OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CHAVERS.
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.]
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Ignoring previous
order of Supreme Court by continuing to practice law while under
suspension.
(No. 97-1313 — Submitted August 26, 1997 — Decided December 31,
1997.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-71.
On November 7, 1990, we indefinitely suspended respondent, Clarence L.
Chavers of Woodmere, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0024930, from the
practice of law in Ohio for neglecting client matters and failing to cooperate in the
ensuing investigation. Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 18,
562 N.E.2d 1386. On that same day, we entered an order requiring, among other
things, that respondent notify all his clients of his suspension, return to them their
papers and property and all unearned fees, and notify the court of compliance with
the order. Respondent did not comply with the order, and on January 16, 1991, we
issued an order to show cause why he should not be found in contempt.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 706, 566 N.E.2d 172.
Respondent failed also to respond to that order, and on February 27, 1991, we
found him to be in contempt of this court. Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers
(1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 704, 569 N.E.2d 513.
On November 6, 1995, this court received a copy of a letter written by
Judge Stuart A. Friedman of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, stating
that respondent was currently appearing before Judge Friedman as counsel of
record in the case of Onyealilachi F.O. Nwoku v. St. Paul Congregational
Methodist Church, case No. 280785. Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, sent two
letters of inquiry about this allegation to respondent by certified mail. The letters
were received, but respondent did not reply. In response to relator’s subpoena
duces tecum, respondent appeared for a deposition on May 17, 1996. Respondent
admitted then that he had not registered with the Supreme Court since the 1987-
1989 biennium and that in July 1991 he received a sanction of $390 for failing to
meet continuing legal education requirements, which he had not yet paid.
Respondent stated in his deposition that after being suspended by this court
he continued to practice in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio in the belief that he could do so because it was a “separate
entit[y].” Respondent filed a case in that court in December 1990 and another in
March 1991. On April 14, 1992, the Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio suspended respondent from the right to
practice law in that court. In 1993, respondent filed another bankruptcy case in
the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Ohio and, in 1995, he was still
attorney of record in a bankruptcy case filed on April 14, 1992.
When respondent failed to answer relator’s October 1996 complaint
charging that respondent’s activities since his November 1990 suspension violated
several Disciplinary Rules, relator filed a motion for default judgment.
Respondent, when contacted by telephone, stated that he did not intend to respond
to the complaint or the motion.
A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the
Supreme Court (“board”) reviewed the motion and attached exhibits, found the
facts as alleged, and concluded that respondent’s appearance as counsel in
Onyealilachi F.O. Nwoku v. St. Paul Congregational Methodist Church
constituted the practice of law while under suspension in violation of DR 1-
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102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-
102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to
practice law), and 3-101(B) (practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would
be in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction) and
Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E) (failure to perform the duties of a suspended attorney).
The panel further concluded that respondent’s continued practice of law in
1990 and later years in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, even after being suspended from practice in that district, violated
DR 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), and 3-101(B), and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E).
In addition, the panel concluded that respondent’s continued practice of law
while not registered during years after 1988 constituted a violation of Gov.Bar R.
VI(1) (requiring an attorney to register and pay the registration fee to remain in
active status). The panel recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.
The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the
panel.
__________________
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sally Ann Steuk, Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
__________________
Per Curiam. Absent any mitigating circumstances, the normal penalty for
ignoring previous orders of the court and continuing to practice law while under
suspension is disbarment. Disciplinary Counsel v. McDonald (1995), 71 Ohio
St.3d 628, 646 N.E.2d 819; Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Shabazz (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d
24, 656 N.E.2d 325. Respondent continued to practice law by appearing in the
common pleas court while suspended. His activities were not unlike those of the
lawyer in Akron Bar Assn. v. Thorpe (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 174, 532 N.E.2d 752,
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where we disbarred a suspended attorney who attempted to settle an accident
claim. Here, we find no mitigating circumstances as we did in Disciplinary
Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 433, 674 N.E.2d 1371, and Disciplinary
Counsel v. Bancsi (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 392, 683 N.E.2d 1072.
Moreover, respondent continued to practice in the bankruptcy court after
being suspended by the Chief Judge of the United States District Court. Contrary
to respondent’s opinion at his deposition, such practice involved a violation of the
Disciplinary Rules. Because the bankruptcy court is a unit of the United States
District Court, Section 151, Title 28, U.S.Code, respondent’s continued practice in
the bankruptcy court after suspension by the district court constituted the practice
of law in a jurisdiction where doing so violated the regulations of the profession of
that jurisdiction. As a consequence, respondent violated DR 3-101(B). Even a
practice limited to advising and representing clients solely on federal law and
appearing solely in federal court entails other activities in carrying out the practice
of law that are not solely federal in nature and warrant state regulation. To file a
bankruptcy case, a lawyer must counsel his client on Ohio law relating to
exemptions and preferential and fraudulent transfers, among other matters.
Respondent, therefore, by necessity counseled his client on Ohio law while he was
suspended and not in good standing, although he filed the case in the bankruptcy
court.
We accept the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the board.
Respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.
Costs of these proceedings are taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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