[Cite as CACH, L.L.C. v. Rutter , 2010-Ohio-4876.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
CACH, LLC, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 09CA33
:
vs. : Released: October 4, 2010
:
BEVERLY RUTTER, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
Defendant-Appellee. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Lawrence J. Roach, The Law Office of Larry Roach, Copley, Ohio, for
Appellant.
Beverly Rutter, The Plains, Ohio, Appellee, pro se. 1
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, P.J.:
{¶1} Appellant, Cach, LLC, appeals from a decision of the Athens
County Municipal Court granting summary judgment in its favor, as against
Appellee, Beverly Rutter. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court
erred in only granting judgment for $1,380.64, which was based upon
Appellant’s submission of a partial ledger history, but was not in
conjunction with discovery responses. Because we find that the decision
1
Appellee has elected not to file a brief on appeal. Accordingly, by Magistrate’s Order dated February 2,
2010, we deemed this matter submitted without further participation of Appellee.
Athens App. No. 09CA33 2
and journal entry did not constitute a final, appealable order, we dismiss
Appellant’s appeal.
FACTS
{¶2} On January 20, 2009, Appellant, Cach, LLC filed a complaint
and first request for admissions against Appellee, Beverly Rutter. In the
complaint, Appellant alleged that it became the owner, by virtue of
assignment, of an account issued to Appellee from GE Electric Corp/GE
Money Bank. The complaint further alleged that the account in question
was canceled due to Appellee’s failure to abide by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, Appellant’s complaint sought damages in the amount of
$4,325.32 owing on the account plus pre-judgment interest at a rate of 5% in
the amount of $421.27; post-judgment interest thereafter at the statutory rate
of 5%; all court fees and costs associated with the matter; and all other relief
available in equity or law.
{¶3} Attached to the complaint were exhibits A through C, which
consisted of an affidavit attesting to the original issuance of the account to
Appellee and subsequent sale of the account to Appellant, multiple monthly
statements that were sent to Appellee, and a copy of a Wal-Mart Business
Revolving Credit Account Agreement. Appellee responded to Appellant’s
first request for admissions, denying each admission on the basis that the
Athens App. No. 09CA33 3
account number listed in the request for admissions differed from her
original account number.2 Appellant then issued a second request for
admissions. Appellee’s responses again denied the requests, claiming that
her card was a Wal-Mart card issued by Wal-Mart, not GE Money Bank.
{¶4} Appellant subsequently filed for summary judgment on the
account. It then filed a third request for admissions, to which Appellee
failed to respond. After considering Appellant’s motion, as well as an
account ledger history submitted by Appellant at the request of the court, the
court deemed Appellant’s third request for admissions to be admitted and
also granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant. Specifically, the trial
court’s August 18, 2009, “Journal Entry” provides as follows:
“DECISION: Summary Judgment is granted to Plaintiff against Defendant
in the amount of $1,380.64 plus interest at 5% per annum from this date.”
Appellant timely appealed this grant of summary judgment in its favor,
assigning a single assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ONLY GRANTING JUDGMENT
FOR $1,380.64 WHICH WAS BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S
SUBMISSION OF A PARTIAL LEDGER HISTORY BUT NOT IN
CONJUNCTION WITH DISCOVERY RESPONSES.”
2
Appellant alleged in the complaint that upon assignment of the account, the account number was changed
from 6032203161644124 to 14035180070109307.
Athens App. No. 09CA33 4
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
court erred in only granting summary judgment for $1,380.64, which was
based upon Appellant’s submission of a partial ledger history, but was not in
conjunction with discovery responses. As set forth above, Appellant’s initial
filing was a complaint on an account. In its complaint, Appellant requested
1) judgment against Appellee in the amount of the $4,325.32 owing on the
account, plus pre-judgment interest at a rate of 5% in the amount of $421.27;
2) post-judgment interest thereafter at the statutory rate of 5%; and 3) all
court fees and costs. The record indicates that after Appellant moved the
court for summary judgment, it filed a third request for admissions to which
Appellee failed to respond. In its entry granting summary judgment, the trial
court deemed admitted Appellant’s third request for admissions; however, it
only granted what appears to be partial summary judgment in the amount of
$1,380.64, which is based upon a partial ledger3 submitted by Appellant, at
the request of the court, rather than the amount demanded in the complaint
or in the admissions.
{¶6} Before we address the merits of this case, we must first address a
threshold jurisdictional problem. Ohio courts of appeals only have appellate
3
Although Appellant makes reference to the trial court’s request and consideration of partial ledger, it does
not appear that the document was included in the record before us on appeal.
Athens App. No. 09CA33 5
jurisdiction to review “final orders” of inferior courts within their district.
Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2505.03(A). A final
order is one that, inter alia, actually disposes of the case. See State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 108 Ohio St.3d 540, 2006-Ohio-
1713, 844 N.E.2d 1199, at ¶ 10. If a judgment is not final and appealable, we
have no jurisdiction to review the matter and the case must be dismissed.
Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems v. Mullins, 161 Ohio App.3d 12,
2005-Ohio-2303, 829 N.E.2d 326, at ¶ 17; Prod. Credit Assn. v. Hedges
(1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 207, 210, 621 N.E.2d 1360, fn. 2; Kouns v.
Pemberton (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 499, 501, 617 N.E.2d 701. Further,
“[a]lthough neither party raised the question of whether the trial court's order
was final, an appellate court is permitted to do so sua sponte. Chef Italiano
Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86.” Schneider, et al. v.
Sherman, et al., Shelby App. No. 17-91-11, 1991 WL 256501.
{¶7} In the case presently before us, we do not believe that the trial
court’s August 18, 2009, “Journal Entry” fully disposes of the case. Rather,
the document appears to simply be a partial grant of summary judgment in
the amount of $1,380.64, but does not dismiss the case or enter judgment for
the victorious party. See, Bapst, et al. v. Goodwin, et al., Pike App. No.
08CA780, 2009-Ohio-6244 (holding that the trial court’s “decision and
Athens App. No. 09CA33 6
journal entry” that granted “defendant’s motion for summary judgment[,]”
but did not make actual disposition of the case did not constitute a final
order.); See, also, Schneider, supra, (reasoning, based upon language similar
to the language in the entry sub judice, that the court’s journal entry was not
a final, appealable order, partly because “the order simply granted plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment. It did not render that judgment.”).
{¶8} As we reasoned in Bapst, supra: “Ordinarily, judgments set out
the rights of the parties to a lawsuit. See Minix v. Collier (Jul. 16, 1999),
Scioto App. No. 98CA2619. Any document that purports to constitute a
judgment should contain sufficient language to terminate the action. See
Vanest v. Pillsbury, Co. (1997) 124 Ohio App.3d 525, 534, 706 N.E.2d 825,
at fn. 4; McCall v. Ohio State Racing Comm. (Dec. 14, 1993), Franklin App.
No. 93APE09-1216. A decision, however, is not a judgment from which an
appeal will lie. Laws v. Board of Liquor Control (1958), 106 Ohio App. 233,
236, 153 N.E.2d 165.” Bapst at ¶9.
{¶9} The entry here does not dispose of the case and, as such, cannot
be considered a final order. The entry does not dismiss Appellant’s claim as
to the remaining principal amount demanded in the complaint, nor does it
address Appellant’s claims for pre-judgment interest. Further, and as in
Bapst, the entry does not assess court costs pursuant to Civ.R. 54(D), which
Athens App. No. 09CA33 7
further illustrates that it does not constitute a final order. In light of our
determination that the judgment appealed from is not a final appealable
order, we are without jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s assigned error.
Accordingly, Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Harsha, J., dissenting:
{¶10} Based upon the rationale of our prior opinion in Jones v.
McAlarney Pools, Spas & Billiards, Inc., Washington App. No. 07CA34,
2008-Ohio-1365, and its interpretation of Internatl. Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, LLC, 116 Ohio St.3d 335,
2007-Ohio-6439, I respectfully dissent.
{¶11} I do not view the requests in the prayer for relief as claims or
causes of action that must be explicitly addressed. Rather in keeping with
Jones, I view them as having been overruled sub silentio to the extent they
were not addressed. Furthermore, I do not view the court’s award of less
than the amount requested in the prayer for relief as indicating the court has
anything else to decide.
Athens App. No. 09CA33 8
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and that the Appellee
recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Athens County Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Kline, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Harsha, J.: Dissents with Dissenting Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.