[Cite as State v. Bales, 2013-Ohio-4957.]
COURT OF APPEALS
KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 13CA5
:
JASMINE S. BALES (AKA COSNER) :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Knox County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 12CR09-
0131
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND VACATED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 31, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
JOHN C. THATCHER JOHN A. DANKOVICH
KNOX CO. PROSECUTOR KNOX CO. PUBLIC DEFENDER
JOSEPH D. SAKS One Public Square
117 East High St., Suite 234 Mount Vernon, OH 43050
Mount Vernon, OH 43050
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Jasmine S. Bales (aka Cosner) appeals from the March 15,
2013 judgment entry of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas overruling her motion
to dismiss her indictment upon one count of corrupting another with drugs. Appellee is
the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} The facts of this case are not in dispute. Appellant is a heroin addict
presently in recovery. On August 18, 2012, while still in the throes of her addiction,
appellant gave birth to a son. The infant tested positive for narcotics and opiates and
suffered respiratory distress at birth, in addition to other complications, necessitating his
transfer to Nationwide Children’s Hospital. He still suffers consequences of appellant’s
prenatal heroin use, including asthma and a suppressed immune system, and is not
presently in his mother’s custody.
{¶3} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of corrupting another
with drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), a felony of the second degree, and one
count of child endangering pursuant to R.C. 2919.22(A), a felony of the third degree.
Appellee later dismissed Count Two of the indictment. Appellant entered a plea of not
guilty to Count One and the matter was scheduled for trial by jury.
{¶4} Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count One, corrupting another with
drugs, arguing an unborn child is not a legal person and a drug-addicted mother cannot
be prosecuted for a violation of R.C. 2919.22 with respect to her unborn child pursuant
to State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 584 N.E.2d 710 (1986). The trial court held an oral
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 3
hearing and overruled appellant’s Motion to Dismiss Count One by Judgment Entry on
January 30, 2013.
{¶5} Appellant entered a plea to one amended count of attempted corrupting
another with drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), a felony of
the third degree. The trial court requested a presentence investigation. On March 15,
2013, appellant was sentenced to a term of 3 years of community control, including 120
days in the Knox County Jail,1 successful completion of a community-based correctional
facility program, and a six-month suspension of her operator’s license. The trial court
suspended the mandatory $5,000 fine.
{¶6} Appellant now appeals from the March 15, 2013 sentencing entry of the
trial court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS PURSUANT
TO STATE V. GRAY.”
ANALYSIS
{¶8} Appellant argues the trial court erred in declining to dismiss the indictment
for one count of corrupting another with drugs. For the following reasons, we agree,
and therefore we reverse the decision of the trial court and vacate appellant’s conviction
upon Count One of the indictment. We note the State opposed appellant’s arguments
in its brief but at oral argument conceded appellant’s conviction upon one count of
attempted corrupting another with drugs must be reversed.
1
This jail term is concurrent with a jail term imposed in an unrelated case appellant was also sentenced
upon, State of Ohio v. Jasmine S. Bales, Knox County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 12CR06-0068.
Appellant entered pleas of no contest to two counts of possession of heroin in that case.
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 4
{¶9} A motion to dismiss in the criminal context tests the sufficiency of the
charging document without regard to the quantity or quality of the evidence which may
eventually be produced by appellee. State v. Patterson, 63 Ohio App.3d 91, 95, 577
N.E.2d 1165, 1167 (1989); State v. Davis, 5th Dist. Stark No.2004-CA-00202, 2005-
Ohio-494, ¶ 36. A pre-trial motion to dismiss cannot reach the merits or substance of the
allegations as there is no equivalent of the civil rules' summary judgment procedure in
the criminal arena. State v. Riley, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2001-04-095, 2001-Ohio-
8618, 2002 WL 4484, *2. Therefore, pre-trial motions to dismiss “can only raise matters
that are capable of determination without a trial on the general issue.” Id. at 4; see, also,
Patterson, supra, 63 Ohio App.3d at 95. We review a trial court's decision on a motion
to dismiss pursuant to a de novo standard of review. State v. Brown, 5th Dist. Stark
No.2007CA00129, 2008-Ohio-4087, ¶ 21, citing State v. Merritt, 5th Dist. Richland No.
06 CA 10, 2007-Ohio-480.
{¶10} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of corrupting another
with drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3) due to the acknowledged fact she gave
birth to a drug-dependent infant whose condition was a result of her illegal drug use
during pregnancy. She ultimately entered a plea of no contest to one count of
attempted corrupting another with drugs pursuant to R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C.
2925.02(A)(3). The latter states in pertinent part, “No person shall knowingly * * * [b]y
any means, administer or furnish to another or induce or cause another to use a
controlled substance, and thereby cause serious physical harm to the other person, or
cause the other person to become drug dependent.”
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 5
{¶11} The issue in this case originates with the definition of “another.” “Another”
is not defined in the statute, or elsewhere in Chapter 2925. We note another court
which has weighed the same issue looked to the definition of “person” contained in R.C.
2901.01. State v. Clemons, 4th Dist. Highland No. 12CA9, 2013-Ohio-3415, --N.E.2d--,
¶ 9. R.C. 2901.01 (B)(1)(a) defines “person” in pertinent part:
Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, as used in any
section contained in Title XXIX of the Revised Code that sets
forth a criminal offense, “person” includes all of the following:
* * * *.
(ii) An unborn human who is viable.
* * * *.
(c) As used in division (B)(1)(a) of this section:
(i) “Unborn human” means an individual organism of the
species Homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.
(ii) “Viable” means the stage of development of a human
fetus at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining
and nourishing of a life outside the womb with or without
temporary artificial life-sustaining support.
(2) Notwithstanding division (B)(1)(a) of this section, in no
case shall the portion of the definition of the term “person”
that is set forth in division (B)(1)(a)(ii) of this section be
applied or construed in any section contained in Title XXIX of
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 6
the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense in any of
the following manners:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2)(a) of this
section, in a manner so that the offense prohibits or is
construed as prohibiting any pregnant woman or her
physician from performing an abortion with the consent of
the pregnant woman, with the consent of the pregnant
woman implied by law in a medical emergency, or with the
approval of one otherwise authorized by law to consent to
medical treatment on behalf of the pregnant woman. An
abortion that violates the conditions described in the
immediately preceding sentence may be punished as a
violation of section 2903.01, 2903.02, 2903.03, 2903.04,
2903.05, 2903.06, 2903.08, 2903.11, 2903.12, 2903.13,
2903.14, 2903.21, or 2903.22 of the Revised Code, as
applicable. An abortion that does not violate the conditions
described in the second immediately preceding sentence,
but that does violate section 2919.12, division (B) of section
2919.13, or section 2919.151, 2919.17, or 2919.18 of the
Revised Code, may be punished as a violation of section
2919.12, division (B) of section 2919.13, or section
2919.151, 2919.17, or 2919.18 of the Revised Code, as
applicable. Consent is sufficient under this division if it is of
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 7
the type otherwise adequate to permit medical treatment to
the pregnant woman, even if it does not comply with section
2919.12 of the Revised Code.
(b) In a manner so that the offense is applied or is construed
as applying to a woman based on an act or omission of the
woman that occurs while she is or was pregnant and that
results in any of the following:
(i) Her delivery of a stillborn baby;
(ii) Her causing, in any other manner, the death in utero of a
viable, unborn human that she is carrying;
(iii) Her causing the death of her child who is born alive but
who dies from one or more injuries that are sustained while
the child is a viable, unborn human;
(iv) Her causing her child who is born alive to sustain one or
more injuries while the child is a viable, unborn human;
(v) Her causing, threatening to cause, or attempting to
cause, in any other manner, an injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its duration or
gravity, or a mental illness or condition, regardless of its
duration or gravity, to a viable, unborn human that she is
carrying.
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 8
{¶12} In light of the above, we must arrive at the same conclusion as the Fourth
District, to wit, appellant’s unborn child was a “person;” and we must further concur with
the Court’s holding:
[R.]C. 2901.01 contains exceptions or limits to the manner in
which the word “person” can be “applied or construed” in a
situation involving a pregnant woman and her viable, unborn
child. Specifically, R.C. 2901.01(B)(2)(b)(i)-(v) essentially
protects conduct by a woman during her pregnancy that
might or does result in the injury, illness, impairment or death
of her child, either before or after its birth. Thus, based upon
a plain reading of the statute, a woman cannot be criminally
prosecuted for her conduct during pregnancy that results in
harm to her child.” Clemons, supra, 2013-Ohio-3415 at ¶ 10.
{¶13} Appellant urges us to reverse the instant case on the basis of State v.
Gray, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held a parent may not be prosecuted for child
endangerment pursuant to R.C. 2919.22(A) due to substance abuse occurring before
the birth of the child. State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 516, 584 N.E.2d 710 (1992).
Gray has only limited applicability to the instant case and the Court’s urging of the
Legislature to create a statute addressing prenatal child neglect has not yet come to
pass. Until the Legislature addresses this issue, corrupting another with drugs is not the
appropriate criminal offense for a mother under these circumstances.
{¶14} We conclude appellant may not be convicted pursuant to R.C.
2925.02(A)(3) for actions taken during pregnancy which affected her unborn child.
Knox County, Case No.13CA5 9
CONCLUSION
{¶15} The decision of the trial court is reversed and appellant’s conviction is
vacated.
By: Delaney, J. and
Hoffman, P.J.
Farmer, J., concur.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER