adjudication” referring to both adult
and juvenile status, and another use distinct from those instances
clearly linking adjudication with the word “delinquent,” “delinquency,” or
“juvenile.”
Turning to subsection 6, we note “adjudication” has not been
linked with the concept of “delinquency” as it has been elsewhere to
signify specifically juvenile status, and has not been contrasted with a
use of the word “conviction,” as it has been elsewhere to signify
specifically juvenile status. While subsection 6 does make reference to
“the supervision of the juvenile court,” it also refers, in the same
disjunctive clause, to “a judicial district judicial department of
correctional services”—a reference which, for most purposes, will signify
adult status. See id. § 692A.128(6). Given the absence in subsection 6
of the linguistic cues employed elsewhere to suggest adjudication’s
limitation to juvenile status, we conclude the registration chapter’s uses
of “adjudication” referring to both adult and juvenile status must guide
our reading of “adjudication” in subsection 6.
Our interpretation of “adjudication” in subsection 6 pertaining to
both juvenile and adult offenders is consistent with both the plain
meaning of the term and its use elsewhere in the Code. See Black’s Law
14
Dictionary 47 (9th ed. 2009) (defining adjudication as “the process of
judicially deciding a case” and making no distinction between adult and
juvenile proceedings); see also Iowa Code § 907.1(1) (making no reference
to limitation to juveniles in defining “deferred judgment” as “a sentencing
option whereby both the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of a
sentence are deferred by the court” (emphasis added)); accord Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b) (employing “adjudication” in establishing standards for class
action certification and making no distinction between adult and juvenile
status); Doe v. Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 467, 471 (S.D. Iowa 2003)
(examining constitutional challenges to prior version of registration
statute and certifying plaintiff and defendant classes based on
“enormous” risk of “inconsistent adjudications” as individuals, while
making no distinction between adult and juvenile status). This usage
evidence favors an interpretation of subsection 6 granting modification
eligibility to those individuals satisfying the various prerequisites of
subsection 6 and the modification provision without limiting its reach to
juvenile offenders.
In determining the meaning of adjudication in subsection 6, we
have also considered the 2009 Summary of Legislation produced by
Iowa’s Legislative Services Agency (LSA). The LSA explains these
postenactment summaries are intended to “generally inform[]” interested
individuals and provide “quick reference” to legislation. See Legislative
Services Agency, 2009 Summary of Legislation, at i (Iowa 2009), available
at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/shelves/summaries/Summary%20
of%20Legislation%202009.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Summary]. The LSA
summary addresses the registration statute generally and
nonexhaustively in two separate chapters—one entitled “Children and
Youth,” and one entitled “Criminal Law, Procedure, and Corrections.”
15
See id. at 69, 87. In the chapter on children and youth, the summary
likely makes reference to section 692A.128(6) in suggesting the statute
“permits an offender required to register as a juvenile who is no longer
under supervision to apply for a modification . . . if the Department of
Corrections agrees to perform a risk assessment . . . .” Id. at 69. The
summary in that chapter makes no reference to the possibility of adult
eligibility under subsection 1 or subsection 6, presumably because the
LSA determined adult eligibility had no relevance to its chapter regarding
legislation affecting children and youth. In its criminal law chapter, the
LSA likely makes reference to section 692A.128(1) in suggesting the
modification provision “permits an offender on probation or parole to file
[a modification application] in district court . . . .” Id. at 95. The
summary makes no reference, however, to the eligibility of those
offenders on work release, special sentence, or any other type of
conditional release—individuals explicitly granted eligibility under
subsection 1.
The criminal law chapter in the LSA summary also likely makes
reference to section 692A.128(6) in generally explaining the “division
provides that an offender required to register as a juvenile who is no
longer under supervision may apply for modification . . . .” 2009
Summary, at 95. That section of the summary gives no indication,
however, of whether any other individuals might be eligible for
modification, or alternatively and perhaps more importantly, whether any
specific classes of individuals might be precluded from petitioning. Given
the general and plainly nonexhaustive treatment of the registration
legislation in both the children and youth chapter and the criminal law
chapter, we are unable to derive helpful interpretive guidance from the
LSA summary.
16
Instead, in addition to the usage evidence we have examined, our
repeated identification of the registration statute’s purpose of public
protection guides our interpretation of subsection 6. See, e.g., State v.
Willard, 756 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Iowa 2008); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 667;
S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d at 408. The modification provision includes various
safeguards promoting this purpose: offenders must have completed all
sex offender treatment programs that have been required; offenders must
have completed a risk assessment and have been classified as low risk to
reoffend; the district court may gather “any evidence deemed
appropriate” to its determination and conduct a hearing on any
application; and, for purposes of subsection 6, offenders must have
completed any required periods of juvenile court and judicial district
corrections supervision. An interpretation of subsection 6 rendering
individuals in Buchwald’s position eligible for modification only after
having satisfied each of those requirements balances the registry’s
protective purpose with our legislature’s related recognition—in enacting
the modification provision—of an individual’s interest in removal from
the registry when appropriate. The interpretation favored by the State
could, as Buchwald has argued, raise questions as to whether a
distinction between individuals subject to corrections supervision and
individuals no longer subject to supervision comports with relevant
constitutional principles. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance
suggests the proper course in the construction of a statute may be to
steer clear of “constitutional shoals” when possible. Simmons v. State
Pub. Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Iowa 2010). Our interpretation of
subsection 6 is consistent with our general preference for avoiding
constitutional adjudication where possible.
17
Based on the language of subsection 6, the structure of the
modification provision, the interpretive guidance from elsewhere in the
registration statute, and the statute’s purpose, we conclude subsection 6
grants modification eligibility to those individuals no longer subject to
corrections supervision who have satisfied the modification provision’s
various prerequisites. Although we conclude the district court’s
interpretation of subsection 6 was incorrect, we find no illegality in the
district court’s determination Buchwald was eligible for modification of
his registration requirement or the order removing Buchwald from the
registry. Accordingly, we annul the writ.
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals and annul the writ.
WRIT ANNULLED.
All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who dissents.
18
#12–0024, State of Iowa v. Iowa Dist. Court
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the well-reasoned decision
of the court of appeals. I think Buchwald is not eligible for relief under
either section 692A.128(1) or 692A.128(6), the latter of which is limited to
juvenile adjudications. See Iowa Code § 692A.128(1), (6) (2011).
Section 692A.128 creates two basic avenues for modification—
subsection 1 and subsection 6. Subsection 1 is potentially available
when the sex offender is “on probation, parole, work release, special
sentence, or any other type of conditional release.” Id. § 692A.128(1).
Subsection 6 is potentially available when the sex offender is on the
registry “as a result of an adjudication for a sex offense, the offender is
not under the supervision of the juvenile court or a judicial district
judicial department of correctional services, and the department of
corrections agrees to perform a risk assessment on the sex offender.” Id.
§ 692A.128(6).
In this case, the applicant, David Buchwald, is no longer on
probation, parole, work release, special release, or any other type of
conditional release. It is also undisputed that Buchwald is not on the
registry because of a juvenile adjudication. Rather, he was convicted of
the sex offense of lascivious acts with a child when he was over the age of
majority.
Over the State’s objection, the district court granted Buchwald’s
request to modify registration requirements. The district court agreed
with the State that subsection 6 “quite clearly applies only to juvenile
offenders.” However, it found it had authority to grant modification
under subsection 1.
19
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari and transferred the
case to the court of appeals. That court ruled, I believe correctly, that
Buchwald could not obtain modification of his registration requirements.
It observed that subsection 1 “is written in the present tense. By its
terms, modification under this subsection is only available to sex
offenders who are on some type of conditional release at the time they
apply for a modification.” I agree.
The court of appeals also overruled Buchwald’s argument that it
would be unconstitutional to preclude “off paper” adult sex offenders like
him from seeking modification of their registration requirements. In
doing so, the court cited precedent from our court upholding the severe
pre-2009 residency restrictions on sex offenders under the rational basis
test. See State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 665–66 (Iowa 2005); Wright
v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 747 N.W.2d 213, 216–17 (Iowa 2008).
In a footnote, the court of appeals declined to consider subsection
6, noting that the district court had rejected that argument and
Buchwald had not asserted it on appeal.
This led to Buchwald’s application for further review in this court.
In his application, Buchwald raised only subsection 1 and his
constitutional arguments. He did not bring his subsection 6 argument to
our attention, just as he did not mention it in his original appellate brief.
Now, however, my colleagues resurrect subsection 6.3 They assert
that “adjudication” in section 692A.128(6) includes criminal convictions
3To be clear, I am not arguing my colleagues are doing anything improper in
reaching subsection 6. The situation here is identical to that in King v. State, 818
N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012). We are affirming the district court on a ground that was raised
below and rejected by that court, and that the appellee then chose not to brief on
appeal. See id. at 11–12 (noting that “[a]ppellants and appellees stand in different
positions”). Because the parties argued the point below, fairness is assured and we
20
and is not limited to juvenile adjudications. Accordingly, they find that
Buchwald may modify his registration requirements. I think this is the
wrong reading of the statute for several reasons.
To begin with, my colleagues cite no examples—none—in chapter
692A where the word “adjudication” has been used to include criminal
convictions. To the contrary, time and again, when the terms
“adjudicated,” “adjudication,” or “adjudicatory” appear elsewhere in
chapter 692A, they refer to juvenile adjudications of delinquency. See,
e.g., Iowa Code §§ 692A.101(7), .103(1)(d), .103(1)(e), .103(3), .103(4),
.103(5)(e), .116(2), .125(4). In each of the foregoing instances, one of two
things is true. Either the word “adjudicated” is accompanied by the word
“delinquent” or the word “juvenile,” see, e.g., id. §§ 692A.101(7),
.103(1)(d), .103(1)(e), .103(3), .103(4), .103(5)(e), or the legislature has
juxtaposed the word “adjudication” or “adjudicatory” with the word
“conviction” or “sentencing” and put the word “or” in between, thus
indicating that an adjudication for purposes of chapter 692A is
something different from what occurs in a criminal proceeding, see, e.g.,
id. §§ 692A.116(2), .125(4).
Furthermore, “convicted”—as defined in chapter 692A—includes
anyone who is “found guilty of, pleads guilty to, or is sentenced or
adjudicated delinquent for an act which is an indictable offense.” See id.
§ 692A.101(7). This further demonstrates that when it drafted chapter
692A in 2009, the legislature intended adjudication to mean something
narrower than a criminal conviction—not the other way around.4
________________________
have discretion to reach an argument even though the appellee didn’t brief it to us. See
id.
4My colleagues assert that section 692A.101(8) supports their position because
“adjudication” as used there means “something other than” an adjudication of
delinquency. That section provides:
21
In addition, the June 2009 Summary of Legislation prepared by
the Legislative Services Agency (LSA) at the end of the legislative session
speaks to the intended scope of subsection 6. It states, “The Act also
permits an offender required to register as a juvenile who is no longer
under supervision to apply for a modification of the registry requirements
if the Department of Corrections agrees to perform a risk assessment on
the sex offender.” See Legislative Services Agency, 2009 Summary of
Legislation, at 69 (Iowa 2009), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
docs/shelves/Summaries/Summary%20of%20Legislation%202009.pdf.
The LSA further explains:
MODIFICATION. The division permits an offender on
probation or parole to file an application in district court
seeking to modify the registration requirements. The court
may modify the registration requirements if all of the
following apply: the date of commencement of the
requirement to register occurred at least two years prior to
the filing of the application for a tier I offender, or five years
for a tier II or tier III offender; the offender has successfully
completed all sex offender treatment programs that have
been required; a risk assessment has been completed and
the offender has been classified as a low risk to reoffend; the
offender is not incarcerated at the time the application is
filed; and the director or the director’s designee of the district
department supervising the offender stipulates to the
modification. The court may, but is not required to, conduct
a hearing on the application to hear any evidence deemed
________________________
“Criminal or juvenile justice agency” means an agency or department of
any level of government or an entity wholly owned, financed, or
controlled by one or more such agencies or departments which performs
as its principal function the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication,
incarceration, or rehabilitation of criminal or juvenile offenders.
Iowa Code § 692A.101(8) (2011).
I confess to some uncertainty about the meaning of this definition, which appears to be
taken verbatim from chapter 692. See id. § 692.1(7). However, for my colleagues’ point
about subsection 692A.101(8) to have any force, they need to explain what they think
that subsection means. Is a court a “criminal or juvenile justice agency”? If so, then
this may be one instance—the only one—where “adjudication” in chapter 692A includes
a criminal conviction. However, my colleagues appear unwilling to reach this
conclusion.
22
appropriate by the court prior to making a determination as
to modification.
The division provides that an offender required to register as
a juvenile who is no longer under supervision may apply for
modification of the registration requirements if the
Department of Corrections agrees to perform a risk
assessment on the offender. All other provisions relating to
a modification shall apply to such an application for a
modification except that the offender is not required to
obtain a stipulation from the director or the director’s
designee of the district department of correctional services.
Id. at 95. Although this publication was prepared by LSA, and is not
part of the legislation itself, it “generally informs persons of the contents”
of legislation and supports my view that the legislature intended to limit
subsection 6 to juvenile adjudications. Id. at i.
Furthermore, as the State points out, reading the term
“adjudication” to include both criminal convictions and juvenile
adjudications would render this very language superfluous. The
subsection begins, “A sex offender may be granted a modification if the
offender is required to be on the sex offender registry as a result of an
adjudication for a sex offense . . . .” Iowa Code § 692A.128(6). However,
if all “individuals no longer subject to corrections supervision who have
satisfied the modification provision’s various prerequisites” are eligible,
as the majority holds, the entire phrase “as a result of an adjudication
for a sex offense” becomes unnecessary. In contrast, if the legislature’s
use of adjudication was intended to refer only to juvenile adjudications,
as in other sections of the chapter, the choice of language in subsection
6 has a purpose—to narrow its applicability from all sex offenders
required to register under the statute, to only those required to do so as
a result of a juvenile adjudication. See Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814
N.W.2d 512, 520 (Iowa 2012) (“In interpreting a statute, each term is to
be given effect, and we will not read a statute so that any provision will
23
be rendered superfluous.” (Citations and internal quotation marks
omitted.)).5
I concede that if you go far afield, you can find examples of the
word “adjudication” covering things other than juvenile adjudications, for
example, in the federal class action rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The
problem with this is that we are supposed to refer to “similar statutes”—
not unrelated ones—in interpreting an undefined term in a statute. See
Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 78 (Iowa 2013). Also, statutes are
supposed to be interpreted as an integrated whole, see State v. Adams,
810 N.W.2d 365, 377 (Iowa 2012), and we are dealing with a chapter
(692A) that was enacted as a single package by the legislature in 2009.
See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119. I think chapter 692A’s usage is consistent,
and the legislature’s intent is clear.
Turning to Buchwald’s constitutional arguments, I agree with the
court of appeals that they are essentially foreclosed by our prior caselaw.
The legislature’s policy choice in section 692A, while perhaps not my
policy choice, was to allow modifications of sex offender registry status to
be sought only by (1) offenders who are under current supervision and
(2) persons who had committed their offenses as juveniles and have
completed their supervision (assuming the offense was not serious
5I note that subsection 6 applies when the previously adjudicated offender is
“not under the supervision of the juvenile court or a judicial district judicial department
of correctional services.” Iowa Code § 692A.128(6) (emphasis added). Normally juveniles
who have been adjudicated delinquent would not be under the supervision of a judicial
district judicial department of correctional services for that offense. However, a juvenile
who was adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense could subsequently be under
correctional services supervision for a non-sex-related offense. Such a person would be
able to seek modification under subsection 1, and upon completion of that supervision
would be able to seek modification under subsection 6. The point remains: Reading “an
adjudication” in subsection 6 as meaning “a juvenile adjudication” gives effect to all the
statutory language, whereas reading it to include criminal convictions does not.
24
enough to warrant the juvenile being tried as an adult).6 This policy
meets the rational basis test because it limits modifications to those who
are currently under some form of supervision or who may be less
culpable and more capable of change because they committed their sex
offenses as juveniles and were tried for those offenses as juveniles.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
6As noted by my colleagues, a separate provision in chapter 692A allows
juveniles who are currently under the supervision of the juvenile court to seek
modification of their registration status. See Iowa Code § 692A.103(5).