[Cite as In re R.M., 2014-Ohio-1200.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: R.M. : APPEAL NO. C-120166
TRIAL NO. 09-216X
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 26, 2014
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee,
Office of the Ohio Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant State Public
Defender, for Appellant, R.M.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Per Curiam.
{¶1} Appellant R.M., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s entry
overruling his objections and adopting a magistrate’s decision classifying him as a
juvenile offender registrant (“JOR”), under Ohio’s sex offender registration and
notification scheme and imposing punishment beyond his 21st birthday. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶2} In January 2009, R.M., then age 14, entered the home of a 70-year-old
woman and raped her despite her pleas for mercy. R.M. had selected his victim for the
most casual of reasons: her porch light had been illuminated. He was apprehended and
was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that would have constituted
rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02, punishable as a felony of the first degree, had he been
an adult.
{¶3} After a risk assessment and psychological evaluation had been
performed, the juvenile court committed R.M. to the legal custody of the Department of
Youth Services (“DYS”) for institutionalization in a secure facility for an indefinite
period of at least 12 months’ duration. The court also ordered DYS to provide
treatment for R.M.’s sexual problems.
{¶4} In October 2011, with R.M.’s release from the secure facility imminent, a
juvenile court magistrate conducted a hearing to determine whether R.M. would be
classified as a JOR. The magistrate heard the testimony of a child psychiatrist who had
examined R.M., and of a DYS parole officer, and reviewed extensive records of R.M.’s
stay and treatment at DYS.
{¶5} The magistrate found that R.M. had been physically and sexually
abused by his mother’s boyfriends. He had a history of cruelty to animals, having
previously killed a dog and a goose. R.M. had committed the rape of his 70-year-old
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victim with great violence. And after nearly three years of intensive mental-health
treatment, R.M.’s behavior was poor. He had committed repeated acts of violence
against other DYS residents, had threatened DYS staff, and had exposed his genitals to
a nurse. In the month prior to the hearing, R.M. had stolen from and had assaulted
DYS staff, had punched a computer, and had commandeered the public-address system
to broadcast sexually explicit statements to other residents. R.M. continued to be
troubled with poor impulse control. The magistrate concluded that he was at a high
risk “to re-offend criminally,” and at “a moderate risk to re-offend sexually.”
{¶6} After considering the evidence and the argument of R.M.’s experienced
counsel, the magistrate classified R.M. as a Tier III JOR and determined that
community notification was warranted to protect the public.
{¶7} In January 2012, 32 months after he had been adjudicated delinquent,
the juvenile court overruled R.M.’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision.
The court classified R.M. as a Tier III JOR with a lifetime duty to register with the
sheriff every 90 days. The juvenile court also adopted the magistrate’s determination
that lifetime community notification was warranted.
{¶8} R.M. appealed raising three assignments of error.
Punishment Extending Into Adulthood
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, R.M. claims that by imposing
punishment for delinquency that will extend beyond his 21st birthday, the juvenile
court violated his right to due process.
{¶10} This court rejected this argument in In re Raheem L., 2013-Ohio-2423,
993 N.E.2d 455, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.), discretionary appeal not allowed, 136 Ohio St.3d 1560,
2013-Ohio-4861, 996 N.E.2d 987. In that case, because the offender was 16 years old
when he committed a sexual offense, his classification was controlled by R.C.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2152.83(A) which mandated that the juvenile court classify the child a JOR and order
periodic registration with the sheriff. See id. at ¶ 2. The juvenile was classified as a JOR
and a Tier II sex offender with a 20-year registration obligation. See id. His mandatory
classification occurred and the sanctions were imposed less than seven weeks after the
initial complaint had been filed. See id. at ¶ 19.
{¶11} We held that due process, under both the federal and Ohio
constitutions, did not prohibit the legislature from punishing children for delinquency
beyond their 21st birthdays by classifying them as JORs under R.C. 2152.83(A) because
no fundamental right was implicated and the punishment was rationally related to the
government’s legitimate interest in enforcing its criminal laws against juveniles. See id.
at ¶ 9-10. We affirmed the juvenile court as we could not say that the punishment
authorized by R.C. 2152.83(A) was irrational. See id. at ¶ 10.
{¶12} Here, R.M. was 14 years old at the time of the rape offense, did not have
a prior adjudication for a sexually oriented offense, and had not been labeled a serious
youthful offender. Therefore, his classification was controlled by R.C. 2152.83(B)(1).
{¶13} Under this statute, the juvenile court is granted wide discretion over
whether to hold a classification hearing in the first instance, over whether to classify the
offender as a JOR if a hearing is held, over which tier the JOR should be placed in, and
over whether, if the offender is determined to be a Tier III sex offender, he will be
subject to the community-notification requirements of R.C. 2950.10 and 2950.11. See
R.C. 2152.83.(B)(1), 2152.83(B)(2), 2152.83(C)(2), and 2152.831; see also In re C.P., 131
Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 20 (“Which tier [a JOR] is placed in
rests within the juvenile court’s discretion.”).
{¶14} In determining whether to classify an offender as a JOR and in
ascertaining which tier sex-offender status the juvenile will be assigned, the juvenile
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
court, after reviewing the effectiveness of the disposition of the child in a secure facility
and of any treatment provided, is required to consider all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to: (1) the nature of the sexually oriented offense; (2) whether the
offender has shown genuine remorse or compunction for the offense; (3) the public
interest and safety; (4) the factors set forth in R.C. 2950.11(K); (5) the relevant factors
set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C); and (6) the results of any treatment provided to
the offender and any follow-up professional assessment. See R.C. 2152.83(D).
{¶15} As R.M. acknowledges, the juvenile courts are creatures of statute with
limited jurisdiction set by the General Assembly. See In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 72-
74, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969). And the General Assembly has acted to extend that
jurisdiction over JORs like R.M. beyond their 21st birthdays.
{¶16} Both R.C. 2152.22(A) and R.C. 2152.83(E) specifically exempt juvenile
sex offender dispositional orders from the general rule that the jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts to impose dispositional orders over an offender ends when the child
attains 21 years of age. See R.C. 2152.23(A)(15). And R.C. 2152.83(E) provides that
registration and community-notification orders issued under R.C. 2152.83(B),
including those setting the duration of the sanction and modifying or terminating the
sanction, are not affected or terminated by the “child’s attainment of eighteen or
twenty-one years of age * * *, and the order remains in effect for the period of time
described in this division.”
{¶17} Thus, here, as in In re Raheem L., we reject the juvenile’s argument.
R.M. has not cited any authority that recognizes his fundamental right to avoid
punishment that extends beyond age 21. See In re Raheem L., 2013-Ohio-2423, 993
N.E.2d 455, at ¶ 10. The punishment imposed on R.M., authorized under R.C.
2152.83(B), and consigned to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, was imposed
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
32 months after he was adjudicated delinquent. The punishment was rationally related
to the valid state interest in enforcing criminal laws against juveniles and in imposing
significant penalties where appropriate. See id. at ¶ 11; see also In re C.P., 131 Ohio
St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 78 and 82. And the General Assembly
conferred jurisdiction upon the juvenile court to impose sanctions lasting beyond
R.M.’s 21st birthday. R.M. has, therefore, failed to show that either the Due Process
Clause of the Ohio Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the juvenile court from
punishing a child for delinquency into adulthood. See In re Raheem L. at ¶ 12; see also
In re D.R., 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27, 2014-Ohio-588, ¶ 28; In re D.S., 5th Dist.
Licking No. 13-CA-58, 2014-Ohio-867, ¶ 62. The first assignment of error is overruled.
Community Notification Does Not Violate Due Process
{¶18} In his third assignment of error, R.M. asserts that the community-
notification provisions of R.C. 2950.11 violate a child’s right to due process by requiring
law enforcement officials to disseminate information about the youth’s juvenile
adjudication to the public.
{¶19} Community notification involves the release of information about sex
offenders and child-victim offenders to public agencies and the general public to further
the governmental interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal, juvenile,
and mental-health systems. State v. McConville, 124 Ohio St.3d 556, 2010-Ohio-958,
925 N.E.2d 133, ¶ 4, citing R.C. 2950.02(A)(6).
{¶20} As R.M. argues, Ohio’s juvenile court system is structured to ensure
privacy so that a delinquent child may be rehabilitated and not have to carry the stigma
of a youthful transgression into adulthood. See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-
Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 63; see also Juv.R. 37(B) (“No public use shall be made
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
by any person, including a party, of any juvenile court record * * *, except” for purposes
of appeal or by court order).
{¶21} R.M. maintains that lifetime community-notification requirements
“anchor the juvenile offender to his crime.” See In re C.P. at ¶ 47. And requiring
community notification while an offender is still undergoing rehabilitation thwarts the
two essential prerequisites of juvenile rehabilitation: confidentiality and the avoidance
of stigmatization. See id. at ¶ 67. Therefore, R.M. argues that the community-
notification sanction is so onerous that, by itself, its imposition violates due process,
and that R.C. 2950.11 is unconstitutional as applied to JORs like R.M. Again, on the
authority of In re Raheem L., we disagree.
{¶22} Under the statutory scheme applied to R.M.—a JOR who committed his
offense at age 14, and who has been released from a secure facility—the juvenile court
has discretion on whether to impose community notification. See R.C. 2152.83(C)(2);
see also In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 20 (“JORs
assigned to Tier III are subject to community notification only if the juvenile court
orders it * * *.”).
{¶23} The juvenile court retains discretion to tailor the sanction to the
seriousness of the offense, the offender’s progress or lack of progress in rehabilitation,
and the need “to provide increased protection and security for the state’s residents from
persons who have been convicted of, or found to be delinquent children for committing,
a sexually oriented offense * * *.” 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, Section 5. Even if
rehabilitative efforts have not achieved their ultimate aim, the juvenile court retains the
discretion not to impose community notification. The court may later reclassify the
offender to a lower tier and end the community-notification requirement. See R.C.
2152.85(A)(1); see also In re C.P. at ¶ 23. The scheme thus maintains “the juvenile
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
system’s core emphasis on individual, corrective treatment and rehabilitation.” See In
re C.P. at ¶ 77. The imposition of community notification under R.C. 2152.83(C) is
committed to the “unique expertise of a juvenile judge” thus ensuring the fundamental
fairness of the process. See id. at ¶ 76.
{¶24} Thus, under both the federal and Ohio constitutions, due process does
not prohibit the General Assembly from providing juvenile courts with the discretion to
impose lifetime community notification on JORs. R.M. has not identified any
fundamental right of a child to avoid this sanction. The imposition of community
notification is rationally related to the government’s legitimate interest in protecting
public safety, a principal purpose of juvenile dispositions. See R.C. 2152.01(A); see also
In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 46. The third
assignment of error is overruled. See In re Raheem L. at ¶ 9-10.
The Imposition of Community Notification
{¶25} In his second assignment of error, R.M. argues that the juvenile court
erred in imposing community notification when it had failed to consider the factors set
forth in R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) and when it did not “find” that he would not have been
subject to community notification under prior law. We disagree.
{¶26} R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) gives a trial court discretion to not impose
community notification “if [it] finds at a hearing after considering the [eleven] factors
described” in the subsection that the offender would not have been subject to
notification requirements under prior law as a sexual predator or habitual sex offender.
See McConville, 124 Ohio St.3d 556, 2010-Ohio-958, 925 N.E.2d 133, at ¶ 4; see also
State v. Downing, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-420, 2009-Ohio-6482, ¶ 5.
{¶27} R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) has primary application in adult sex offender cases
where, pursuant to subsection (F)(1), an adult Tier III sex offender is subject to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
community notification as a default sanction. For Tier III JORs like R.M., however,
community notification is not an automatic sanction. See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513,
2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 20. JORs assigned to Tier III are subject to the
community-notification requirements contained in R.C. 2950.10 and 2950.11 only if the
juvenile court imposes them. And the juvenile court has wide discretion to impose
those requirements or to refrain from doing so. See R.C. 2152.83(C)(2); see also In re
C.P. at ¶ 20; In re B.T., 5th Dist. Morrow No. 11-CA-3, 2011-Ohio-5299, ¶ 44. We will
not disturb the juvenile court’s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v.
Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶28} While R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) requires a juvenile court to consider the
factors in the statute, it does not require the juvenile court to make specific findings to
justify imposing community notification. See State v. Kerekgyarto, 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-12-1115, 2013-Ohio-2805, ¶ 12; see also In re B.T., 5th Dist. Morrow No. 11-CA-3,
2011-Ohio-5299, ¶ 44. A presumption of regularity attaches to all judicial proceedings,
including sexual-offender proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350,
2012-Ohio-5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 19. Here, R.M. did not request a hearing under
R.C. 2950.11(F)(2). The record does not demonstrate that the magistrate or the
juvenile court failed to consider R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) in reaching the decision to impose
community notification. The magistrate and the court carefully considered all relevant
evidence in light of the factors listed in R.C. 2152.83, which largely track the factors in
R.C. 2950.11(F)(2).
{¶29} In reviewing the record here, we hold that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing community notification. Its decision exhibited a
“sound reasoning process” and will not be disturbed on appeal. See State v. Morris,
132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990). The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶30} Therefore, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
H ENDON , P.J., H ILDEBRANDT and C UNNINGHAM , JJ.
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