[Cite as State v. Shaw, 2011-Ohio-4723.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24263
vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 10CR1161
LAMARK R. SHAW : (Criminal Appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
. . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 16th day of September, 2011.
. . . . . . . . .
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Kirsten A. Brandt, Asst.
Pros. Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0070162, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, Ohio
45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
Darrell L. Heckman, Atty. Reg. No. 0002389, One Monument Square,
Suite 200, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . .
VUKOVICH, J. (BY ASSIGNMENT):
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Lemark Shaw appeals from his
conviction in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court for first-degree
felony kidnapping and the attached firearm specification. Shaw
asserts three arguments for reversal. First, he contends that
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the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the
firearm specification, specifically that the firearm was operable.
Second, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it failed
to instruct the jury on second-degree felony kidnapping. The last
argument appellant asserts is that the trial court erred when it
allowed a typed copy of appellant’s written statement to be admitted
into evidence.
{¶ 2} For the reasons expressed below, we find no merit with
appellant’s arguments. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
is hereby affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶ 3} On May 11, 2010 appellant was indicted by the Montgomery
County Grand Jury for kidnapping, a violation of 2905.01(A)(1),
a first-degree felony and a firearm specification, a violation
of R.C. 2941.145.
{¶ 4} The case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the
evidence established that on April 1, 2010, a friend of appellant’s
was carjacked by a Devin Garrett, aka Nuke. Later that day, Olivia
Anderson, Nuke’s girlfriend, was kidnapped at gunpoint outside
of her residence. Her hands and feet were tied, she was gagged,
a sheet placed over her head and she was put in the trunk of the
kidnappers’ car. While in the trunk, the kidnappers talked to
her through the open console in the backseat and pointed the gun
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at her. They asked her where her boyfriend was and wanted his
cellular phone number.
{¶ 5} The victim indicated that the kidnappers took her to
a place that she believed was a house. They continued to ask about
Garrett and even started asking about her parents. They wanted
$50,000 to release her. She told them that she was pregnant with
Garrett’s baby and that her parents had disowned her. While it
was true that she was pregnant, her parents had not disowned her.
Still she refused to give them information on Garrett or her
parent’s, because she did not want Garrett or her parents to be
put in danger. Eventually the kidnappers became irate with
Anderson and they punched her in the stomach, the gun was put in
her mouth and cocked and she was told they were going to kill her.
{¶ 6} After a couple hours she was placed back into the car.
She was then taken to a secluded area called The Learning Tree,
where the kidnappers removed her from the car with the sheet still
on her head. They told her not to remove the sheet or they would
kill her, then they drove away.
{¶ 7} After they left, she removed the sheet and began looking
for help. She was able to get one of the people living in the
area to call the police. A deputy was sent to the area around
The Learning Tree, found Anderson and observed that she was
bleeding. She was then taken to a hospital where she refused
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medical treatment. Days after the kidnapping, she was shown a
photographic lineup and she identified appellant as the kidnapper
with the gun.
{¶ 8} During trial, it was established that appellant met with
Detective Lawson, from the City of Dayton Police Department and
provided a confession that he was one of Anderson’s abductors.
However at trial, he asserted that he lied to Detective Lawson
and that when he gave his statement to her, he was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol. He also offered witnesses to
confirm his alleged alibi.
{¶ 9} At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found him
guilty of the charge and the specification. The trial court
sentenced him to six years for the kidnapping conviction and three
years for the firearm specification. The sentences were ordered
to be served consecutively.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 10} “THE EVIDENCE OF OPERABILITY OF A FIREARM WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW.”
{¶ 11} The relevant inquiry for appellate review of a
sufficiency of the evidence argument is whether any rational fact
finder, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state,
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Dennis (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421,
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430, citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319. A guilty
verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless “reasonable minds
could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.”
Id. at 430.
{¶ 12} R.C. 2941.145 permits imposition of a mandatory three
year prison term where the indictment specifies, and the jury finds:
{¶ 13} “* * * that the offender had a firearm on or about the
offender's person or under the offender's control while committing
the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm,
indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to
facilitate the offenses.”
{¶ 14} R.C. 2923.11(B) defines “firearm” and provides:
{¶ 15} “(1) ‘Firearm’ means any deadly weapon capable of
expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of
an explosive or combustible propellant. ‘Firearm’ includes an
unloaded firearm, and any firearm that is inoperable but that can
readily be rendered operable.
{¶ 16} “(2) When determining whether a firearm is capable of
expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of
an explosive or combustible propellant, the trier of fact may rely
upon circumstantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the
representations and actions of the individual exercising control
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over the firearm.”
{¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that:
{¶ 18} “The state must present evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that a firearm was operable at the time of the offense before
a defendant can receive an enhanced penalty pursuant to R.C.
2929.71(A) [prior firearm specification statute]. However, such
proof can be established beyond a reasonable doubt by the testimony
of lay witnesses who were in a position to observe the instrument
and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” State v. Murphy
(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 206, syllabus.
{¶ 19} Consequently, the state is not required to admit into
evidence the firearm used during the commission of the crime in
order to establish the firearm specification; both the firearm's
existence and its operability may be inferred from the surrounding
facts and circumstances. State v. Vann, Montgomery App. No. 22818,
2009-Ohio-5308, ¶27, citing Murphy, supra. In Murphy, the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
possessed a firearm and that firearm was operable when the evidence
at trial established that the defendant entered a store with a
gun described as a one or two shot derringer, the defendant
announced he was robbing the store, he pointed a gun at the store
clerk and stated he would kill the clerk if the clerk did not give
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him money. Murphy, supra.
{¶ 20} Considering facts similar to Murphy, this court has
consistently found that there is sufficient evidence for the jury
to infer the operability of the firearm even when the firearm is
not admitted into evidence. State v. Branigan, Montgomery App.
No. 23593, 2010-Ohio-5745; State v. Leftwich, Montgomery App. No.
223383, 2009-Ohio-5044; State v. Melton, Montgomery App. No. 22591,
2009-Ohio-535. We have stated that “a victim's belief that the
weapon is a gun, together with the intent on the part of the accused
to create and exploit that belief for his own criminal purposes,
is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.” Vann, supra,
at ¶27, citing State v. Greathouse, Montgomery App. No. 21536,
2007-Ohio-2136. See, also, State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158,
1997-Ohio-304; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52.
{¶ 21} In the case at hand, Ronnie Gullatte, who witnessed the
abduction, testified at trial that the abductor had a gun. Tr.
138. Gullatte described the gun as a big gun, a rifle or AK-47
type rifle. Tr. 140-141. In appellant’s handwritten statement
he stated that a gun was used by Little Johnny Boy during the
kidnapping and that it was a camouflaged sawed off shotgun. Tr.
271, 376, 381. Anderson also testified that a gun was used in
her abduction. Tr. 163. She stated that while she was in trunk
of the car the gun was pointed at her through the open console.
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Tr. 166-167. She indicated that at one point during the
kidnapping the gun was put in her mouth, it was cocked several
times, and the kidnappers told her they were going to kill her
if they did not get what they asked for. Tr. 171-176. Considering
these facts and all of the above cited case law from this district
and the Ohio Supreme Court, there was sufficient evidence from
which the jury could infer that the firearm was operable.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 22} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON THE OFFENSE OF INFERIOR DEGREE OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY
KIDNAPPING.”
{¶ 23} R.C. 2905.01(A)(1) states that no person by force or
threat “shall remove another from the place where the other person
is found or restrain the liberty of the person” for purposes of
holding that person for ransom. A violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(1)
is a first-degree felony, except when the victim is released in
a safe place unharmed. R.C. 2905.01(C)(1). In that instance,
the violation of (A)(1) would be a second-degree felony. R.C.
2905.01(C)(1).
{¶ 24} Although the safe place unharmed provision mitigates
an offender's criminal culpability, it is not an element of
kidnapping, but rather must be treated the same as an affirmative
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defense. State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046,
¶233. See, also, State v. Carroll, Cuyahoga App. No. 93938,
2010-Ohio-6013, ¶13; State v. Bankston, Franklin App. No. 08AP-668,
2009-Ohio-754, ¶16. Thus, it is the defendant’s burden to prove.
{¶ 25} After the state closed its case, appellant made a
statement that he might want a jury instruction on second-degree
felony kidnapping. Tr. 295. The trial court indicated that such
an instruction would be allowed if the evidence warranted it, but
the court stated that it would wait until the end of the presentation
of evidence before deciding whether such instruction was warranted.
Tr. 296. After the defense rested its case-in-chief, the state
indicated that it did not believe, considering the evidence
produced at trial, that an instruction on second-degree felony
kidnapping was warranted. Tr. 388-398.
{¶ 26} In response to that argument defense counsel made the
following statement:
{¶ 27} “Just in response. I think that is correct. The
defense did not put forth any evidence tending to show that as
a – and the reason is the defense didn’t have any witnesses that
could testify as to what exactly happened to Ms. Anderson prior
to the kidnapping, during the kidnapping and after the kidnapping,
Your Honor. Thank you.” Tr. 389.
{¶ 28} The trial court, however, did not rule on whether a
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second-degree felony kidnapping instruction was warranted until
after the state’s rebuttal witness. At that point it stated:
{¶ 29} “Very well. The Court, during the break, had taken
another look at the affirmative defense and would note for the
record that the Court considered the fact that the evidence can
be considered from the State’s case without any evidence regarding
that by the – produced by the Defendant.
{¶ 30} “However, because the evidence is uncontroverted that
the victim was struck and – without going into what the injuries
might have been, either minor or otherwise, because the evidence
is uncontroverted that the victim was struck and, accordingly,
not released unharmed, the Court finds that there could be no
preponderance of the evidence argument made by the Defendant in
that regard. And we are not including it in the charge.” Tr.
395.
{¶ 31} Appellant never objected to this determination.
{¶ 32} As there was no objection, appellant waives all but plain
error. Plain error exists only where it is clear that, but for
the error, the result of the trial would have been different.
State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, ¶52.
{¶ 33} The Eighth Appellate District has found plain error in
the situation where an appellant did not request a jury instruction
on second-degree felony kidnapping but the evidence warranted such
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instruction. Carroll, supra. In coming to that conclusion, our
sister district indicated that while Carroll did not introduce
evidence that the victim was released in a safe place unharmed,
the state’s evidence could be used to establish such an affirmative
defense. Id. at ¶15. In Carroll, the witnesses that testified
at trial stated that Carroll threatened to hurt them, however,
none of the witnesses avowed that he actually inflicted any harm
upon them. Id. They indicated that once the events were over,
Carroll fled. Id. Carroll also testified that he had no intention
of hurting the victims. Id.
{¶ 34} Appellant insists that the case at hand is similar to
Carroll. We disagree. Anderson testified that she was pregnant,
she was punched in the stomach by her kidnappers and she miscarried.
Tr. 173, 179. It is true that she did not accept medical treatment
and there is no clear medical evidence produced at trial to confirm
that the punch caused the miscarriage. Tr. 179. Regardless of
the outcome of the punch, it cannot logically be concluded that
a person is left unharmed when that person is punched. Likewise,
it is also noted that she testified that she had red marks on her
wrists and feet. Tr. 178. The deputy who found her also stated
that he observed that she was bleeding from her right hand. Tr.
223. Thus, there is evidence of harm.
{¶ 35} Furthermore, we note, just as the trial court did, that
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all of that evidence is uncontroverted. Appellant offered no
evidence to show that Anderson was unharmed when she was released.
Accordingly, considering the evidence, the trial court’s
conclusion that there could be no preponderance of the evidence
argument made by appellant that the victim was released in a safe
place unharmed does not amount to plain error. This assignment
of error lacks merit.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 36} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING OVER OBJECTION
TESTIMONY OF A CLAIMED TYPED COPY OF A WRITTEN CONFESSION.”
{¶ 37} Appellant was interviewed by Detective Lawson and
proceeded to give her a written statement. Detective Lawson
testified about the written statement and read it into the record.
However, instead of reading from the original written statement,
she read from a transcribed copy. This was allegedly done because
appellant’s handwriting is hard to decipher. Appellant objected.
Tr. 275-276. The trial court overruled the objection based on
the interest of time that it would take to read the handwritten
statement. The trial court then stated that any issue with the
transcript could be remedied by submitting both the written
statement and that transcribed copy to the jury for them to
determine whether the transcription was an accurate copy. Tr.
276.
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{¶ 38} When the state moved to admit its exhibits it did not
mark or move for the admission of the transcribed copy of the
statement. Tr. 297. Following appellant’s case-in-chief, the
state noted that the transcribed copy was not admitted into
evidence. Tr. 387. The trial court gave appellant the option of
whether he wanted it admitted into evidence. Tr. 387-388.
Appellant objected to the admission, which was sustained by the
trial court. Tr. 388.
{¶ 39} Despite the wording of the assignment of error, appellant
does not clearly argue that Detective Lawson was not permitted
to read from the transcribed copy during her testimony. Rather,
his argument is that “the jury should have been given the actual
confession only, without the claimed transcript.” As is shown
above, this argument fails because the factual premise it is based
on is not accurate. The jury did not view the transcript; only
the written confession was admitted into evidence.
{¶ 40} Regardless, it cannot be concluded that the detective
reading a transcript of appellant’s written statement amounted
to reversible error. As the state indicates, this court has
previously approved the procedure of submitting to the jury a
transcript of an audio taped conversation to use as a listening
aid during trial, so long as the transcript is not admitted. State
v. Rogan (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 140, 153-155, citing State v. Waddy
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(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 445-446. The transcript was used in
the case at hand as an aid in deciphering a difficult to read
handwritten statement and, as such, is similar to the use of the
transcript in Rogan. Consequently, the Rogan holding is
applicable in this case.
{¶ 41} Furthermore, the detective’s rendition of the written
statement was substantially accurate. Appellant read his hand
written statement into the record during his testimony. Tr.
371-373. A comparison of his testimony to that of the detective’s
indicates that the detective’s version is an accurate reflection
of the typed statement. Tr. 277-278, 371-373. While there are
slight variations, such as slight alterations for readability,
those variations are at the most minor and do not change the
substance of the confession. Consequently, based on Rogan and
the accuracy of the transcript, use of the transcript did not amount
to reversible error. This assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
{¶ 42} All three assignments of error lack merit. Therefore,
the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
FAIN, J. And DONOVAN, J., concur.
(Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich, Seventh District Court of Appeals,
sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio.)
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Copies mailed to:
Kirsten A. Brandt, Esq.
Darrell L. Heckman, Esq.
Hon. Gregory F. Singer