[Cite as State v. Klein, 2013-Ohio-228.]
COURT OF APPEALS
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
-vs-
Case No. CT2012-0016
RICHARD H. KLEIN, JR.
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. CR2011-0207
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 25, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ROBERT L. SMITH DAVID J. GRAEFF
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Post Office Box 1948
27 North Fifth Street, Suite 201 Westerville, Ohio 43086-1948
Post Office Box 189
Zanesville, Ohio 43702-0189
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant Richard H. Klein, Jr. appeals from his convictions, in the Court
of Common Pleas, Muskingum County, for child endangering and involuntary
manslaughter. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On the evening of June 3, 2011, Appellant Richard Klein and his wife, co-
defendant Kasey Klein, commenced a tent camping trip at Ellis Dam, Lock 11. They
brought Kasey’s sons, A.C. (age three) and A.J. (age two), with them on the trip.
{¶3} The next morning, emergency management officials were alerted that the
boys were missing. Rescue personnel eventually found A.C.’s body in the Muskingum
River. The coroner subsequently determined that A.C.’s death was caused by
accidental drowning. A.J. has never been found.
{¶4} On September 7, 2011, appellant and Kasey were each indicted by the
Muskingum County Grand Jury on two counts of child endangering, felonies of the third
degree under R.C. 2919.22(A), and two counts of involuntary manslaughter under R.C.
2903.04(A), felonies of the first degree.
{¶5} Appellant thereafter appeared in court and entered pleas of not guilty.
The case proceeded to a jury trial commencing January 30, 2012.
{¶6} At the trial, the State presented evidence that appellant and Kasey set up
their tent in an authorized camping area about twenty-five feet from the river’s edge.
There were no restrictions against children or pets in the campground. A.C. and A.J.
were known to be rambunctious, and a latch lock had been put on outside of their
bedroom at home. According to Kasey’s trial testimony, the boys were permitted to
stay up until about 9:00 PM on the evening of June 3, 2012. Kasey tucked them in their
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 3
blankets or sleeping bags and came back to the tent about an hour later, while
appellant fished a while longer. See Tr. at 456-457.
{¶7} The next morning, appellant woke Kasey up and told her the boys were
missing. Law enforcement and rescue officials were called to the scene. Appellant told
investigators that he awoke briefly at about first light on June 4, 2012, at which time
A.J. was fussing. He claimed he rubbed A.J.’s back to calm him down, and then went
back to sleep, but when he woke up a little later, both boys were gone. Kasey told law
enforcement officers that she had taken a prescription Xanax pill on Friday afternoon,
which tended to make her tired. No other evidence of alcohol or other drugs was
produced. However, appellant purportedly had worked from 5:50 AM to 4:30 PM on
Friday.
{¶8} As part of the search effort, rescue teams brought in two specially-trained
tracking dogs, who followed the boys’ scent to a lockwall about five-hundred feet from
the tent site. Searchers ultimately found A.C.’s body floating in the river about one mile
south of the dam. He was wearing a sleeper and had both shoes on. A.J.’s body was
never found, although at least one of his shoes was discovered. Evidence was
adduced that A.C., age three, had cerebral palsy and tired easily after walking about
two-hundred feet, and that he also had balance issues. Also, A.C.’s early childhood
teacher, Lisa Shannon, testified that A.C. needed assistance putting on his shoes due
to his weaknesses on his right side and his difficulty with balance.
{¶9} The jury found appellant guilty as charged on all counts. Kasey was also
found guilty as charged on all counts
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 4
{¶10} On February 21, 2012, following a sentencing hearing, appellant was
sentenced to a total prison term of twelve years, plus restitution.
{¶11} On March 6, 2012, appellant filed a notice of appeal. He herein raises the
following five Assignments of Error:
{¶12} “I. WHEN THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CO-DEFENDANT REPRESENTS,
AND PRESENTS ‘EVIDENCE’ TO THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED
PURPOSEFUL MURDER, WHEN THERE IS NO SUCH BASIS, LEGAL OR
FACTUAL, TO SUPPORT SUCH, THE RESULT IS A DEPRIVATION OF DUE
PROCESS, CONTRA THE FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE
SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION.
{¶13} “II. WHERE THE VERDICT FORMS VIOLATE R.C. 2945.75, SAID
VERDICTS CONSTITUTE A FINDING OF THE LEAST DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE
AND THE SENTENCE NEEDS TO BE REDUCED.
{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO
SEVER, CONTRA THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION.
{¶15} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION TO THE CO-DEFENDANT’S FATHER.
{¶16} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED A REQUEST TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF RECKLESS
HOMICIDE.”
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 5
I., III.
{¶17} We will address appellant’s First and Third Assignments of Error together.
In his First Assignment of Error, appellant contends he was deprived of due process
and a fair trial based on the strategy and actions of his co-defendant’s trial counsel. In
his Third Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying the
motion to sever the trial as between appellant and his co-defendant. We agree.
{¶18} The essence of a defendant's right to due process in a criminal case is the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations.” See State v.
Swann, 119 Ohio St. 3d 552, 2008-Ohio-4837, ¶ 12, citing Chambers v. Mississippi
(1973), 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 312-313.
{¶19} Crim.R. 14 reads as follows: “If it appears that a defendant or the state is
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, or
complaint, or by such joinder for trial together of indictments, informations or
complaints, the court shall order an election or separate trial of counts, grant a
severance of defendants, or provide such other relief as justice requires. * * *”
{¶20} In analyzing issues of severance, the general rule is that the defendant
bears the burden under Crim.R. 14 to prove prejudice and that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying severance. See State v. Coley (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 253, 259,
2001-Ohio-1340, citing State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 421 N.E.2d 1288, syllabus.
In State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 400 N.E.2d 401, the Ohio Supreme
Court noted: “Joinder of defendants and the avoidance of multiple trials is favored in
the law for many reasons. Joinder conserves judicial and prosecutorial time, lessens
the not inconsiderable expenses of multiple trials, diminishes inconvenience to
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 6
witnesses, and minimizes the possibility of incongruous results in successive trials
before different juries.” Hence, “[j]oinder of defendants is the rule rather than the
exception and the burden is on the defendant to establish any resulting prejudice.”
State v. Fannin, Cuyahoga App. No. 80014, 2002-Ohio-4180 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. State v.
Jacocks, Stark App.No. 2002CA00359, 2003-Ohio-6839, ¶ 92; Zafiro v. United States
(1993), 506 U.S. 534, 538, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (internal quotations
omitted).
{¶21} Appellant emphasizes that he is not suggesting prosecutorial misconduct
in this case. See Appellant’s Brief at 13. However, appellant points out that during
Kasey’s defense testimony, she was asked about her review of some of the discovery
materials in the case:
{¶22} “Q: And at that time did you read a summary of [Appellant] Richard’s
statement to the detectives on June 4th?
{¶23} “A: Yes.
{¶24} “Q: Okay. Did anything in there concern you?
{¶25} “A: Yes.
{¶26} “Q: And - - what concerned you?
{¶27} “A: His statement about [A.J.’s] shoes.
{¶28} “Q: Okay. Did --- the jury has heard the tape yesterday, but can you tell us
what Richard said about [A.J.’s] shoes that bothered you?
{¶29} “A: He said that [A.J.] had his shoes on and he must have kicked one off.
But [A.J.] didn’t have his shoes on. He took them off before he went to bed.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 7
{¶30} “Q: Okay. Was there anything else in Richard’s statements to detectives
that concerned you?
{¶31} “A: He said that he didn’t know if [A.C.] had his shoes on or not. And then
when they told him that he was found with his shoes he said then he must have had
them on - - or that he didn’t know. But I took them off of him.
{¶32} “Q: Okay. Kasey, after you saw that did you make a decision with regard
to Richard?
{¶33} “A: Yes.”
{¶34} Tr. at 470-471.
{¶35} At that point, appellant’s trial counsel entered an objection, which was
overruled. The questioning of Kasey then continued as follows:
{¶36} “Q: When you got that discovery, Kasey, did --- did you make a decision
with respect to your husband?
{¶37} “A: Yes.
{¶38} “Q: And what was that, Kasey?
{¶39} “A: I stopped having contact with him. I quit writing.
{¶40} “Q: Okay. And you’ve not written him since?
{¶41} “A: No.”
{¶42} Tr. at 472.
{¶43} During the subsequent cross-examination of Kasey, the prosecutor asked
her about the boys’ shoes and the tent door at the time the boys were put to bed.
Kasey answered in the affirmative that she “believe[d] [she] took the shoes back off.”
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 8
Tr. at 497. She also stated that she had “zipped up” the tent door. Tr. at 498. The
following exchange also occurred:
{¶44} “[Prosecutor] Q: So you feel Richard lied about this issue about the shoes,
for what that’s worth?
{¶45} “A: Yes.”
{¶46} Tr. at 501.
{¶47} After all the witnesses had testified at trial, Kasey’s trial counsel requested
jury instructions, for Kasey’s defense, on the issue of an independent intervening act of
causation, arguing outside the presence of the jury that “even if [Kasey] were reckless,
which we do not concede, we think there’s [a] very good argument against that, but
[Appellant] Mr. Klein is the only other person in that tent who could have gotten the
boys out of that tent at 500 feet – almost 500 feet down the river.” Tr. at 531.
However, the trial court denied an instruction on “intervening act.” See Tr. at 540.
Kasey’s trial counsel also stated, again outside of the presence of the jury: “Now, if Mr.
Klein murdered these boys in the middle of the night when my client slept, and there’s
a clear inference for that, then that means she could not have reason to foresee that.
This is not *** a situation of mutually antagonistic defenses.” Tr. at 546.
{¶48} Kasey’s trial counsel’s closing arguments to the jury included the following
commentary:
{¶49} “Does anybody believe, ladies and gentlemen, that this three-year-old boy
in a dark tent at night would have been able to do this (indicating)? Open this up.
Well, look what happened here when you open that up. Look at that. This velcro strap
comes out. Does anybody really believe that this boy would have been able to take
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 9
that shoe (indicating) and put his foot with this sleeper on into that shoe like that,
himself in the dark in that tent, standing up to put it on his right foot? Does anybody
believe he could have done that without falling down? These shoes tell the story of this
case.
{¶50} “Now, Kasey was rather matter of fact about a very simple fact in this
case, ladies and gentlemen, when she was interviewed by Mike Ryan; when I put the
boys to bed I took their shoes off. No question about that, because that’s what
happened and that’s what anybody would do. What kid sleeps in his shoes. [A.C.]
certainly didn’t, because Lisa [Shannon] said he kicked them off. And Lisa spent a lot
of time with him every day, all day.
{¶51} “* * *
{¶52} “I believe that when asked about how the boys were dressed when they
went to bed, Mr. Klein said he had - - said they had on their sleepers, and then he
made a point of offering that [A.J.] had his shoes on earlier - - or he had his shoes on
but must have kicked one on - - or must have kicked one off in the middle of the night.
That’s interesting. Why would he offer that?
{¶53} “Well, you remember the testimony was that he was there when they were
doing the - - not the inventory, but the - - they were looking for an item to get a scent
from the boys and Mike said that they found one shoe in the tent. Obviously, it wasn’t
[A.C.’s] shoe or one of his shoes, because his shoes were found on his body in the
river. So the inference is that it would have been one of [A.J.’s] shoes. Now, that
wasn’t collected. It wasn’t inventoried, cataloged, itemized, or otherwise described, but
it was obviously a child’s shoe.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 10
{¶54} “Here’s what happened. Mr. Klein realized that and he realized that it had
to be explained. That’s why he offered that explanation on his own without prompting
in that interview. This is what we call in the law consciousness of guilt. Shakespere’s
[sic] old saying. He protested too much.”
{¶55} Tr. at 571-573.
{¶56} In its response brief, the State reiterates that both appellant and Kasey
were tried for involuntary manslaughter, not murder. The State also notes that the
prosecutor reminded the court and/or the jury at least twice during the trial that he did
not believe either defendant committed murder. See Tr. at 546, 615. In essence, the
State maintains that reasonable jurors would not have given credence to Kasey’s
theory of the case.
{¶57} Taken in its entirety, we presently find the joint trial of appellant and
Kasey, under the circumstances that developed as the case progressed, prejudiced
appellant’s defense with the insinuation that he murdered the two victims to such
extent that a new trial is warranted with the co-defendants severed. In reviewing this
matter, we recognize that the trial court was required to make its decision regarding
severance of defendants at the beginning of the trial. We note Kasey’s trial counsel, at
the pre-trial motion hearing, somewhat vaguely told the trial court that it “may or may
not be the case” that “both defendants are in the same boat.” Tr. January 17, 2012, at
9. However, Kasey’s trial counsel assured the court at that time that he saw “no
reason to separate” the trials. Id. at 10. It was in this context that the trial judge chose
to conduct a joint trial.
{¶58} Appellant's First and Third Assignments of Error are therefore sustained.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 11
II., IV., V.
{¶59} Based upon our above conclusions, we find the issues raised in the
Second, Fourth, and Fifth Assignments of Error are moot.
{¶60} For the reasons stated in the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Common Pleas, Muskingum County, Ohio, is hereby reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
By: Wise, J.
Farmer, P. J., and
Edwards, J., concur.
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JUDGES
JWW/d 1221
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0016 12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
RICHARD H. KLEIN, JR. :
:
Defendant-Appellant : Case No. CT2012-0016
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio, is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs assessed to appellee.
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JUDGES